Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality

FRANZ ALEXANDER, M.D.

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The Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality

The Application of Freud's Theory of the Ego to the Neuroses

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FOREWORD TO THE AMERICAN EDITION

BY

A. A. Brill, M.D.

Those who grew up with the psychoanalytic movement, can clearly distinguish the various epochs of its gradual evolution and the logical concatenations of its structure. For psychoanalysis did not start with preconceived theories or systems; on the contrary it may be said that it came into being as an accidental by-product in the laborious quest for understanding of the psychoneurotic afflictions. In the early nineties Professor Freud, like many others, was fully aware that the existing methods for the treatment of psychoneurotic disturbances were illogical and ineffectual. His work with Professor Charcot in Paris convinced him of the importance of psychic factors in the causation and treatment of mental disorders and prepared him, so to say, for his work with Dr. Breuer who used hypnotism in conjunction with investigation. This colloboration resulted in the new and fundamental concepts of hysteria and other psychoneuroses and brought into mental medicine the mechanism of *psychic traumata, repression, abreaction,* and *mental catharsis,* all of which were hailed by the medical profession as novel and valuable.

The next epoch witnessed a sort of cataclysm which gave birth to psychoanalysis proper. Professor Freud working alone soon abandoned hypnotism in favor of "free associations" and through these subterranean paths of the mind he discovered the important rôle of sex in normal and abnormal life. This period may just as well be designated as that of "outer resistance," for with the dictum, "In a normal vita sexualis no neurosis is possible," there arose an avalanche of hostile reactions towards psychoanalysis and its followers, the convulsive after-effects of which are still felt on occasion. It mattered little that Professor Freud's concept differed basically and

materially from the generally accepted sense of sex. His opponents were quite willing to accept his other discoveries but the weak spot of civilized humanity, sex, struck them so forcibly that they were totally blinded by it. It is difficult to say whether one should be pleased with the gradual diminution of this sex resistance. Struggle seems to belong to the scheme of natural evolution. For notwithstanding all opposition psychoanalysis has continued to progress by leaps and bounds and the few who have offered the world *immaculately conceived* substitutes have not gone very far with them. The average person soon realizes that the sex demon is not as bad as he is painted and that with a bit of knowledge about his nature this powerful force can readily be controlled and utilized in the highest accomplishments of life. But this *Sturm und Drang* period laid the foundation for an entirely new orientation in normal and abnormal psychology. New light was thrown not only on the neuroses and psychoses but also on normal psychology, mythology, folk-lore, anthropology and sociology. It is no exaggeration to state that psychoanalysis has rewritten all the mental sciences. Professor Freud and his followers have continued assiduously to gather facts and from time to time we received new formulations, or new theories if you wish, which modified some of our views and practices. Yet it is to be noted that nothing formulated by Professor Freud from the very beginning had to be rejected, it was simply a question of building higher up on the existing foundation.

During the first two epochs psychoanalysis occupied itself almost exclusively with the manifestations of repression. It was thought that the transference neuroses were the only maladies accessible to analytic treatment and hence most of the studies were directed to *object libido* and only little attention was paid to the *narcissistic neuroses* or psychoses. However, further study showed that the gap between these two classes of neuroses was not nearly as wide as was first imagined. The fact that schizophrenics usually show hysterical manifestations or compulsive phenomena long before the psychosis appears makes

the relationship between transference and narcissistic neuroses quite obvious. Moreover not infrequently one sees a manic-depressive patient whose depression is altogether centered in an obsessive symptom. These, and many similar observations, showed the need of formulating next to object libido, a narcissistic or *ego libido,* that is, a libido which is directed to one's own ego (introversion). In his very profound study of narcissism (Zur Einführung des Narzissmus) which Professor Freud published in 1914, he clearly demonstrated from the libidinous development of the early phases of childhood that the ego is the true and original reservoir of the libido, from which alone the libido is extended to the object. This concept of ego libido opened new paths of study and observation especially after it was further amplified by Professor Freud in his " Jenseits des Lustprinzips " (1920) and in his " Das Ich und das Es "(1922).* It is in the " Ego and the Id ", however, that one finds a fascinating and profound study of the ego in its relation to the id and super-ego. Briefly stated the psychic apparatus at birth is composed of an id which is characterized by blind impulsive wishing instigated through the impulses of hunger and love. A part of the id, its upper crust, which undergoes some modification by virtue of its contact with the outer world through the senses and becomes imbued with consciousness, this part of the id, is designated as the ego. In time the ego too assumes some changes and a part of it reaches to a higher instance and is designated as the super-ego or ego ideal. These components of the psychic apparatus are forever contending with one another. The ego forever attempts to control the instinctive id, while the super-ego, consisting of the ideals implanted in the individual by the father or parents in the form of ethics and religion, acts as a sentinel over the behavior of the ego. Thus Professor Freud silences the oft repeated criticism that psychoanalysis takes no cognizance of the higher, moral and spiritual side of human nature. By tracing the origin of the super-ego to the influence

* Translated into English under the respective titles of Beyond the Pleasure Principle and the Ego and the Id, Internat. Psychoanalytic Press, London.

of the parents, the super-ego becomes the representative of the most important events in the development of both the individual and the race. To be sure psychoanalysis has really never ignored the higher side of man; the theory of conflict and repression in the origin of symptoms demonstrates this most glaringly. In elaborating upon the relations of the id, ego and super-ego to the neuroses and the psychoses, Professor Freud came to the very significant conclusion that *the neurosis represents a conflict between the ego and the id (the instinctive needs); the psychosis between the ego and the outer world; and the narcissistic neurosis a struggle between the ego and super-ego.*

The differentiation of the mental apparatus into an id, ego and super-ego thus resulted in a clearer understanding of the dynamic relations within the mind. For in the same work Professor Freud saw fit to revise his views of the instincts. Hitherto when one spoke of the instincts one always thought of hunger and love but, hand in hand with the elaborations of the ego theories, Professor Freud distinguished two classes of instincts, one of which is the erotic or sexual instinct and the other the death instinct, the representation of which is sadism. The former or life instinct comprises not only the uninhibited sexual instinct and the impulses of a sublimated or aim-inhibited nature derived from it, but also the self-preservation instincts, which also belong to the ego. The latter or the death instinct has for its task the reduction of organic matter to the inorganic state.

To continue further with these fascinating theories and problems of the various ego organizations and the life and death instincts as manifested in the neuroses and psychoses would lead us into fields that belong to the author. Numerous papers have been written in the effort to further elucidate some of the problems stimulated by Professor Freud, but none in my opinion has accomplished the task as well as Dr. Alexander in the present volume. The very title of the book shows the author's ambitious undertaking. Like many of us, Dr. Alexander must have been fired with enthusiasm on reading the "Ego and the

Id" but unlike most of us he felt bold enough to apply these theories to a mass of interesting material. And yet Dr. Alexander makes very modest claims; in the introduction to this volume he tells us that his contribution to Professor Freud's problem of the neuroses consists in only one point, namely, in the general significance of the neurotic mechanism of self-punishment—the neurotic suffering—for the formation of the symptom. The reader will find that this was a task of great magnitude, excellently performed.

"The Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality" offers a clear presentation of the development of the ego, its rôle in the neuroses and psychoses, and of the basic instincts of the neuroses and perversions. The author has the capacity of presenting difficult and intricate problems in a very lucid and simple way so that the book will be read with benefit and interest not only by psychoanalysts but also by jurists and intelligent laymen.

A friendly relation with the author and a thorough understanding of the spirit of his work enabled Drs. Glueck and Lewin to make an excellent English edition of this volume.

TRANSLATORS' PREFACE

As the author's introduction to this book indicates, its material was contained in a series of lectures delivered by him at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute. It is the first comprehensive exposition of the psychoanalytic contribution to the psychology of the ego, or of those agencies within the personality which deal with the control of instinct. The outstanding merit of the book lies in Alexander's demonstration of the practical clinical utility of these newer psychoanalytic concepts. Insofar as it deals with the defensive resources of the personality and with the introjected social demands made on the instinctual urges, it represents another point of contact between psychoanalysis and clinical psychiatry. We need not add anything to Alexander's justification for the unique method of presentation. We must, however, call attention briefly to certain terminological difficulties.

In the main in this translation we have followed the recommendations of the English group, but here and there we found it more advisable to conform to usages current in America. Thus, "cathexis", the recommended translation for the German *Besetzung,* was not employed consistently, the words "investment" or "charge" being used instead. *Zwangsneurose* was usually translated "compulsion neurosis" instead of "obsessional neurosis", in accordance with American usage.

Perhaps the neologisms introduced by the English group deserve some consideration. The "id", (*das Es*) is used to designate the "non-ego" part of the personality. The Germans find no difficulty in understanding the way *Es* is used in this connection; the impersonal *es* is used to express psychic states in a way unknown to other languages. For example, the Germans readily understand the *es* in "*Es träumt mir*" (I dream). The term *id,* therefore, chosen by analogy with *ego,* is distinctly not the "that thing" *id* of "*is, ea, id*", but rather the "*id* understood" of such verbs as *oportet.* We have adopted the English suggestion and translated *ichfremd* and *ichgerecht,* as "ego

dystonic" and "ego syntonic" respectively. They mean "out of harmony with" and "in harmony with" the ego. The use of these two neologisms obviates the necessity of such clumsy periphrastic phrases as "unacceptable, alien, unbearable to the ego" (dystonic), or "in keeping with, acceptable to, satisfactory to the ego" (syntonic).

The German word *Instanz,* borrowed from the technical terminology of civil government, offers some difficulty. In Germany an *Instanz* is an organization or institution vested with authority and exercising certain administrative functions. The police force is an *Instanz;* so are the courts of justice. We have translated the word as "agency" or with some liberty "faculty". In using "instinct" as a translation for "*Trieb*" we follow previous translators, but it must be understood that *Trieb* is much broader than "instinct", and connotes "drive", "impulse", "instinctive urge". The French avoid "instinct" by using a neologism "*pulsion*". We have adopted the British translators' word "defusion" as a translation of *Entmischung;* the idea represented by this term is the decomposition or separating out of elements or simpler forms from a compound, as when two metals are separated from an alloy.

The significance of these terms and of others not mentioned here is made clear in the book itself.

B. G.
B. D. L.

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AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION

Drum willst du dich vor Leid bewahren,
So flehe zu den Unsichtbaren,
Dass sie zum Glück den Schmerz verleihn.

This book is based upon two series of lectures held during 1924 and 1925 at the Psychoanalytic Institute in Berlin. Since then these lectures have been subjected to numerous corrections and additions, without being modified in their essentials.[1] The most important addition is a more thoroughgoing consideration of the problem of anxiety, which the publication of Freud's work, *Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety*[2] (published since these lectures were held), has made possible. On the basis of this work, we could attempt a more thorough account of the relation between anxiety and defense against instinctive urges. But even in respect to this we did not have to revise our views to any extent, because the conception of anxiety which Freud formulates definitely in this latest book was already to be found in his recent metapsychological contributions (especially in *The Ego and the Id*), even though it was not stated in a systematic way. Under the influence of the paper just referred to, I was already able in my article *Metapsychologische Darstellung des Heilungsvorganges* to give an account of the meaning and significance of true anxiety in neurotic introversion and regression.

The first part of this book represents an attempt to apply Freud's theory of the ego to the individual neuroses, indeed to extend this application to account for isolated clinical facts. For this, it was necessary for us to establish systematically the connection between what we know concerning the dynamics and economics of psychic processes with the structural conception of the ego; and in this way to attain a complete picture of the per-

[1] Translation of Psychoanalyse der Gesamtpersönlichkeit. Neun Vorlesungen über die Anwendung von Freuds Ichtheorie auf die Neurosenlehre. Internat. Psa. Bibliothek No. 22. Internat. Psa. Verlag, 1927.

[2] Int. Zschr. f. Psa., 1925, XI. In English: Stamford Psychoanalytic Institute.

sonality. This undertaking, however, represents little else than a consistent systematization of Freud's metapsychological views. Only on one score do I believe myself to have contributed essentially to the problems involved in the neuroses. I refer to my ideas on the general significance of the neurotic self-punishing mechanism, of neurotic suffering, in the formation of symptoms. These ideas are deducible from one of Freud's earliest and most far-reaching perceptions in the psychology of the neuroses; namely, that just as in the conversion symptoms in hysteria there is simultaneously a wish fulfillment and a self-punishment, so in all other types of neurosis these two antagonistic tendencies somehow come to expression. Especially interesting and clear is the manifestation of these two tendencies in manic-depressive conditions; here each of the two tendencies appears in pure culture, first one and then the other. The manic period is completely under the sway of uninhibited "living out". In the depressive period the self-punishment, the turning of hostile strivings against the individual's own self, dominates the picture entirely. But it was only after I had Freud's idea of the causal psychologic relation between these two periods to work with, the idea that the one phase is the psychologic reaction to the other, the uninhibited living out a reaction to the excessive inhibition or *vice versa,* that I had a basis from which to explore more thoroughly the intimate relation of the repressed and the repressing forces. It soon became clear to me that the manic-depressive mechanism was only an individual case of a general principle operating in the neurotic psyche. The first empirical confirmation of this view I found in neurotic characters. In these individuals I was able to perceive very clearly the relation between impulsive self-destructive activity and neurotic living out.[3] However, it was in certain dream-pairs, where as in manic-depressive states, one member was devoted entirely to the fulfillment of wishes and the other just as entirely to self-punishment, that I had the first opportunity for a more accurate investigation of this connection.[4]

[3] Alexander, *Kastrationskomplex und Charakter.* Int. Ztsch. f. PsA., VIII (1922).

[4] *Ibid, Ueber Traumpaare und Traumreihen.* Int. Zsch. f. PsA., XI (1925).

Here it became clear to me (and I could see the full significance of the fact) that it was the fact that there had been a punishment dream which permitted the subsequent appearance of dreams containing unusually apparent wish-fulfillments; for the first dream had satisfied the inhibiting demands of conscience. After these punitive demands had been satisfied, there were no longer any inhibiting forces to obstruct the fulfillment of wishes. In this way I learned to recognize a fundamental characteristic of the neurotic conscience which I designated as its "corruptibility", for if it is permitted to live out its punishing tendencies it will cease exercising its inhibitory function. The rôle of the ego in this corruption maneuver was clear to me only some time after this. For my knowledge on this point I also am indebted to Freud. In a letter he warned me against expressing myself too precipitately in regard to the rôle of the super-ego in the neuroses. I soon learned good grounds for this caution. Clinical experience taught me that the ego makes use of the satisfaction of the need for punishment in order to free itself from the super-ego and surrender itself to the repressed forces. The neurotic ego accepts the punishment meted by the super-ego, that is, suffering, and in this way loses its fear of the super-ego. But just because this fear (or anxiety) was the reason for repressing (the ego represses because it is afraid of the super-ego), the acceptance of punishment promotes and furthers the satisfaction of forbidden wishes. Thus I gradually came to see the fundamental mechanism of symptom formation: the self-punishing mechanisms lead to a disappearance or a mitigation of conscience anxiety, and then only may wishes, repressed because of conscience, be gratified in the form of symptoms. The previous psychoanalytic conception, that a disguise of the meaning, by itself alone, could explain the formation of symptoms, needed modification. The fact that there is an unconscious need for punishment showed us that "bad conscience" may appear even when the meaning of the forbidden wish-fulfillment is concealed. We had, therefore, to ascribe to the super-ego an intimate relation with the unconscious, an internal perceptive function, which understands the latent meaning

of the symptom in spite of concealment and disguise. I then was able to state that neurotic satisfaction of repressed wishes becomes possible only if the super-ego is bribed with suffering, upon which, the motive for repression, the ego's fear of the super-ego (anxiety), disappears. A description of this fundamental mechanism in neurosis formation, and a consistent application to data and explanation of its rôle, makes up the main content of the first series of lectures.

Starting from observations of a different sort, yet obviously also influenced by the idea of an unconscious need for punishment, Reik[5] arrived at conclusions in many points not dissimilar to mine. Reik believes that in all expressions of the unconscious there is always to be found, besides wish fulfillment, a sort of confession—in other words a satisfying of conscience needs—and he assumes that the satisfaction of the demands of the super-ego aids and abets the fulfillment of the wishes. Since he recognizes the satisfaction of the demands of conscience as a general precondition for neurotic satisfaction, his conception is in principle equivalent to mine. I believe, however, that his somewhat forced conception of confession as the most general form of satisfaction of the demands of conscience becomes unnecessary if in place of confession we substitute *suffering,* which is really always present.

This generalization of the principle found at work in the manic-depressive mechanism and its application to all other neuroses does not imply a revolution in our conception of the individual disease pictures. The fact that there is simultaneously a satisfaction of repressed wishes and of the need for punishment in the conversion symptoms of hysteria was, as we have stated, one of Freud's earliest findings. Our advance consists merely in recognizing the dynamic and psychological relation which obtains between these two antagonistic tendencies. The full importance of this connection is apparent only when it is applied to the compulsion neurosis. For it is the appreciation of this relation which enables us to find our way in the complicated labyrinth of obses-

[5] Reik, *Geständniszwang und Strafbedürfnis.* Int. Psa. Bibliothek, XVIII, 1925.

sive symptoms and character traits. In this case also this is not something entirely new. A fact recognized by Freud quite early in the history of psychoanalysis, that the tendencies against which defensive measures must be used always penetrate into these defensive measures, rests on the same principle.[6]

But the applicability of this conception of the neuroses proves itself most beautifully in the explanation of the difference between the phobic and the obsessional mechanisms—a problem, the solution of which Freud in his latest work leaves partly open.

So, the functional relation between neurotic suffering and neurotic satisfaction, which mutually condition each other, was seen to be a characteristic and fundamental phenomenon throughout the entire field of neurotic processes. It leads us to a simple dynamic formula of the neurosis, which promises to be of general validity, independent of the individual disease pictures.

I cannot share the *a priori* distrust of many scientists for simple formulations. I am prejudiced in a different way: against complicated and obscure attempts at explanation. I am convinced that in nature relations are extremely simple. In the protestations of investigators that " the state of affairs is extraordinarily complicated and obscure ", I can see nothing else than a veiled confession of their own lack of understanding. What one has understood is *eo ipso* simple. To be sure the simplicity of a formulation is not a guarantee of its correctness. Besides being simple it must be true. The principle that the neurotic psyche knows no satisfaction without suffering, seems to me one of those fundamental facts which is confirmed in every hour of psychoanalytic practice. In the fifth lecture I attempt to make clear the origin of this close relation between neurotic suffering and satisfaction.

More speculative are the elements contained in the second part of this book. After describing, in the first part, the dynamic and economic basis of the neuroses (and especially their formal construction), I attempt in the second part a consideration of the quality of the forces involved in the dynamic formula. In other

[6] Freud, *Ueber einen Fall von Zwangsneurose.* Ges. Schr., VIII. In English in Vol. 3 of Hogarth Press edition.

words, I attempt to correlate the metapsychological discussion with Freud's theory of the instincts. This attempt is equivalent to a further elaboration of the fourth chapter of *The Ego and the Id*[7] (*The Two Classes of Instincts*). Another source for this elaboration is to be found in Freud's classic, *The Economic Problem in Masochism.*[8] The fruit of this investigation is a general theory of "disease", which accounts for the instinctual basis both of "organic" and psychic illness. The need for such a general theory of disease has been growing from day to day, ever since it has become more and more apparent, because of the courageous pioneering work of Groddeck,[9] and later, the contributions of Simmel, F. Deutsch, and others, that organic disease may also arise on a psychogenic basis. The "erotization" of the biological processes in the diseased organ, an early finding of Ferenczi's, is recognized as a part manifestation of the total disease process. The erotization is not the true disease process, but rather the attempt on the part of the organism at healing, the reaction of Eros to the primary destructive tendencies of the death instinct. Quite similarly, Ferenczi and Hollós[10] regard the megalomanic manifestations in general paresis as a "recompense" for the destructive processes. Indeed already in his paper on the "pathoneuroses", Ferenczi[11] considered the erotization of biological processes an attempt at healing, a reaction to the destructive processes. At that time, however, he was only in a position to speak of exogenous injuries and not of the endogenous injury, that is to say, the self-destructive workings of the death instinct. The gist of this whole process is to be found in Freud's formulation, that "even self-destruction cannot take place without libidinal satisfaction".[12]

[7] Freud, The Ego and the Id. In English in the International Psychoanalytical Library, London.

[8] Freud. Ges. Schr., V.

[9] Groddeck, The Book of the It. No. 49 of this series.

[10] Ferenczi und Hollós, *Zur Psa. der paralytischen Geistesstörungen.* Beihefte V. In English in this series, No. 42.

[11] Ferenczi, *Hysterie und Pathoneurosen.* Int. Psa. Bibliothek, Nr. 2 (1919).

[12] Freud, *Das ökonomische Problem des Masochismus.* Ges. Schr., V.

To my mind the most important point made in this discussion is this: that just as in organic conditions, so in psychic illness, the true essential disease process—which also ushers in every illness—is a turning back upon the self of the outwardly directed death instinct. The conspicuous phenomena of symptom formation already are a part of the healing attempt, and are manifestations of Eros. Only too characteristically, in this point as in the whole psychoanalytic field, the conspicuous manifestations of Eros were recognized before the silent operation of the death instinct.

This book sprang from my desire to offer evidence for my conviction that Freud's theory of the ego is deeply rooted in clinical experience. Freud in his more recent concentrated contributions has revealed only fragmentarily the laborious empirical road which led him from the observation of the individual facts to the formulation of the theories. To reconstruct this path, unifying theory and experience, was the object of these lectures.

When I held the first series of these lectures similar efforts were not as yet to be found in psychoanalytic literature. Since then a large number of important studies have been published. Besides the paper of Reik, referred to on a previous page, Aichhorn[13] has applied the theory of the ego to problems of child guidance, and Schilder[14] in part pursuing his own course, in part with a mere difference in terminology, has attempted an outline of psychiatry based on Freud's structural theory. The theory of the ego is being applied more and more to explain individual problems in the theory of the neuroses (Fenichel,[15] Nunberg,[16] Müller-Braunschweig[17]). Reich[18] attempts to explain impulsive character types from this angle. Using the conceptions contained

[13] Aichhorn, *Verwahrloste Jugend.* Int. PsA. Bibliothek, XIX (1925).

[14] Schilder, *Entwurf zu einer Psychiatrie auf psychoanalytischer Grundlage.* Int. PsA. Bibliothek, XVII (1925). In English in this series, No. 50.

[15] Fenichel, *Identifizierung.* Int. Zsch. PsA., XII (1926), Heft 3.

[16] Nunberg, *Schuldgefühl und Strafbedürfnis.* Int. Zsch. f. PsA., XII (1926). Heft 3.

[17] Müller-Braunschweig, *Genese des weiblichen Ueber-Ichs.* Int. Zsch. f. PsA., XII (1926), Heft 3.

[18] Reich, *Der triebhafte Charakter.* Neue Arb. z. ärtzl. PsA., V (1925).

in the theory of the ego, Radó[19] and Jones[20] have been able to give a more accurate acount of the hypnotic state. To the latter author we also are indebted for a careful synthesis of what is known empirically concerning the origin and characteristics of the super-ego.[21]

With the discovery of the ego, there was ushered in a new era in psychoanalysis. Whereas the first era was dominated by an art of interpretation which taught us to understand the manifestations of the instincts, we now are beginning to understand these manifestations in relation to the total personality. First the human psyche was dissected into its components; now, seeing the plan of its construction, we are beginning to reconstruct it.

[19] Radó, *Das ökonomische Prinzip der Technik.* Int. Zsch. f. PsA., XII (1926), Heft 1.
[20] Jones, *The Nature of Auto-Suggestion.* Int. Jour. of PsA., IV (1923).
[21] Jones, *Ursprung des Ueber-Ichs.* Int. Zsch. f. PsA., XII (1926).

PART I

THE DYNAMIC AND ECONOMIC BASES OF THE NEUROSES

LECTURE ONE

The Direction of Psychoanalytic Development. The Discovery of the Ego.

In this series of lectures it will be my endeavor to present a resumé of the way in which we may think, at the present time and in the light of psychoanalytic theory, of the structure of the psychic personality and particularly of its disorders. There is a clearly recognizable trend which marks the main line of development in our science: more and more we are coming to regard neurotic illness as a manifestation of the whole human being. Although this ambition has been present in psychoanalysis since its inception, the most recent theoretical contributions of Freud have put us in a position to comprehend the relations obtaining between the manifestations of psychic disease as well as normal psychic manifestations within the personality as a whole. I have, therefore, no completely new point of view to offer; I merely wish to direct attention to certain consequences which the theory of the ego has both for our theoretical and therapeutic attitude in regard to the neuroses. I am under the impression that these recent contributions of Freud have not been sufficiently taken into account in our formulations concerning the different neuroses, and to an even less extent in therapy. On the contrary, these publications have led to an entirely unjustifiable theoretic schism in psychoanalysis, though, to be sure, not an acknowledged one. These recent contributions, which Freud designates as metapsychological, are being set apart with some show of feeling from the well established old psychoanalytic empirical formulations, as being theoretical, indeed, speculative, and for the time being inapplicable to daily practice. I do not doubt that their theoretical

importance is correctly estimated. But the effect upon clinical practice of these contributions, which are so basic and so important for the future development of our science, is by no means widespread to-day, much as if they constituted merely an interesting theoretical superstructure above empirical experience.

You may take these observations with a grain of salt, as they are meant to be taken. I should have nothing against this attitude if the schism between theory and practice was in reality so great. I hold with the majority, that we are in the first place therapists, and that our first concern is with the therapy of the neuroses. I have set for myself the task of attempting to show, not only in a general way, but on the basis of specific illustrations, how much we can really gain for therapeutic purposes from these contributions of Freud, so erroneously called " speculative ".

We are familiar with a similar schism in another scientific field, in physics; namely, the schism between the experimental and theoretical physicists. This schism too is not an official one, but an intimate secret behind the scenes in the scientific world, and shows itself in the fact that the experimenter looks upon the theorist with somewhat suspicious eyes, does not consider him sufficiently accurate, and suspects him of being in secret alliance with the occult philosopher. The good theorist certainly does not deserve this suspicion. Without him, indeed, even without his frequently premature theories, the developmental tempo of science would be materially retarded. In our own science we find ourselves in an extraordinarily favorable position. The discoverer of the very first, indisputable, empirical findings is at the same time our keenest theoretical thinker. We possess a living example of the compatibility of theory and practice.

However, at no time did psychoanalytic theoretical considerations lead to a rigid systematization. We do not know whether it was the sure intuition of an empirical investigator, or sane and deliberate intention, which kept Freud from inhibiting the development of this young empirical science through premature systematization. Every system is rigid and can stand as an obstructive wall between the facts and the observer.

To this scientific attitude of Freud, psychoanalysis is indebted for its rich treasure of experience, which is constantly growing, as well as for its ever plastic concepts and formulations, which never lose living contact with reality. And yet the longing for a systematic resumé grows from day to day. That which only recently was still an advantage, may gradually become an obstacle. The lack of orientation, the want of a general survey, render difficult the work of the therapist, and the investigator loses his vision for new theoretical possibilities. Instruction in psychoanalysis is also becoming increasingly difficult.

The penetrative power with which psychoanalysis might enter the field of medicine and other related fields of science, is being weakened by the absence of a unification of the scientific material. Zealous antagonists in public declare their opposition to psychoanalysis, but in private make use of it, diluting and falsifying its conceptual content, which, unprotected by a wall of sharp and clear cut definitions and ideology, is subject to all sorts of misunderstanding and distortion. Opposition schools have reaped sympathy through unjustified generalizations and superficial systematization, inasmuch as they have spared people the difficult task of familiarizing themselves with the empirical bases, and furnished them with a few, only half-true fundamentals in the form of a circumscribed scientific system.

But all these external considerations would not suffice to change anything in the research tactics hitherto pursued if the intrinsic laws of growth did not force psychoanalytic science to a stabilization of its internal structure. The rich experiential material demands unification and a sharpening of concepts. Psychoanalysis is already capable of fulfilling its most important task, that is, of furnishing a comprehensive and plain survey of its field. As a matter of fact, Freud's contributions on the structure of the ego are really a unifying retrospect of the road so rapidly covered. These unifying contributions also are not in the nature of a rigid system. They represent, however, an attempt to condense the insight thus far gained into an integrated picture of the whole psychic apparatus.

The theory of the ego is obliged to contend with another difficulty apart from the existing general tension between theory and practice. You will permit me, among ourselves, to designate this difficulty as a resistance, and you will not mind if I attempt to interpret this resistance in accordance with our method.

Freud has explained the antagonism to his teachings as arising from the same resistance which a patient exhibits in the course of his treatment to a knowledge of himself. He compared psychoanalysis accurately and justifiably with two previous great scientific discoveries; with the Copernican cosmological theory and with the Darwinian theory of descent. Both constituted violent narcissistic insults to mankind. First, it was man's environment, the earth upon which he lives, which was placed beyond his autocratic reach; then, it was his own body. But what he feels most acutely is that his psychic personality should be removed from the sphere of influence of his conscious personality, and to be told that he is not even complete master of his own actions. Civilized man reacted to the wound inflicted upon his self-esteem by Copernicus with a reaction formation in the form of greater knowledge and mastery of his physical environment. He compensated this injury through the development of his technical knowledge. Copernicus robbed him of the earth as a constituent of his narcissism, and he responded with a heightened technical mastery of nature. He lost his phantastic sense of omnipotence, but gained instead the real power of technology. We see a similar reaction to Darwin's discovery, the development of a biologically rooted medical science. Darwin struck a blow at man's evaluation of his body, which he reduced to the level of the animal world. Man responded with the technical, that is, the medical mastery of his body.

And in a quite similar manner does the discovery of the "Unconscious" lead to a striving to bring this "Unconscious" under the domination of consciousness, to a psychological technique, the technique of psychoanalysis.

I believe that I hear you saying, "Well, with this we have arrived at the end of the tale; beyond this there is nothing. What

sort of field for conquest can lie beyond the unconscious part of the mind?" Having conquered his physical invironment, his body, and his psyche, man, satisfied, might well cease his exertions. He need fear no further assaults on his narcissism for which he would have to overcompensate through the fatiguing construction of new reaction formations. You will ask, "As a matter of fact, if a person has succeeded in overcoming his resistance against the understanding of his 'Unconscious', what further resistance to knowledge can he possibly have?" What sort of new resistance to certain theoretical views am I trying to conjure up? My answer is a simple one. The recognition of the unconscious instinctual life, of the libidinal manifestations is easier than the recognition of the unconscious part of the ego. Instinct, as Freud states it, is a something which lies between body and mind. Historically, there was a similar order of discovery. The discovery of the body was followed by the discovery of the life of instinct, and only at last came the discovery of the ego, of the nucleus of the personality. At first, therefore, there was required a psychoanalysis of the libido and only then could there follow a psychoanalysis of the ego. The order of development of European civilization runs somewhat as follows: The discovery of the Earth, of the body, of the life of instinct, and finally, of the ego. The resistance to the new ego theory corresponds to the final resistance in a psychoanalytic therapeutic procedure. We used to say, the final and greatest difficulty is furnished by the analysis of narcissism. To-day we say more correctly, the analysis of the unconscious part of the ego.

Before entering in greater detail upon the character of this resistance I should like to indulge in a few words concerning this remarkable order of development of civilization. This developmental order we discover very clearly in the history of Greek philosophy. The interest of the first thinkers, the Eleatics, was directed exclusively to cosmological problems. Windelband calls this period the cosmological period of Greek philosophy. Only gradually "man" comes into the center of interest; the circle of speculation becomes more and more narrowed down to the human

being. Following an interest in moral problems, the process of "knowing" itself undergoes an examination. As early as Socrates, even, the main objective of all knowledge was a knowledge of oneself. It seems as though every civilization must pass through this development from cosmology to psychology. But the ontogenesis of the individual psyche traverses the same path. We have assumed on good grounds that at first the child is incapable of differentiating between itself and its environment, that the whole world is comprised within itself. Every experience which contradicts this attitude is taken as an injury. Thus the child gradually loses the surrounding world as a possession, but as a compensation for this, discovers itself on the level of narcissism. With this is terminated the first major period of its development. Now the same process begins on a higher level. The solution of this puzzling general genetic law lies as a matter of fact close at hand. It is obviously much easier to view and evaluate objectively that which is remote from oneself than that which lies closer to the sphere of subjective interest.

Let us return to our main thesis. It is less difficult to bring the repressed nearer to consciousness than it is to recognize the repressing forces of the ego. Or, to put it differently, the greatest resistance is directed against a recognition of the forces of repression. How is one to understand this? This contention of ours sounds strange at first, since we have been in the habit of identifying on the whole the tendencies of the conscious ego with the repressive tendencies, in that we maintained that whatever is objectionable to the ego is repressed. Analytical theory has in this regard suffered a significant correction. It is at this point that the newer ego theory steps in. Conscious ego tendencies and repressive tendencies are not always identical. Implicitly, it had always been assumed that repression is a dynamic function which does not issue from the conscious ego. We call the inhibitory function of the conscious ego, rejection or condemnation, but not repression. The conscious ego would not reject or condemn everything which is repressed even if it were to have knowledge of it. It is, therefore, implicit in the concept of repression, that repres-

sion issues from an unconscious faculty. And yet it was only at the Berlin congress that this topography of repression was expressed and clearly formulated by Freud. He then introduced the concept of an " unconscious sense of guilt ", which he now prefers to designate as " unconscious need for punishment ".

The unconscious need for punishment is a fact of wide significance, which, because of its importance for our conception of the structure of the psychic apparatus, I should like to discuss in greater detail. It compels us, to start with, to make an assumption of a psychic faculty, which reacts to certain unconscious stirrings with a feeling of guilt, and condemns them in the same way as our conscious conscience condemns certain of our actions. This faculty, therefore, sits in judgment on thoughts and wishes, in short, on psychic processes as though they were actions. This faculty behaves as does conscious judgment, except that its selective and censuring activity takes place in the unconscious. Now, psychoanalytic experience demonstrates that the moral principles of this faculty are identical with those prohibitions and commands which the child imbibes from the persons responsible for its upbringing during its first years. On the other hand, this faculty reflects certain phylogenetic echoes of primitive man. This code which has become relegated to the unconscious is identical with the totemistic code of primitive peoples. Its chief prohibitions are directed, in the male, against the incest wish and against inimical stirrings against the father. We are, therefore, obliged to recognize in this faculty the result of an adaptation to those social commands and regulations which constitute the basis of present-day social forms, an adaptation for which modern man has been prepared by his historical past and which becomes strengthened by education and rearing. It is a product of adaptation, a domesticated and socialized part of the ego, which Freud calls the " super-ego ". Its relation to the process of repression is peculiarly intimate. Freud assumes that a great part of the repressions instituted by the ego takes place under the influence of this social faculty. The psychoanalytic investigation of the nervously ill shows us with a highly monotonous uniformity that the wishes

and tendencies which above all others undergo the fate of repression and give rise to symptoms are precisely those which are in conflict with the code of the super-ego. We are justified, therefore, in our assumption that a great part of our repressions, and particularly that part which plays a rôle in the causation of a neurosis issues from that portion of the ego which Freud delimited as the super-ego.

Of greatest importance for the theory of the ego is the fact that the condemning activity of this faculty is unconscious. This means that not only are the repressed motives unconscious, but also that the repressing force with all its motives for negating certain tendencies and for excluding them from the possibility of becoming conscious, is unconscious. This thesis, although self-evident, requires emphasis. It is self-evident because if the motive which prevents a tendency from becoming conscious were itself conscious, the repressed tendency could no longer remain unconscious. A conscious verdict is thinkable only when the condemned tendency is likewise conscious.

Thus the fact of repression itself presupposes an unconscious condemning function. And yet the *modus operandi* of conscious judgment differs from the process of repression in one important feature. The *modus operandi* of the repressing faculty is a schematic one, indeed an automatic one. There can be no question of a testing and deliberating function in connection with repression. Certain stirrings are forbidden and become repressed, and indeed in every instance; others again are free to express themselves. This unconscious process of discrimination is much cruder and more schematic than is the conscious kind. Its mode of functioning is comparable with the functioning of a border guard who receives information that a certain criminal is red-haired and proceeds to view with suspicion all red-haired travelers, indeed to arrest them. Even conscious conscience has something rigid about it. Hence, Kant's designation, " categorical imperative ". But the super-ego exhibits this rigidity to a much greater extent. In truth it defends a code which constitutes the basis of society and must be maintained under all circumstances.

The unconscious, automatic mode of functioning of repression has a high economic value for the total activity of the psychic apparatus. Inasmuch as the regulation of instinct in accordance with social requirements is, in part at least, accomplished without the participation of the conscious ego, that is to say, unconsciously and automatically, the conscious self is thereby freed in large part from internal psychic expenditures and can direct itself entirely outward in the service of testing reality.

Thus the ego of cultural man appears to us divided into two parts with differing functions. Originally it was a single united organ of perception for external and internal stimuli (instincts). Its dynamic task consisted in bringing the results of internal perceptions, that is, the claims of instinct, into accord with reality testing, that is, with outer perceptions; in short, to concern itself with the possibility of instinct gratification. Although its outwardly directed perceptive function has not only been retained but has indeed become powerfully developed, the ego has to a large extent lost its internally directed perceptivity, or to express it more correctly, relegated it to the unconscious parts. Not all internal instinctual forces reach consciousness; only those do which have succeeded in passing the censoring barrier of internal perceptivity. Thus the internally directed perceptivity of the conscious personality becomes limited.

Its task consists from now on in attending to those instinctual claims which have passed the repression barrier. The rest of the instinctual urges are altogether excluded from its domain because they have already been rejected, repressed as indisputably opposed to reality. Thus it happens that a large part of the internal process of repression remains unconscious, indeed even a large part of the moral inhibitions of conscience.

The internal censor has taken over the rôle of the conscious faculty of judgment in that it has perpetuated, made permanent, in a rigid manner the results of a one time conscious testing of reality. Such an unconscious process is of the quality of those automatic, organic processes which betray by their purposefulness, by their meaningful arrangements that they were at one

time psychically invested, and became automatic only through endless repetition in the course of phylogenetic development. We shall attempt to illustrate in a very crude manner and by means of a simple example, this phenomenon, namely, the substitution of an unconscious automatic inhibition, which we call repression, for a type of inhibition which had been based upon conscious deliberation.

The primitive mastery impulse of the child is manifested in one form by the child grasping for objects perceived by it in the environment. As the result of a painful experience, such as the burning of its fingers in a candle-flame for which it grasped, this mode of expression of the mastery impulse becomes inhibited when it makes its next appearance because of the memory of this painful experience. Seeing the candle reactivates the painful experience and this memory, which is accompanied by a painful anticipatory feeling, is that psychic process which we call objective fear or objective anxiety. Under the influence of objective fear the ego inhibits the grasping movement which is intended to serve the mastery impulse. If now a similar painful experience repeats itself in the life of the child the inhibition of the grasping movement gradually becomes automatic, indeed a reflex, without reactivating the painful memory image, and by the same token, without the development of the anxiety. The lesson of experience, the painful result of previous experiments with reality, namely, "If I see a beautiful burning candle and grasp it, I shall suffer pain", is replaced by an automatic inhibition of the grasping movement. This automatic inhibition leads to the same result as does the recollection with its accompanying feeling of anxiety. It contains all the wisdom which is embraced in the psychic process for which it is a substitute.

The advantage accruing to the psychic apparatus from this mechanization of the inhibitory function is an economic as well as an affective one. Consciousness is relieved of the task of the psychic elaboration of instinct, it is spared the development of anxiety with which the recall of the painful memory is associated, and is thus freed of the conflict between temptation and anxiety.

In spite of all this the result of the reality test, "You must not grasp a burning candle" is achieved.

This mechanization or automatization of psychic processes appears to be one of the most primal characteristics of the psychic apparatus. It was recognized by Freud in a somewhat different form, as far back as the period of his collaboration with Breuer. They designated this phenomenon the conversion of freely flowing psychic energy into a tonic form. We shall have further opportunity for an elaboration of this fundamental principle. But for the present we wish to continue a little longer with our example.

We see from it that the satisfaction of an instinct, of an internal tension, which prompts the child to make the grasping movement, may become inhibited in two ways: first, through actual anxiety which develops in consequence of the appearance of memories of painful experiences, and second, by means of an automatic inhibitory function along with the circumvention of consciousness, and the avoidance of anxiety.

Psychoanalytic experience has taught us that not only may the innervation of a movement become inhibited in this manner—that is, through a circumvention of consciousness—but even the impulse itself, the wish, which gave occasion for the movement, may be inhibited. In the adult the major portion of the innervations are dependent upon consciousness. Because of this, the satisfaction of instinct may become inhibited merely because the instinct or, more precisely, the instinct representative is excluded from consciousness. In that case the inhibition does not take place at the motor end of the total instinct-satisfying process, as it does in a small child, but much sooner, one might say, prophylactically, at the margin of the system which controls innervation. The inhibitory process has become internalized. It is clear that this type of exclusion of the wish from consciousness—from the system which controls innervation—signifies a more complete protection than if the wish first becomes conscious and is rejected only after a to-and-fro vacillating struggle between temptation and anxious denial. The advantages of such a type of exclusion from consciousness as against the conscious inhibition of an innervation

are the same as those of the automatic inhibition of innervations in the cited example: (1) the avoidance of anxiety, (2) a saving in psychic expenditure. As against this, is the disadvantage that the "becoming conscious" of the wish constituted a new confrontation of it with reality, a new testing of it—a possibility excluded in the event of an automatic inhibition, in the case of repression. However, as long as the real situation which led to an inhibition remains unchanged, as long, that is, as no new testing of reality is called for, repression has only advantages for the psychic apparatus. But when this situation becomes altered, it may happen that the automatic process of inhibition may also exclude from consciousness wishes whose gratification would no longer lead, under these altered circumstances, to pain, or to denial.

Since most repressions take place in childhood such an alteration of circumstances practically always exists. The adult does not condemn everything which he repressed as a child. We shall see later on that this rigidity of the inhibitory mechanism, its imperviousness to the effects of later experiences with reality is one of the most important conditions for the development of a neurosis.

A lack of synchrony in human development, and one fraught with consequences, is to be found in the fact that the development of the ego lags behind the development of the instincts. As a result, the earlier developed claims of instinct are made upon an unprepared ego, which is incapable of attending to the adequate satisfaction of instinct, of removing instinctual tension through appropriate behavior. Thus the instincts have the same significance for the ego as those external stimuli against which the ego is as yet not prepared to defend itself. They signify a source of danger. Because the ego is as yet not prepared to gratify the claims of instinct, all that remains for it to do is to defend itself against them. The general reaction of the child's ego to a great part of the claims of instinct, especially to certain aggressive and genital-sexual tendencies, is defense. We have seen that this defense against instinct is most complete when the instinct repre-

sentatives do not become conscious; that is, when the inhibition affects not only the motor innervation to which the instinct urges, but when this inhibition sets in still earlier and excludes the claims of instinct from reaching consciousness, that is, represses them. Thus the ego protects itself not only against the painful consequences of an eventual instinct-satisfaction—or more accurately expressed—against disappointment and painful experiences with which his inadequate attempts at satisfaction would be associated, but also against the anxiety which would develop in connection with the "becoming conscious" of the instinct-representatives and memory pictures of previously miscarried attempts.

The weakness of the ego, which confronts a practically complete but early developed life of instinct, renders the period of childhood (infantile sexuality and latency period) the epoch of most violent repression. Along with the general tendency of the ego to free itself from the tensions of instinct, its weakness during the period of childhood contributes still further to encourage repression. One might even say that repression is the appropriate reaction of the ego during the period of childhood, because it is as yet not ready for a psychic elaboration of certain instinctual claims. It can do nothing with a large portion of its instinctual claims, except repress them.

A general principle, one to which I have already called attention and which I designated as the Breuer-Freud principle of inertia, underlies this genetic description of the automatization of defensive functions against instinct. In its efforts to rid itself of stimuli-tensions, the psychic apparatus aims to convert free psychic energy into a tonic form. All those processes of instinct mastery in the conscious apparatus which depend upon a comparison of memory images with recent impressions from the environment, in short, which rest upon the function of conscious judgment are manifestations of freely mobile energies. They represent a steady detailed adaptation to existing outer situations. If one succeeds in supplanting the result of such deliberations with an automatic mechanism, which operates without the participation of consciousness but contains the results of former

judgments, that is, former energy outputs in a tonic form, the psychic apparatus is spared a new active task. What takes place is simply a mechanical repetition of that which was at one time discovered to be appropriate to the situation—that is, adequate for the relief from stimulus tension—only after a tiresome effort in the struggle with reality and with the claims of instinct. The lesson of this groping laborious struggle for adaptation is preserved in a tonic form, an active psychic function being replaced by an automatism.

Freud recognized in this economic principle, which consists in the avoidance of constantly changing active psychic effort and its replacement by compulsive repetitions which occur without new psychic effort, the psychological form of the general principle of inertia, and designated it the repetition compulsion.

The reflex or automatic defense mechanisms against external stimuli likewise arose by means of the repetition compulsion as fixation products of at one time psychically determined innervations. In the same way, repression is an automatic, unconscious defense process, but one which is directed against internal instead of external stimuli. It is independent of situational changes and is the expression of the repetition compulsion in the form of a compulsive repetition of a one time conscious process, that is, of a conscious inhibition of instinct. No matter how primitive those functions of judgment may be which drive the child to the first defensive measures against instinct, the replacement of these mobile psychic functions by the tonic processes of repression constitutes an economy in active energy expenditure. The transformation of conscious condemnation, which depends upon perceptions, into an unconscious process of repression, is a typical example of the conversion of mobile psychic energy into a tonic form. One is justified in assuming that this tendency to energy transformation must lead to a steady decrease of mobile psychic energy and is in accord with a general biological developmental tendency, namely, the corporealization of the psyche. According to Freud, the unconscious is a border land something between body and mind.

We suspect behind this law a manifestation of the general natural law of entropy. The same tendency which is at the bottom of the transformation of psychic mobile energy into a tonic form, also dominates the physical phenomena of nature and comes to expression in the formula of the law of entropy, which maintains that there is a steady loss of free energy passing over into closed systems.

In the field of biology this law is manifested in the structure of the body, where processes which were at one time psychic in nature, which had meaning and purpose, become congealed into reflexes and automatisms. Thus the eternal riddle of biology, namely, the logic of the structure of the body in all its anatomical and physiologic arrangements, arrangements which give the impression as though the body had been designed by an understanding intelligence, finds a ready solution. The body was in truth constructed by a wise genius; not, however, by an outside genius but by one which dwells within and has always dwelt there. The body with all its arrangements constitutes the fossilized descendant of former individual psychical achievements in the struggle for adaptation. In the course of biological evolution the psyche becomes converted into body. Thus also the meaning of any bodily arrangement can be understood only on the basis of those psychic tendencies which in their day constructed it and shaped it.

Modern physics stresses the same phenomenon in its concept that " matter " is the product, perhaps the evolutionary product, of non-material tendencies. But let us return to our more specific psychological field.

A large part of the adult's inhibitions take place consciously under the influence of actual fear. This renunciation of the satisfaction of certain wishes as a result of painful memories, let us designate as conscious " condemnation ", and differentiate this process from " repression ", an inhibition taking place outside of consciousness. We must assume that the latter form of defense mechanism issues from some internal faculty which has an inhibitory rôle similar to actual anxiety within the psychic apparatus. The emergence of a memory image with its accompanying anxiety

is prevented through an instinct-inhibiting counter-charge which arises from this internal faculty. In other words, in place of conscious condemnation there takes place an unconscious counter-charge. We must emphasize in this connection that the internal perception of the instinctual stirring, as well as the inhibition of it, takes place unconsciously. A comprehensive psychoanalytic experience of many years has repeatedly confirmed the fact that this unconscious inhibition, repression, is employed especially in connection with those instinctual stirrings which violate moral and aesthetic laws. Let us designate that part of the internal inhibitory faculty which represents these laws within the psychic apparatus, the super-ego. Along with this we assume that the ego possesses also independently of the super-ego the capacity for repression, or generally speaking, the capacity for defense against instinct. The entire course of an act of repression might be formulated somewhat in this fashion, that the super-ego perceives the tendency issuing from the id and pressing towards consciousness, and gives the ego the signal to repress. The ego carries out this command automatically, without further inquiry.

It is not difficult to derive this process from the customary process of child-rearing. Child-rearing clothes those stirrings which will later come under the ban of repression with prohibitions containing a punitive clause. Child-rearing imitates in this respect inanimate nature, which inhibits, through the infliction of pain, those of our instinctual stirrings which run counter to adaptation—a pain-infliction for which punishment is the substitute in the process of child-rearing. In the course of time these prohibitions and commands of the educational process become transformed into internal laws, and this internalized morality as "conscience" becomes in large measure independent of the presence of the original prohibiting person. The objective fear of the punishing persons in the child's environment becomes internalized as conscience-anxiety. If now an instinctual stirring condemned by conscience becomes conscious, there results conscience-anxiety.

But should this instinctual stirring become inhibited even

before it has reached consciousness, that is, excluded from consciousness, repressed, the individual is spared the development of anxiety. Gradually the ego adapts itself to its conscience in a manner similar to its adaptation to its external environment. In order to avoid conscience-anxiety it represses such tendencies as might lead conscience to threaten it with punishment. If we view the development of conscience as an adaptation to social reality, we may look upon repression as a similar type of adaptation to one's own conscience. As a result of the internalization of objective anxiety as conscience-anxiety, the external conflict with reality becomes converted into an internal conflict with one's own conscience. Whereas external conflict with reality is avoided through conscious inhibition of innervations, conflict with one's own conscience is avoided through repression. In order to eliminate a conflict with reality it is sufficient to inhibit action, that is, to give up the carrying out of a wish which would meet opposition in the real world. In order to escape conscience-conflict, however, even the "becoming conscious" of the wish must be prevented, because conscience reacts not only to deeds but even to mere wishes. If the repressing mechanism does not function completely there arises conscience-anxiety. In accordance with this, we must assume two internalizations in the conflict of instinct with reality. First the persons in the child's environment who oppose his instinctual urges become internalized as conscience, and then conscious inhibition becomes converted into an unconscious form. And this part of conscience which operates in the unconscious, and which there retains the point of view of the previously "conscious conscience" is that unconscious faculty which we termed the super-ego.

On the basis of this formulation, the super-ego is that part of conscience which has become unconscious—an outpost of conscience confronting the life of instinct, which carries on the same function as does conscience except that its effect is an unconscious one; whereby the conflict between the instinct's striving for expression and the anxiety of denial is avoided.

We might say, every repression spares the individual a con-

scious conscience conflict, or at any rate, should do so. According to this we must assume that at one time the place of the repression was occupied by a conscious conscience conflict and its sequel a conscious renunciation. During the course of individual development the conscious conflict became submerged into the unconscious as the result of repetitions and in response to the tendency of consciousness to rid itself of painful conflicts.

Just as in the example of the " child and candle " a movement becomes automatically inhibited, so does an instinctual stirring become, as it were, unconsciously thwarted through the unconscious conscience reaction. This unconscious thwarting faculty is the super-ego. Its relation to conscious conscience is similar to the relation between conscience and the child's parents and guides. Just as the demands of these latter are at first assimilated into the conscious ego through identification with these persons in order to escape a conflict with them (which leads to the development of conscience), just so the conscience itself, which has taken over the rôle of the guides within the ego, is shifted to a deeper stratum of the psyche, one which lies closer to the life of instinct, and becomes still more intimately absorbed in the personality. It becomes " second nature ". Thus it becomes possible for the claims of conscience to act directly upon the life of instinct, without having to involve consciousness in this inhibitory function.

I must admit that psychoanalytic opinion is not united concerning the nature and genesis of the super-ego. This fact finds expression also in a certain indefiniteness in the terminology. Freud originally introduced this concept using the expression " ego-ideal " and by this term understood a critical faculty in the ego which judges our acts and feelings in accordance with moral and aesthetic norms. He placed its source in the identification with the child's guides, especially with the parents, which represent and uphold the standards opposed to the asocial life of instinct.

This identification and introjection signifies, therefore, that the child has taken on a part of the instinct-inhibiting strivings of its environment; *i.e.*, the parental prohibitions, and now himself

prohibits that which was formerly prohibited by people outside of himself.

It was only after nine years, in *The Ego and the Id*,[1] that Freud, after having called attention to the unconscious nature of many of our moral feelings, proposed to call this faculty the "super-ego", and deduced from this the notion of an "unconscious need for punishment". He emphasized the intimate relationship between the super-ego and the life of instinct, a relationship which alone is capable of explaining the possibility that a need for punishment may arise for tendencies and wishes which are not in consciousness. Its identity with the previously discovered dream-censorship becomes clear in view of its internal perceptive capacity. We believe that we are in harmony with the spirit of the developmental history just outlined when we propose that the conscious conscience, the first result of identification with the introjected parents, should continue to be designated the *ego-ideal,* and that the term *super-ego* be reserved for the ego-ideal which has later become unconscious, whose inhibitory activity no longer is manifested in the form of a conscious conscience conflict.

The proposition which lies at the bottom of this discussion as well as of the terminological suggestion; namely, that conscious conscience becomes in the course of time converted into an unconscious conscience, is not only a necessary consequence of our basic psychoanalytic conceptions, but is also readily demonstrable in our everyday experience with the growing child. That the incest prohibition still active in the unconscious of an adult once arose out of fear of the father and out of the feelings of guilt entertained with reference to him, is the crux of psychoanalytic theory, as is the fact that this entire conflict later completely disappears from consciousness. In respect to other moral prohibitions, which do not recede into the unconscious as completely as the incest prohibition, the gradual automatization of the conscience reaction can be demonstrated even more readily, indeed, without the employment of any depth-psychology. The prohibition, "Thou

[1] English translation. International Institute of Psycho-analysis, London.

shalt not steal", for instance, is at first still an important problem in conscience for the small child, the object of a severe struggle between conscience-anxiety and temptation, whereas later the temptation is not at all conscious, and the inhibition of the asocial mastery-impulse takes place categorically without any conscience conflict.

No such impulse is apt to reach the consciousness of the average Wall Street banker, but even he, the classical representative of capitalistic morality, may experience it in the form of a harmless unintentional action when he unthinkingly pockets his business friend's pencil, and demonstrates thereby that his super-ego still has to battle with this tendency. The difference between repression and "categorization" of moral prohibitions is a question of degree. The influence of conscious judgment is already eliminated from a categorical prohibition—even more so in the case of repression. The submergence of conscious moral inhibitions into the unconscious is a readily ascertainable fact, and we take cognizance of this fact when we differentiate between a conscious ego-ideal and an unconscious super-ego. This differentiation is justified, furthermore, by the fact that the super-ego deviates in many respects from the conscious ideals which we impose on ourselves. This difference between conscious morality and the unconscious morality which issues from the super-ego is particularly obvious in the neurotic. Just as conscience has become independent of the external laws, so in time the super-ego becomes more or less independent of the conscious ego-ideal. The latter participates in the entire development of the ego and its claims change with growth; the super-ego remains rigid and represents the methods of rearing to which we are subject in our youth. Odier, taking into consideration the cleft between conscious moral sentiments and unconscious moral inhibitions, has recently proposed a distinction between a super-ego and a *super-id,* the super-ego representing the more conscious aspects of moral inhibitions, and the super-id, because of its close relation to the id, the unconscious part. I believe that the terminology suggested in this book does equal justice to the psychological situation but obviates the

introduction of a new term. At the same time it takes cognizance of the historical evolution of Freud's concepts, ego-ideal and super-ego.

Experience demonstrates that only a part of the instinctual claims is controlled by means of the unconscious inhibitory mechanisms, whereas another part continues to remain under the sway of conscious judgment. We have already stressed the economic significance of this division of labor, the preparatory and selective function of repression. But we have also indicated that along with these advantages, namely, the avoidance of anxiety and the elimination of conscious effort, this division of labor entails a serious disadvantage from the standpoint of pathology. We might almost say that this splitting in two of the function of the ego is at the bottom of the formation of the neurosis, whereby we merely restate in a new form the well-known fact that symptom-formation is the sequel of repression. How this differentiation of the ego-function comes to be the basis of the neurosis we shall investigate in detail in connection with the individual forms of disorder. But this much must surely have become quite evident, that the division of the inhibitory function into a conscious rejection and an unconscious inhibition brings with it the possibility that the result of a repression which takes place without involving conscious judgment will not be the same as the result of conscious rejection. However, before discussing the matter further, we must illustrate what has been said through every-day clinical examples.

At the present time we are able to reply in a more definite manner to the question frequently put to us by the patient: how can one speak of a resistance or a repression of which the patient himself is not directly aware, seeing at most only its manifestations. The answer is that it is not he who represses but something within him, just as it is not he who has unconscious wishes, but the something within him which wishes. The assumption of an unconscious repressive faculty is in no way more speculative than the assumption of an unconscious instinctual life. The observation of its manifestations forces us to the assumption of its

existence. The first antithesis between the ego and the unconscious instinctual forces was, therefore, inaccurate. There is probably no direct connection between the conscious ego and the life of instinct, certainly not a complete one. Formerly we were wont to say that a psychic tendency either becomes conscious or remains unconscious, depending on whether the conscious ego does or does not wish to know about it. The most elementary experiences of every analytic session contradict this formulation. Let us consider what occurs during a psychoanalysis.

The patient brings free associations and you discern the dynamic background for them; for instance, certain unconscious inimical tendencies. You see to it that at the appropriate time these unconscious tendencies are brought to the patient's attention. Let us assume the favorable case, that the patient understands these connections and accepts them intellectually. He will then say, for example, " Yes, I see that it must be so, and that I unconsciously harbor some hostility to you, but I feel nothing of this, and know nothing of it." When such an unconscious inimical attitude becomes sufficiently clear and is fully recognized, the patient completely accepts it, speaks of it as he would of an ascertained fact, and will probably even recognize it himself whenever it comes to the surface. It then becomes a *façon de parler:* " I hate you in my unconscious without being in any way directly aware of this hatred." We must therefore admit that he is ready to see this clear ego-alien hostility to the doctor who wants to help him; but his willingness to see does not help him in the least.

Something within him prevents this aggression from reaching consciousness, and this inhibiting faculty is itself unconscious. We see from this that the conscious ego has no direct contact with the unconscious life of instinct. To be sure, it recognizes, as in our example, a certain unpleasant internal stirring, the aggressive attitude towards the helpful physician but something which is obviously more moral than the patient's conscious personality prevents this stirring from becoming conscious. We shall see that it is precisely this over-morality of the repressive faculty which enables this immoral tendency, which is being

restrained from entering consciousness, to be retained in a disguised form and even to appear as aggressively colored deeds in the form of unintentional mistakes. It is therefore not the conscious ego which determines what may and what may not reach consciousness. The clinical fact of repression forces us to the assumption of an unconscious condemning faculty which possesses an internal perceptive capacity.

Thus the factual basis of the psychoanalytic theory of the neuroses, namely, that the result of repression in the neurosis is not satisfying to the ego, becomes intelligible. Some neurotics, for instance, are inhibited in such activities as speaking, writing, walking, working, etc., which consciously they would wish to carry on. These inhibitions they consider their illness. They can do so only because these inhibitions as well as the repressions do not issue from the conscious ego. The reason for the dissatisfaction of the ego is a dual one. The unconscious repressing faculty, which in the neurotic is often completely at variance with conscious judgment, excludes from consciousness, and therefore from access to the motor apparatus, even those tendencies which can in no way be designated as ego-alien. The best known example of this is the sexual repression which ties up not only incest wishes, but all sexuality. All manifestations of neurotic inhibition rest upon this schematic procedure of the super-ego. Elsewhere[2] I have especially endeavored to demonstrate this schematizing or automatizing mode of functioning of the repressive faculty. A dysfunction of the super-ego consists in this: that the ego in doing the super-ego's biddings often represses more than is demanded by the conscious personality, by the conscious ego-ideal. The other cause of the defective functioning of the super-ego in the neurosis is what might be called its "corruptibility". Indeed, one often obtains the impression that the super-ego maintains a secret agreement with the id, for it will often tolerate in consciousness thoughts and wishes which the ego strongly condemns. Take for example certain obsessive ideas

[2] Metapsychologische Darstellung des Heilungvorganges. Int. Zsch. f. PsA., Bd. XI, 1925.

with a markedly asocial content, such as the murdering of a beloved person. Frequently, entirely ego-alien tendencies are realized in the form of unintentional or compulsive acts. But apart from these exceptionally obvious cases, we know that every neurotic symptom is a substitutive gratification of some ego-alien tendency, a return of the repressed. We might speak here of a failure of repression. However, if the above described dysfunction of the super-ego lay in its demanding too much, we must now ask how it is that under the domination of such a severe super-ego the repression can be so inadequate that obviously ego-alien tendencies may reach consciousness in an entirely undisguised form. This contradiction between formal severity (of the super-ego) and its inadequate repressive activity arouses a suspicion that bribery is going on. The combination of outward severity and corruptibility is typical of corrupt officials. Indeed we shall see how this too-much and too-little repression stand in a causal connection with one another, how the two are present consecutively or simultaneously in every neurosis, and how this is one of the basic psychological factors in the formation of a neurosis.

The primary function of repression is ostensibly the protection of the interests of the ego against the instinctual claims, and the releasing of the conscious ego from the task of regulating the life of instinct. It is the duty of the super-ego, which is by nature a categorical imperative, to see that the demands of reality are met automatically, unreflectively. This is consistent with its genesis, as a precipitate of the rearing process, the internal representative of social reality. It is only in the neuroses that it is not adequate to its task and that it abuses its far-reaching independence of the conscious ego, and uses its autonomy in such a fashion, that a condition arises which the patient regards as illness.

The above considerations already justify our speaking in the neuroses of a dysfunction of repression. I should now like further to substantiate this assertion, at first, however, only in a general way. Later we shall discuss the rôle of the super-ego in the various individual forms of neurosis, insofar as this is possible in the present state of our knowledge.

Let us formulate our assertions once again. The claims of the super-ego do not coincide with those of the conscious ego (of the conscious ideal); in the neurotic, under no circumstances, and in normal persons only to a certain extent. The border-line case of ideal health probably furnishes an exception to this rule.

If the standpoints of the super-ego and of the ego always coincided, the results of repression and those of conscious judgment would be the same. The greater the incongruity between the standpoint of the super-ego and that of the conscious ego, the wider the neurotic splitting of the personality. In order to thoroughly test this statement, let us examine the general consequences of repression, that is, the fate of the repressed instinctual strivings. Of course we know a great deal concerning this. An instinctual claim is not abandoned merely because the adequate satisfaction of it is interfered with; it only seeks new avenues of release which are capable of circumventing the censorship of the super-ego. We differentiate between these modes of release of repressed impulses, the normal ones, that is, sublimations, and the pathological ones, that is, the neurotic symptoms. But no matter how we evaluate them they all possess an important common characteristic; they are all modified, or at any rate, disguised manifestations of repressed tendencies, that is, tendencies which have been condemned by the super-ego. The alteration, therefore, to which the original instinctual claim has been subjected, takes place under the pressure of the demands of the super-ego; it is this modification which makes possible the eventual release. In the case of sublimations, this modification is much more fundamental than in the case of neurotic symptoms, wherein the original ego-alien impulse is not abandoned nor essentially modified, but merely disguised. This difference is very significant for the understanding of the neuroses and will claim our further attention later on. But even at this point we can not leave it unmentioned.

In all sublimations we observe that the original impulse undergoes profound modifications. It becomes attached to other impulses which are acceptable to the ego, and in this good company gets by the censorship. It acquires a distinctly social aspect

Take for example, the way in which the wish to murder becomes modified into the knock-out blow in boxing. Or think of the dentist who has succeeded in associating his sadistic impulse with the curative purpose and thus is enabled to give way to it harmlessly and without guilt. The moral claims of the super-ego become satisfied through this altruistic social note, thus rendering possible the return of the repressed in this altered form. In the case of the neurotic symptom the original activity alone is checked, but the meaning of the substitutive gratifications is very much akin to the originally condemned instinctual urge. This originally condemned tendency, therefore, does not become altered, as in the case of sublimations, but only disguised. Upon this fact is based the accusation to which we have already alluded: that the super-ego of the neurotic is in conspiracy with the id. It is only concerned in giving the appearance of carrying out the letter of the law, yet permits the cropping out of the asocial urges of the id. It accomplishes this secret objective through the various mechanisms of punishment which we shall study in detail in connection with the individual forms of neurosis. I should like, however, to stress to-day a common characteristic of these mechanisms which I should like to designate as the over-severity of the super-ego. This is manifest in the above mentioned excessive repression and particularly in a rather remarkable punitive system. We have known for a long time that the neurotic symptoms represent not only the gratification of wishes, but at the same time punitive mechanisms. Every neurosis means first of all suffering, and the first and outstanding characteristic of every neurotic symptom is that it brings with it suffering.

Let us not forget this most important characteristic of the symptom because it seems so obvious. We investigate the most hidden depths of the soul and are inclined to overlook that which is not hidden. In *The Ego and the Id,* Freud calls attention to an important, perhaps the most important, factor which hinders the patient from getting well. When we cure the patient we rob him of the relief from his sense of guilt which his disease makes possible. The punishments of the super-ego furnish *carte blanche*

to the sins, inasmuch as through these punishments the ego is rid of its qualms of conscience, of its conscience anxiety. The gratification of a condemned tendency by means of a neurotic symptom becomes possible only because the symptom constitutes at the same time suffering, relieving in this manner the inhibiting feeling of guilt. It is not only the content of the symptom which reveals the self-punishment (for under certain conditions an isolated symptom may reflect only the gratification of a wish without any elements of self-punishment) but the mere fact of illness signifies punishment. And suffering is a characteristic, a common characteristic of all disease symptoms. The super-ego of the neurotic does not punish because of the demands of justice, neither is the punishment intended to serve as a deterrent, as in the case of modern penology, but as a matter of form, in order to satisfy in a formal manner the code of conscience. But it is precisely because of this that its inhibiting effect is lost and free expression of the repressed wish is made possible. This constitutes what I have previously designated as the corruptibility of the neurotic super-ego. This is what I meant by the secret alliance with the id.

I should like to illustrate this secret alliance by means of a similar phenomenon of our social life. One may properly look upon the state as a macrocosmic repetition of the ego-structure. When one observes the social struggles of a country, one unwittingly gains the impression that the radical extremes, the party of the right and the party of the left, are in a secret alliance in spite of their apparently entirely opposed programs. They vote in unison on practically all questions and pursue a common goal, revolution (in the sense of political change). Psychologically it is immaterial whether they are known as revolutionists or as counter-revolutionists. They have a common goal, struggle as an end in itself. They conceal their true objectives behind allegedly moral and social motives but the affective goal of revolution is the real motivator of their activities. The transparency of their rationalizations, which are so full of holes, cannot deceive the psychologist. They provoke one another into excesses and hail every excess of the opposition as a victory for themselves, in

order to justify their own existence thereby. The struggle, the revolution, has become an end in itself, and these manifestations are the expressions of repressed mass instincts. The injustices of the opposition party furnish the alleged justifications for excessive instinct release. Internal conflict has replaced productive activity. Sociologists and publicists are inclined to see in these manifestations a disease of the body politic. They come to light according to historical evidence, after lost wars, after a weakening of the organization of the state. Quite similar manifestations are exhibited by the neurotically split psyche. The secret alliance between the two opposition parties, between the repressed impulses and the super-ego, is firmly established through the common goal, the intrapsychic release of instinct.

Outwardly directed activity is replaced by the struggle within the personality. Super-ego and id are in conflict with one another. Environmental privation, the most common immediate cause of the neurosis, can be compared with a lost war. The erotic and destructive tendencies which are prevented from flowing outwards force themselves upon the internal stage and cause an over-investment of the affiliations between the various parts of the self. The internal politics of the psyche become overheated, after the blocking of external political ambitions are checked following the loss of the war, the environmental frustration, the disappointment. It is not the relations with the environment which primarily constitute the neurosis. These relationships, or the disturbance of these relationships, only initiate the neurosis. The true disease is a matter of psychic internal politics; its arena is the total inner structure of the personality. How this internal political struggle within the self displays itself in various types of neuroses, we shall investigate later.

At present I should like to return to the basic assumption we made initially, to the economic thesis that the most active resistances are directed against a recognition of the repressive forces, more powerfully than against the repressed tendency itself.

As proof for this contention I referred to the developmental history of our civilization, an evolutionary history which shows

how the defense of our narcissism has become restricted to an ever narrowing sphere in the center of which stands the self. In this defensive struggle, the instincts are sacrificed sooner than the most intimate intentions of the ego. I have also called attention to a parallel to this, a psychological fact in individual development, and demonstrated here too the same law. In the development of the individual, the discovery of the self likewise follows the discovery of the environment. But I believe that the most convincing proof is, after all, furnished by the nature of the neurosis. Clinical experience forced us to the assumption of an unconscious condemning faculty, thus demonstrating the schism within the ego itself. In this way it became clear to us that the tendencies of this faculty, which in the neurotic is markedly independent of the ego, are capable of being out of harmony with the standpoint of the ego. Thus it also becomes clear that the repressive functions of this faculty may be rejected by the ego of the neurotic. The discrepancy between the demands of the ego and those of this unconscious agency is explained by the corruptibility of this agency, which, in spite of maintaining a certain appearance of agreement with the ego, nevertheless gives encouragement to the tendencies of the id because of its oversevere punitive mechanisms. By means of the punishment, of the suffering, it opens the way for the expression of the repressed tendencies. The exposé of this secret id-syntonic attitude of the super-ego constitutes the most difficult problem in the treatment of the neuroses. The exposé of this secret alliance with the id captures the final and most secret position of the neurosis.

I have already discussed these economic relations in a publication on the economics of a dream-mechanism.[3] The point of this observation was, that particularly clear and undisguised incest and pollution dreams are made possible only when a punitive dream precedes them the same night, in which the super-ego gives vent to its punitive tendencies, thus furnishing an antecedent absolution and opening the way for the indulgence in the sin. Since then I

[3] Internat. Zeitsch. f. Psa., XI, 80, 1925. Also in Internat. Journal of Psa., in English, 6, 446, 1925.

have been able to enrich considerably my collection of such dream pairs. I should like, however, at this point, to illustrate these economic relationships by means of a much more transparent and exceptionally glaring example. I choose as an illustration, not an analyzed case, but an observation from the daily life of a neurotic.

This very intelligent man suffered in middle life from a severe depression which developed out of an unsuccessful struggle for existence. He came from a well to do, socially eminent family but married into a different social stratum. After this alliance, his father and family refused to have anything more to do with him. His unsuccessful struggle for existence through many years terminated (on account of neurotically determined inhibitions) in a total psychic collapse. I advised him to begin an analysis with a colleague, because I had personal relations with him and his family and was well acquainted with his previous history. He found decision difficult. One evening when the final decision about the analysis was to have been made, he wanted to visit me, in order to talk over once more the pros and cons. But he did not arrive because he was run over by an auto in the neighborhood of my home. He was taken to a hospital suffering from many severe injuries. It was only on the following day that I heard of the accident. When I discovered him in the third class division of the hospital he was bandaged up like a mummy. He could not move and all one could see of his face were his eyes, shining with a euphoric light. He was in good spirits, free from the oppressive melancholy of recent days. The contrast between his physical condition and his mental state was particularly striking. The first words with which he greeted me were, "Now I have paid for everything, now I will at last tell my father what I think of him." He wanted to dictate a determined letter to his father immediately, demanding his share of his mother's estate. He was full of plans and was thinking of starting a new life.

The economic relationships are very obvious in this case. He desired to replace the analysis by a different form of treatment, by the automobile accident, in order to free himself of the pressure of his sense of guilt. Instead of recognizing these feelings of guilt, he lives them out.

You are familiar with this picture from Freud's elucidation of the manic-depressive psychosis except that in the latter case the same mechanism lies deeply hidden in the ego itself, whereas here it comes to light freely.

The tyrannical period of punishment, during which the super-ego celebrates its sadistic punitive orgies, is followed by the manic phase of release. The tyrannical super-ego is deposed and the disguised tendencies of the id live themselves out unhindered. Thus you see a clear demonstration of the economic situation which I have described. Hatred of the father, repressed hitherto, becomes conscious as soon as the need for punishment is satisfied. Yet this need for punishment itself continues to be unconscious. The analytic problem in this case is not to bring into consciousness the hitherto repressed hate for the father; this has already become conscious. The problem requiring a solution is to bring into consciousness the punitive tendency, to make it clear to the patient that his automobile accident as well as his failure in the struggle for existence were planned by him. This he will not see. Against this he brings forth the great resistance, because insight of this kind will destroy his entire neurotic mechanism, which consists solely in gaining the right to hate through the endurance of punishment.

I believe that this example, so typical of the manner of symptom-formation has made sufficiently clear to you what I conceive to be the causal relationship between the over-severity of the super-ego and the development of the neurotic symptom. Excessive repression leads to a damming up of instinct, to an overheated revolutionary atmosphere, out of which the neurotic symptom arises as a reaction, as a breaking through of the repressed. And this breaking through is made possible particularly because of the severe punitive system. The effect of this over-severity and of the punitive system is similar to the effect of an over-severe educational system which is based on punishment. The child soon notices that its forbidden deeds are wiped out by the punishment which follows, even in a moral sense. Thus it soon comes to take its punishment gladly in order to be thereby absolved from the sins committed. It then sins with the thought in back of its head,

"I will be punished for it anyway". The more schematically this educational system is applied, the more readily a situation will arise in which one gladly accepts even possibly too severe and unjust punishment to exculpate sins not yet committed. In this way there arises the truly paradoxical relationship between the child and its elders, namely that it provokes punishment so that it may sin freely.

Thus punishment makes possible the commission of forbidden acts. Our entire psychoanalytic experience concerning the meaning of symptoms has taught us that all neurotic symptoms mean the gratification of desires, which have been forbidden in childhood. And now we see that this gratification comes about in the same way as we see in unpsychological and unsuccessful educational methods. The over-severity of the punitive system of the super-ego plays the same rôle in connection with symptom formation as was played by the unpsychological teacher in connection with the unsuccessful upbringing of a child. This agreement is not surprising. We know the genesis of the super-ego in its relation to education. It is, of course, to a large extent the product of education.

Thus our deeper insight into the rôle of the super-ego in connection with symptom-formation strengthens an old and well established psychoanalytic assumption which assigns an important rôle in the causation of neurosis to infantile impressions, especially to those coming from the child's guides and teachers (for instance the castration threat). This assumption might be further enlarged upon and more precisely defined by putting the matter in this way: that it is perhaps the entire educational spirit of the parental home, more often than isolated traumatic impressions which condition the internal neurotic regime in the psyche. The pathological relation between the super-ego and the life of instinct mirrors the early infantile relation between the child and its unpsychological environment.

We have already indicated that the mechanism of symptom formation as described by us is fundamentally identical with Freud's statement of the mechanism of the manic-depressive

state. But it applies to all forms of neurosis even though it is differently expressed in the different conditions. Whereas the neurotic living-out of repressed tendencies and the punishment mechanism are separated into two great periods in the case of circular psychosis, into a manic and a depressed period, in the case of compulsion neurosis the living-out and punishment phenomena take place at the same time, one might almost say they oscillate, but are distributed among several symptoms. In the case of conversion hysteria, the meaning of an isolated symptom is a double one, the symptom has, at one and the same time, a wish significance and a punishment significance.

All three of these mechanisms are known to us also in the dream. It will now be quite clear why it is that these punishment tendencies of the super-ego which secretly foster the gratification of repressed wishes, are so ardently defended by the neurotic psyche; we understand why the sufferers cling so tenaciously to their oppressive suffering.

Man's hardest task is to face his own asocial tendencies without palliating circumstances. In social life, too, there are no transgressions which might not, under certain mitigating circumstances, be looked upon as excusable or even as justifiable; and such mitigating circumstances man makes possible for himself through his self-punishments, through the suffering in his neurosis.

He is more ready to admit to unconscious ego-alien tendencies (in the case just cited this took place spontaneously) than he is to relinquish the supreme narcissistic sovereignty of his internal court of justice, which itself, in its own sphere of influence, metes out punishments, and forgives transgressions.

LECTURE TWO

The Rôle of the Ego in the Neuroses. The Hysterical and Paranoid Mechanisms

In the last lecture we reached the conclusion that to understand the origin of the neurotic symptom we must become acquainted with the behavior of the super-ego as an unconscious judging faculty from which issues the demand on the ego to repress. We have seen that the conscious ego has nothing to do directly with the actual act of repression but that the responsibility for repression rests with that censoring faculty which occupies a more intimate relation to the unconscious than does the conscious ego itself. We saw that the faculty of conscious judgment has no direct relation to the repressed tendencies, since conscious judgment does not determine what should and what should not be repressed, and that consequently not only ego-alien but also ego-acceptable tendencies are repressed. It is therefore clear that to understand the origin of the neurotic symptom, to know how the repression takes place and how repressed tendencies find expression in the form of substitutive gratifications, we must become acquainted with those principles of the repressive faculty in accordance with which it prevents certain tendencies from gaining access to the motor system, and those conditions which make possible the substitutive gratification of certain modified repressed tendencies.

We have brought forward a significant well-substantiated accusation against the super-ego; namely, that its principles and working conditions are only apparently in line with the demands of the conscious personality. Secretly they give preference to the id, since the result of the function of repression, the neurotic symptom, is more closely allied to the tendencies of the id than to those of the ego. Indeed, the ego condemns the symptom.

Furthermore, we have described a common mechanism of neurotic symptom formation which is characteristic of every

symptom, one by means of which the super-ego maintains the appearance of adequately performing its duty and nevertheless keeps the way open for the tendencies of the id. We refer to the punishment mechanism—an important characteristic of every neurosis. It is manifested in the fact of suffering. In causing the suffering the super-ego rids itself of the accusation of contributory culpability. It can always call attention to the suffering, to the punishment it causes the personality as a whole. As a matter of fact this excuse is accepted by the conscious ego. The ego suffers in silence, does not bother to inquire how the suffering came about, and considers itself helpless in the face of the illness. This behavior, however, makes us somewhat suspicious of the ego itself. Perhaps it, too, is after all in some way responsible for the illness. Let us follow up this line of inquiry. Not without reason do our patients compare us in their dreams to a prosecuting attorney or detective.

The pre-psychoanalytic physician has always instinctively felt that the conscious personality somehow participates in the causation of the neuroses. He called these disorders imaginary, and urged the patient to pull himself together. Even now the non-psychoanalytic physician behaves in the same way. There are neurologists even to-day who impatiently dismiss a patient from their office if he shows no organic disorder.

This until recently quite generally prevalent naïve attitude of the physician (and of society), the latest representative of which is the Nancy school of auto-suggestion, is certainly incorrect, since it demands the impossible of the patient; namely, that he rid himself of his illness through effort. His conscious personality has no access to the cause of his illness; this access is made possible only through a psychoanalytic approach. And yet there is a kernel of truth in this quite unjust and unintelligent estimate of the neurotically ill. The conscious personality somehow does participate in the illness. We, too, require as a precondition for a successful analysis a desire to get well. Thus we have perhaps gone a little too far in holding the conscious personality so entirely blameless in the causation of the disorder. We did so, however,

only for the sake of avoiding an immediate complication of the matter.

To-day we shall round out what we have said by means of a significant correction. We have established on the basis of clinical facts that repression takes place without the knowledge of the conscious ego, that the conscious ego has no direct relation to the unconscious life of instinct, and we concluded from this that it consequently cannot participate in the result of repression—the neurosis. To-day, however, we found that the behavior of the conscious ego was somewhat suspect; it adjusted itself too readily to the illness, or perhaps we should say, to its own impotence in the face of the illness. If one does not take sufficiently seriously the suffering of a hysteric, and doubts the organic basis of his illness, he is to say the least offended. He defends the organic basis as long as possible because it lifts the disorder out of the realm of his psychic personality, and he will have nothing of a psychological approach to his illness. Often it requires a substantial bit of psychoanalytic work to rob the patient of his conviction that there is an organic basis for his illness.

But we have still weightier reasons for the assumption that the ego participates in the formation of the neurosis. We frequently see that the ego derives a benefit from the illness and clings to it in spite of the suffering involved. Think of the so-called " secondary benefit from illness ", which we were able to observe so clearly in the war neuroses.

In the anamnesis of every neurosis you will find on thorough investigation that there is a participation of the ego. We saw in the last lecture, in connection with the patient run over by an automobile, that after he was freed from the pressure of his sense of guilt through the accident, his hatred of his father came into consciousness and he identified himself with this hatred without conflict. Because he had been run over by an auto, it was possible for him to become hostile to his father. He had paid. A curious kind of logic, but nevertheless the ego accepts it. The ego has yielded to the id-syntonic secret purpose of the super-ego and holds the same view as the id. The tendencies of the id have

mastered the entire personality, as in the manic state. The super-ego had brought about such an unjust and severe punishment by means of the automobile accident that now anything is permissible to the id, and the ego must agree to this.

The inner political psychic coup has succeeded: the id has been egged on to the extent of breaking through all barriers, so that the whole personality is now under the sway of its apparently justifiable terrorism. And the ego participates in this. Up to now, the ego would have nothing to do with the ego-alien hatred of the father; now it changes colors and acknowledges this hatred. This change of heart we can explain only on the assumption that the ego, even before the outbreak of the id, was in secret sympathy with the id tendencies, and that its former attitude was not entirely sincere.

The ego possesses an outpost against the asocial tendencies of the id in the super-ego; to it it has turned over the entire interior administrative machinery. We must accuse the neurotic ego of not having adequately supervised this agent, perhaps of having been complacent in regard to its secret pact with the id. If we succeed in proving that the conscious personality participated in causing the accident, our accusation acquires great probability. We have seen that the automobile accident was due to an unintentional act, a "slip" which meant self-punishment, the secret purpose of which was to open an outlet for the hatred, to acquire through self-inflicted punishment the right to hate. You will recall how Freud proceeded in the analysis of unintentional acts. He put the question directly, "Can you give me some reason why it might have been agreeable for you to forget to mail the letter, to be late for your appointment?" etc. In most cases conscious motives were unearthed which might have brought about the same result as did the unintentional act. Let me remind you of Sachs's neat simile: that the dreamer sees as a tremendous thing, as through a microscope, something which appears in consciousness a mere unimportant trifle. In the dream, one brings about the death of a man who stumbled against him during the day. Now, if the hero of our automobile accident had been asked the

day before whether he entertained suicidal ideas, he would have admitted that he actually had toyed with such thoughts. I can assure you that this was the case. If moreover, he had been asked why he could not succeed in any of his undertakings, he would sooner or later have admitted that it was his own fault that he lost his positions. He behaved unpsychologically with his superiors in spite of a knowledge that this was to his disadvantage. Something urged him to behave in this way, and he gave in to the urge. His blood-thirsty super-ego drove him to it. For his super-ego was well acquainted with the ways of the undomesticated id, and knew that when the self-punishment went beyond a certain point the id would assert itself.

The ego submitted to this compulsive need for punishment without thinking, without investigating the motives. The ego favored these policies because it was weak and was fatigued by its perpetual conflict with the ego-alien id, traces of whose tendencies the ego also possessed.

We have now divided the psyche into three parts. It is now our duty to reconstruct it. A sharp inflexible division such as is demanded by heuristic methods of research is a simplification not well tolerated by reality. Personality constitutes a continuum. The most repressed, most ego-alien impulses of the id seep through into consciousness, and in case of psychic upheavals such as the automobile accident in our example, the tendencies of the id may gain the upper hand over the entire personality even in such a highly moral and respectable person as I have described. It is remarkable how Freud, in *The Ego and the Id,* succeeded in preserving the conception of this indestructible continuity of the personality, but nevertheless could bring clarity into its most obscure relationships. For the sake of clarity in exposition, my own method was cruder and more schematic. But now it is time for me to correct those points where I permitted myself too great a simplification of the real state of affairs. The personality as a whole is involved in the development of any neurosis. It is true that the super-ego is more closely in contact with the instinct urges than are the conscious parts of the personality but the

ultimate responsibility rests with the ego. The super-ego could abuse its administrative powers only because it sensed the weakness of the ego. The neurotic psyche has yielded to the id tendencies to a certain extent, and indeed to an extent greater than the demands of real life allow. It is true that the signal for repression must come from the super-ego, because it has the capacity for internal perception, but the ultimate opposition to the id issues from the ego. The ego is to blame because it secures for itself the privilege of acceding to the urges of the id through submitting to the punishment meted out by the super-ego. The super-ego punishes instead of prohibiting; the ego suffers instead of renouncing. Such an abuse of the repressive forces by the super-ego as takes place in the neuroses is only possible if there is an enfeebled ego. Consequently our therapeutic aim is to strengthen the ego, to remove the corrupt super-ego and its punishment mechanism from the control of the instinctual life, and to bring the re-enforced ego into direct relation with the id, with the instinctual urges. We must raise the level of the entire personality in the direction of the conscious ego.

At this point it is necessary to reconsider the relation of the ego to the super-ego. We must not forget that the super-ego is a differentiated part of the ego or, as Freud says, "a stage in the ego". The super-ego is that part of the personality which is the intrapsychic representative of the standpoint of rearing and education, of the requirements of morality. It is nevertheless a part of the ego which has acquired an unusually important rôle in connection with repression, with the regulation of the instinctual urges. It was only clinical experience that justified us in separating it from the ego. We derive most of our psychological knowledge from the study of the neuroses, and this circumstance should warn us, especially in this question against a too one-sided point of view. The peculiar position of the super-ego within the ego, the conflict between ego and super-ego is particularly characteristic of the neuroses; in normal persons no sharp antagonism between the two is possible. Because the super-ego operates for the most part unconsciously and is relatively inaccessible

to conscious judgment and intelligence, it becomes more or less independent of the rest of the ego, even of the conscious ego-ideal, and in certain neuroses actually constitutes a circumscribed separate personality within the individual.

After thus correcting our description, let us proceed to investigate the rôle of the super-ego (and ego) in the various neuroses. But first it might be well to state, and thus strengthen one of our former assertions, that it is the behavior of the super-ego which is the distinguishing feature of the different neuroses, and that the remainder of the personality participates only by acquiescence. The ego retains its greatest strength in hysteria because in this case it succeeds in making light of the sense of guilt. It has less strength in the compulsion neurosis, and in melancholia and the psychoses it is weakest. If I begin my discussion with the hysterical conversion symptom, it is not simply because this symptom has a claim to historical priority, but because in this case the rôle of the ego is of least importance. As Freud put it, in this condition the criticizing function of the super-ego is completely repressed. The shift to the physical almost completely relieves the ego. In this condition it is able to assert its innocence most boldly. The symptom is located in the depths of the physical processes, and to this region the ego has no access; it truly falls outside the ego's administrative district. The ego is aware of the suffering and illness, exploits it thoroughly for its own purposes, but stands firm in its contention, "I know nothing. I am responsible for nothing." This attitude of the hysteric is well known; it explains why he defends so ardently the organic theory of his symptoms, and behaves so arrogantly to his environment. Let us see how a conversion symptom develops. For this purpose we choose a simple example, since we do not wish to present an interesting case but a typical situation. Let us consider the shame reaction, blushing, a well known conversion symptom.

The general mechanism described in our first lecture is to be found in this specific example. A repressed tendency, exhibitionism, creates an outlet for itself, because it simultaneously induces suffering. The person who is ashamed becomes red in

the face, the one uncovered part of the body, attracting thereby the attention of the environment. Nevertheless this act of exhibitionism is felt as painful. The ego has no idea that there is an exhibitionistic tendency in the blushing. If you try to explain to the patient that he blushes in order to exhibit himself, he will laugh in your face. He will tell you that his real wish was for a hole into which to crawl. And as a matter of fact his behavior in so far as it is based on conscious intention gives force to his assertion. He is reserved, bashful, fearful of being conspicuous—yet his bodily reaction, blushing, indicates that he is also just the contrary. How does this happen? How can we describe this process in terms of our knowledge of the structure of the personality? The rôle of the super-ego is obvious. Shame is the typical reaction wherever there is strong sexual repression. The super-ego is too severe and has repressed all of the genital libido along with the incest wish. Thus inhibited, the genital libido at first regressively invests pre-genital levels such as the exhibitionistic one. With this the chances for libidinal discharge are increased, because the super-ego is less harsh with non-genital libidinal manifestations. But even this transformation of the instinct by means of regression is insufficient. The tendency to exhibitionism is still burdened with a feeling of guilt; it is still too closely related to the Oedipus complex, to the infantile pleasure in exhibiting. In the modified impulse the super-ego recognizes the derivative of repressed genitality and now inhibits all manifestations of exhibitionism. The individual, whose every means of expression is tied down in this way, hardly dares to stir. All his movements are condemned as sinful and blocked by the super-ego.

Because all natural manifestations of exhibitionism, which under other circumstances would find an important and justifiable outlet in speech and gesture, are inhibited, there ensues a state of excessive tension, and the desire to exhibit finds a new avenue of physical expression in directions no longer accessible to the censoring forces. But even after taking this roundabout path, the exhibitionism must lose its pleasure-giving quality and appear in

consciousness as painful. Thus the super-ego has technically carried out its task and pursued the incest wish in all its manifestations, inhibiting every impulse in the slightest degree suspected of being in some way related to the incest wish. Nevertheless, it has merely carried out the letter of the law, not the spirit. Were it not so over-severe it would tolerate those sublimated manifestations of the exhibitionistic tendencies which have been accepted by the ego, and which might have found a legitimate outlet in social intercourse as ordinary expressive movements of speech and gesture.

In a morbid shame reaction all expressive movements are hindered, speech is silenced, and gesture inhibited. The result of this over-severity is that the exhibitionism comes to expression in a much less sublimated form—in a sign of sexual excitement, blushing. Thus it is apparent that the super-ego through over-severity again gives aid to the repressed id tendencies, and that it does so because its over-done inhibiting so raises the tension in the id that it must seek an outlet, so to speak, behind the super-ego's back.

Another factor just as important as the excessive damming up of instinctive urges is the suffering or punishment included in the symptom—the other condition for symptom-formation. The regressive reactivation of exhibitionism as a substitute for inhibited genitalism does not in itself suffice to bring about a discharge of the instinctive urges. The need for punishment must also be satisfied. The exhibitionistic tendencies can be manifested in the form of blushing only when they are accompanied by suffering. We shall see later that, like instinctual regression, symbolic disguise of the meaning of the repressed tendencies is also in itself insufficient to permit the gratification of instinct in neurotic symptoms in contravention of the protective forces of the ego and super-ego. Under all circumstances the need for punishment must also be satisfied. Without neurotic suffering there can be no neurotic gratification.

In the case of the conversion symptoms also we may, therefore, accuse the super-ego of being in secret collusion with the id. All

that it can muster in its defense is, that it did not grant permission for pleasurable indulgence, but only for a painful one, for suffering. This whole process is located in the unconscious, involving the super-ego and the id, and the ego is aware only of the effect of this subterranean battle, suffering because of it. The only thing we can hold against the ego is its indolence, its refusal to find out what is going on. It had turned over the whole business of instinct regulation to the super-ego, which was then able calmly to abuse its independence by allying itself with the id, yet because it could point to the manifest fact of punishment was still able to maintain the appearance of morality. The ego in its turn utilized the suffering as proof of its innocence and permitted the exhibitionism to be satisfied in blushing. That a woman's blushing excites the sexual aggressiveness of a man, who unconsciously grasps its significance, no longer makes an impression on the ego. When we undertake the psychoanalytic treatment of a case of morbid shame reaction it becomes our task to bring about a rapport between the conscious ego and the urges of the id, and to eliminate the corrupt super-ego by exposing the covert provocative intention of its over-severity. From now on the ego itself must determine which sexual stirrings it will admit and which it will reject, and compromise solutions such as the shame reaction are in this way out of the question. In the case of the conversion symptom, then, the contributory guilt of the ego lies chiefly in its ignorance.

Another method of dealing with the exhibitionistic tendency may serve us as an example of a different neurotic mechanism, of the paranoid. For this I shall refer to a case met with in my practice, although it is a very typical case. Every analyst has surely seen many such cases. You are undoubtedly acquainted with those frigid women who spend such a large part of their lives in the waiting rooms of various medical specialists seeking treatment for innumerable chronic and apparently organic ailments. In a case of this type I was able to demonstrate very clearly the part played by exhibitionism in determining this craving to be treated. Gynecological complaints were the outstanding ones in

my patient's case. Even as a girl she had been obliged to undergo a gynecological examination although because of her resistiveness the examination could only be carried out under narcosis. Other evidence of inhibited exhibitionism was definitely present. She could not ride on a street car because, as she said, she didn't want everyone on the car to goggle at her. As happens so often in the course of a psychoanalysis, as soon as I had called her attention to the exhibitionistic element in her street car phobia and in her craving to be doctored, I myself became the focus of her exhibitionism. Like a hunted criminal whom one would least expect to find in the home of the chief of police, the repressed tendency, after it had been exposed in all its manifestations in real life, had fled into the transference. It made use of a trick of Casanova's, who escaped from the prison in the Doge's Palace, and immediately when his escape was discovered, took refuge for the night in the house of the chief of police. During one of the analytic sessions, the patient elaborated her ideas concerning the hidden motives of medical practitioners and expressed the opinion that psychoanalysts in particular are outspoken voyeurs. The meaning of her acute observation was transparent. What she meant to say was, that it was not herself who went to a physician to exhibit herself, but that the physician treated her only in order that he might gaze upon her psychic nakedness. She stated quite definitely that therapeutic ambitions, granting that he had any, were really only side-issues for the psychoanalyst, and that the real point of his profession was to get an opportunity to observe the naked soul of women. While she was saying this, and I was admitting that she had very cleverly discerned the unsublimated basis of all scientific research, she shifted her position on the couch so abruptly that, quite unwittingly, she exposed her legs above the knees. Thus she succeeded in being exhibitionistic at the precise moment in which she had been able to exculpate herself of her sense of guilt by shifting it to me. At the very moment in which she demonstrated to me and to herself that it was not she who wished to show herself, and that it was I who wished to look at her, the exhibitionistic tendency which had been re-

pressed up to this point because of her sense of guilt, succeeded in manifesting itself. I facilitated this projection of her sense of guilt when I praised her keenness.

From a psychoanalytic point of view this case is commonplace enough, but for this reason it is all the more suitable for the study of its mechanism. Let me remind you that, as a matter of fact the biblical account of the Creation begins with this mechanism. When God took Adam to task, he answered, " The woman Thou gavest me led me astray by means of the apple ", that is, by showing the breast. And Eve in her turn shifted the blame to the serpent; *i.e.,* the phallus.

Although the meaning of the guilt projection is very obvious, the economic and structural relations are much more complicated here than in the previous case. This mechanism already resembles the paranoid one, in fact is identical with it. The part played by the ego here is much more important and the super-ego is eliminated. The emergence of the repressed tendency here takes place in an entirely different way than in the previous cases. In the case of the neurotic who was run over by the automobile we saw that the super-ego, by imposing a harsh punishment and thus causing suffering, had opened a path for the repressed hate. Through its severity the super-ego had provoked violence and made moral precepts absurd. The rôle of the ego consisted in yielding to the punitive desires of the super-ego; that is to say, through unintentional carelessness provoking the accident, then accepting the tenuous logic which made the father in some way responsible for the accident. In the conversion symptom, the shame reaction, something similar took place, but the ego's participation was considerably less. But both cases have this in common, that the ego furthers the secret alliance between the super-ego and the id by assuming the imposed punishment and then yielding to the id. In the mechanism of projection something occurs which differs from this process. The ego yields to the id to a much larger extent, indeed goes so far as to falsify its perceptions of the real world and to reshape reality in harmony with the tendencies of the id. Let us attempt a reconstruction of the psychology of this process by means of our example.

In this case, as in the previous one, a conversion mechanism was first used to obtain an outlet for the instinctive urge. The continual protean organic disorders of this woman were, of course, the result of sexual repression. The wish to be examined served to satisfy her exhibitionism, which had increased in intensity, and being treated was a substitute for the passive rôle in the sexual act. The suffering furnished her an excuse. She was really ill and thus forced to exhibit her body. Only such terroristic weapons as these were of avail against the harsh super-ego of this frigid woman. Yet it was the super-ego itself which, by its behavior, provoked the use of these weapons. When I destroyed this hysterical mechanism through exposing the hidden meaning of her craving for medical examinations, she seized upon another mechanism, the paranoid one. Her only remaining recourse lay in disavowing her exhibitionism. Indeed the paranoid mechanism is nothing else than a disavowal, a falsification of inner and external reality. I had explained to the patient that she went to the doctor in order to exhibit herself. She answered this with a disavowal: "*I* do not wish to show myself; the physician wishes to gaze upon me." I had destroyed the creation of the super-ego, the hysterical mechanism, through my interpretation. I call this mechanism the creation of the super-ego because it is brought into being as a reaction to the super-ego's severity. Thereby her ego was brought into direct contact with her repressed tendencies, and proved itself weak in the face of them. The hysterical mechanism had served to disguise and excuse her proscribed exhibitionism. After the disguise as well as the excuse was punctured by interpretation, she could only belie her tendencies. Then it became evident that, as Freud says, the ego is like a constitutional monarch, absolutely powerless when deprived of its administrative machinery. It became subject to the id and falsified reality in accord with the id tendencies. This woman, who wished to exhibit herself and who could no longer do so unconsciously and guiltlessly after being deprived of her hysterical mechanism, hallucinated that she was being scrutinized by the physician. She simply took no cognizance of her own exhi-

bitionistic wishes. Thus she also falsified inner reality. The paranoid mechanism was a substitute for the destroyed hysterical one which, up to this point, had enabled her to gratify her exhibitionism without a sense of guilt. In one sense this paranoid mechanism has the same purpose as our therapeutic endeavors: to drive the super-ego from the field, bring ego and id into direct contact, and remove the unconscious repression mechanism. But in this hand-to-hand fight, the feeble ego is at the mercy of the more powerful id. It is the aim of the analysis to bring the id into direct contact with a strengthened ego, an ego able to dominate the id.

At the Salzburg Psychoanalytic Congress, I expressed these relations as follows: The neurotic state is not one of stable equilibrium. The release of repressed material has been paid for too dearly with suffering. Two courses are open for the attainment of a real equilibrium. One leads to a psychosis; the other to health. In both cases the psychic apparatus has become homogeneous. In the psychosis it is unequivocally dominated by the tendencies of the id; in health, by those of the ego.

I hope that I have successfully demonstrated by means of these examples how much these theoretical considerations can contribute to aid our therapeutic craft. These theories are not so very sterile; they come from clinical experience, and can always be applied to clinical facts. They make the management of a psychoanalytic treatment much more of a conscious procedure. Therapeutic intuition, healing art can be replaced at many points by knowledge. Thereby we may avoid many false paths. If we bear these economic-structural relationships in mind, if we are better able to estimate the effect of our interpretations, we will realize that the elimination of the super-ego and the removal of repressions should be brought about only to the extent which the given status of the ego permits. To deprive the conscious ego of its protector against the id, the super-ego, and thus deliver it to the onslaught of the repressed tendencies, is not without danger. It may happen altogether too easily that the ego itself yields before this onslaught, regresses to primitive levels, and adapts to the id instead of elevating the latter. Every regressive manifestation experienced

by the patient during an analysis in this way signifies a yielding on the part of the ego. In an analysis conducted on correct economic principles, deep regressions will not play an important part. Consequently, we must begin the treatment, as Freud suggested, with the superficial part of the psyche, and so prepare the ego for the struggle it must carry on with the ego-alien tendencies during the course of the analysis. Freud's statement that in his analyses he had not met with the deep regressions described by Rank, such as a reproduction of the birth experience, thus becomes intelligible. Abraham also denies having seen manifestations of this sort. In an analysis conducted on correct economic principles, the ego is not driven to such acts of desperation. It is satisfied with more moderate regressions, which still lie within the scope of psychoanalytic insight; that is, within the field of what can be remembered. A re-living during an analysis, which is not accompanied by any insight, Freud regards as an unmitigated misfortune.

The provocation of an affective re-living of the birth sensations, as proposed by Rank, is contrary to the basic principles of psychoanalytic treatment. A regression to such a deep level (and I agree with Rank that such do occur) is a symptom of resistance. In the analysis it is our task to permit, so far as it lies in our power, only such re-living as can be cleared up by insight, memories, or at the least, by a feeling of conviction. It cannot be assumed that the patient realizes his struggle against ending the analysis in the form of birth sensations. He can have only a purely intellectual insight into this. Neither the analyst nor the patient can do anything with such a regressive re-living of affects. The resistance to giving up the analytic situation, which, moreover, has many prototypes besides the biological separation at birth, such, for example, as weaning, learning to walk, leaving the parental home, etc., must with all its objective motives become conscious. Psychoanalytic experience demonstrates that either one or several of these later separations may exert a pathological influence. Most people have dealt successfully with the biological separation from the mother, better than with their later psychic problems, with

later demands that they be independent. Our effort is to have repeated in the transference those traumatic situations which really remain unsolved. The affective repetition of birth means a regressive avoidance of this effort. The repetition of really pathogenic situations is to be effected by a rational utilization of the economic point of view or by therapeutic intuition. Once we overcome our sceptical attitude to theory, which though abstract, to be sure, is nevertheless well founded, we shall perhaps have sacrificed a little of our narcissistic confidence in our art, but we shall gain instead a certitude and uniformity in our treatment of the neuroses.

And we add, there is one other advantage: art is the privilege of the select few; knowledge is accessible to all.

LECTURE THREE

Reasons for a Presentation of the Neuroses in Dramatic Form—The Dynamic Structure of the Compulsion Neuroses and the Phobias

I should not like to proceed with my expositions until I have given you a justification of my method of procedure. I feel duty bound to offer this justification, not because I consider my method of presentation particularly novel or original (for it derives from Freud), but because it might seem somewhat too consistently limited to one style. I refer to the dramatic style of presentation, to the fact that I describe the different parts or faculties of the personality too much as if they were separate independent individuals who must carry on various conflicts with one another. It may seem to you that I go too far in this direction when I represent the neuroses as intrapsychic dramas of this sort, dramas in which I undertake to allot rôles to the different individual parts of the psyche, and ascribe to them intentions and motives, even personal attributes. Thus, I speak of the secret provocative plans and of the corruption of the super-ego, which often behaves like an *agent provocateur,* of the terroristic weapons of the id, and of the indolence of the ego. Surely there must arise in your mind the question whether this is merely a metaphorical allegorical manner of presentation or whether I seriously mean these expressions to be taken literally. Do I really believe that the psyche consists of three parts which are three personalities, and which come into conflict with one another in the neuroses? I almost consider it presumptuous for me to defend a way of looking at things and of presenting them, in which I play simply the part of an interpreter. The sole point for which I can be brought to book is whether I have not gone too far in my use of this mode of presentation, whether I do not take it more literally than Freud himself does, and mistake his figures of speech for realities. I cannot answer this question in one sentence; nevertheless I should

like to make clear that I consider this mode of presentation in no way merely allegorical. I am in earnest about the division of the personality into part-personalities, which, it is true, are closely connected, merge into one another, and form a whole, but which still, especially in neurotics, maintain a much more independent existence than we have hitherto imagined.

I must take up this question now, because in my presentation of the compulsion neurosis I intend to go considerably further in my dramatizing of the psychic conflict than I have so far found necessary. In the compulsion neurosis the personality is split to a much greater degree than in hysteria or paranoia. Therefore, I am afraid that unless I proceed to justify this mode of presentation you will no longer be willing to follow my exposition, and that you will accuse me of abusing Freud's intuitive descriptions either naïvely or consciously for the purpose of transmuting psychology into *belles-lettres*.

The division of the total personality into fairly independent parts is the fundamental scientific contribution of psychoanalysis. It was formulated when the discovery of unconscious mental processes was made. With Freud's discovery that there were mental processes, similar to conscious ones, of which the subject was not aware, the question of the possibility of an unconscious personality was, in principle, answered in the affirmative. In describing the relations between the repressing and the repressed forces, both of which are unconscious, we are attempting on the basis of certain of their manifestations, a reconstruction of these unconscious parts of the personality in respect to their psychological content.

On the other hand, it is quite true that a large part of the unconscious tendencies, the instincts, which for the present we topographically locate in the id, are not in any way bound together into a personality but, instead, are particularly characterized by their lack of systematization, by the coexistence of separate and contradictory strivings. These deepest dynamic forces, standing as they do at the boundary of the physical and the psychical, do not as yet require a personifying representation. We are aware,

however, that the first cohesion and organization of this chaotic world of instinct takes place in the child as early as the stage of primary narcissism, in the form of an ego-construction. This primary narcissistic nucleus of the ego, which is still beyond good and evil, persists in the neurotic in a form less restricted than in normal persons, and is calculated to come into conflict with the higher parts of the ego. In such cases it is really true that there are two souls in one body. Whereas the higher parts of the ego correspond to the manifest visible character, the narcissistic nucleus, retained and preserved from childhood, represents the character of a four or five year old child. The conflict which psychoanalytic investigation reveals in such cases really gives the impression of a struggle between a stubborn child and its elders.

Even more outspokenly personal in form is that psychic agency which Freud describes as belonging (in its essentials) to the unconscious ego: the super-ego. Freud first recognized this agency in the dream censorship, and even then ascribed to it numerous personal qualities. A censorship is in itself a personification, a personified being, which has definite points of view and duties. In the course of time the concept of the censorship was extended more and more to mean an unconscious personality. The steps in this development are the introduction of the idea of narcissism, the conception of the ego-ideal, and finally the idea of an unconscious need to be punished. With the analytic interpretation of states of grief and of melancholia, Freud laid a firm foundation for all of our later knowledge about the censoring, unconsciously judging, and punishing part-personality, and to mark the amplification in our understanding of it, gave it a new designation: the super-ego. The description given by Freud of the ego-ideal as the precipitate of relinquished object relationships and of freshly set-up personalities within the psyche, justifies our assumption that besides the conscious personality there is at least one unconscious agency which to a greater or less degree represents a circumscribed personality, and which represents the demands of upbringing, having been formed with the parents as a model by a process of identification. Whether, and to what

extent, we must conceive the nucleus of the personality, primary narcissism, as a person-like psychic construction is a question which an increasing knowledge of the mechanisms of the neuroses alone can solve. That this primary narcissistic nucleus corresponds to the first coördination of disorderly instincts into an ego-like structure, and that it is in constant conflict with the more highly organized ego-ideal of the neurotic, may be taken as established. Perhaps it will eventually prove that some of the conflicts which we think of at present as taking place between the super-ego and id are more accurately to be described as conflicts between ego-ideal and primary narcissism, as Tausk and more recently Schilder[1] have assumed. But inasmuch as the primary narcissistic nucleus is still very close to the id, a description of the neurotic conflict which does not take this distinction into account will suffice for our present needs. Furthermore a description of the conflict between primary and secondary narcissism (ego-ideal) is in its essentials contained in Freud's paper,[2] in which he first wrote of the structural relations within the personality.

In the normal psyche all these ego structures form a more or less coherent and integrated whole in which they coöperate harmoniously. Primary narcissism collects the different individual strivings at the boundary of the physical and the psychic, coordinates them, and conducts them as a coördinated bundle of instincts in which the individual antagonistic pleasure strivings are brought into harmony with one another for the good of the total *biological* individual. A second sifting of the instincts, this time from the standpoint of *social* demands, is the function of the super-ego. Only after this double inspection do the psychic tendencies reach the conscious ego, which then aims to bring them into more accurate adaptation with the actual and accidental conditions of reality, that is to say, tries to bring them into harmony with the final results of reality-testing. In the neurotic

[1] Schilder, P., *Zur Pathologie des Ich—Ideals.* Zeit. f. PsA., **8**, 322, 1922.
[2] *Zur Einführung des Narzissmus.* Jahrbuch **6**, 1914. Collected Works, Vol. 6, 1922.

psyche this coöperation is disturbed, the different agencies are mutually hostile, the integrity of the personality is lost, and the individual parts acquire an extensive mutual independence. According to Freud's classical formulation, external activities are replaced by internal processes. And these internal processes take place between the different psychic parts. Let me remind you of my metaphor, in which this intrapsychic state of affairs was compared to the social conditions following a lost war, when the strivings of the defeated country for success in foreign politics cease and give way to internal political struggles. But, in this macroscopic enlargement, in the state, the internal political struggles are visible; whereas we can only deduce internal conflicts between the part-personalities of the psyche. They are, however, none the less real. On the contrary, it is much more of an abstraction to consider conscious strivings and motives as entities. For this is the sort of abstraction we make when we say "One state is carrying on negotiations with another one." In reality these negotiations are being carried on by individual men, the official representatives of the two countries. But their policy coincides only with the *official* policy of the two countries. Besides this official policy, there are frequently numerous party policies, some which may even be directly opposed to the official one. The official policy in foreign politics, in a constitutional state, is a compromise between the different party policies. Even though the representatives of the two countries can consider only the official policy as valid and binding, nevertheless, if they are good politicians, they will not ignore or consider non-existing the other opinions obtaining in the foreign country, nor will they regard these as completely ineffective. Thus, for example, if they were closing a friendly treaty with a foreign land, they would be forced to exercise caution if they knew that in this latter country there was a powerful war party, even though the militaristic policy of this party had not become the official foreign policy of the country. But it would occur to no one to deny the existence of such militaristic tendencies, even if for the moment they were not externalized. To be sure, diplomats who wish to

orient themselves as to the internal affairs of a foreign country are in a more favorable position than we are when we try to catch a glimpse into another human psyche. In general, of all the activities which take place within another person, we are acquainted only with the official policy, only with so much as is manifested in external expression. We receive no daily press dispatches from the psychic depths of our fellow man. As to his repressed cravings, or his repressing forces, in short as to his various party policies, we can learn only through a laborious psychoanalysis. Hence we are inclined to think of these different parties in the personality as less real than their outward manifestations. But the more proficient we become in the psychoanalytic dissection of the personality, the more does it appear to us as a microscopic state, in which various opposing opinions and tendencies are in conflict; and the more do we learn to regard voluntary activities as to the final outcome of these internal struggles. Therefore, when I describe the super-ego as a person and neurotic conflicts as struggles between different persons, I mean it, and regard this description as not just a figurative presentation.

I believe this comprehensive justification of the dramatic mode of presentation necessary because with the analysis of the ego, we enter a new field of our science (which itself is young), and our thinking has not as yet accepted sufficiently the reality of these invisible intrapsychic part-personalities. But we must recollect too that the conception of atoms and molecules did not always have the same reality value as it has to-day. Yet even before the discovery of their immediately perceivable manifestation, Brownian movement, we were able to deduce the existence of molecules with considerable certainty. Furthermore, in the study of the neuroses there is no lack of such visible manifestations of a divided personality. There are, for example, the true cases of dual personality—quite rare, to be sure. But the compulsion neurosis lacks few of the indubitable manifestations of a dual personality.

In his " Lectures on Psychoanalysis ", Freud begins his pres-

entation of the compulsion neurosis with the observation that a person suffering from a compulsion neurosis feels in himself cravings which are alien to or incompatible with his conscious personality. Freud assumed that these cravings—" dystonic ", ego-incompatible—which are either pointless, or such as would offend aesthetic and moral feelings, are derivatives of repressed tendencies. Other obsessive impulses, again, have an outspoken moral or social quality; indeed, they are even, as in the case of hand washing compulsions, the exaggeration of demands made on the individual during his training in cleanliness. These over-moral or over-aesthetic obsessive impulses, Freud formulated as assurances (over-compensations) against ego-alien tendencies. The theory of the ego has enlarged our knowledge of the mechanism of a compulsion neurosis, so that we now consider one part of the obsessional symptoms as manifestations of one part-personality, which especially in the compulsion neurosis is well-defined and readily circumscribable, namely, the super-ego; whereas another part of the symptoms are manifestations of a less unified part of the psyche—the id. The conscious ego is here really a mere spectator at the struggle between these two parts, and is completely paralyzed so far as external activity is concerned. The coexistence of these two antagonistic forces; the ego-alien hostile ones, directed against the environment, and the over-moral ones directed against the individual's own person, can be seen in some form or other in every case of compulsion neurosis. Most commonly, the over-moral tendencies come to expression in the form of compulsive acts, which represent an exaggeration of the requirements of upbringing, while the aggressive urges appear as obsessive thoughts with a content painful to or incompatible with the conscious ego, such as: murderous ideas, ideas of dirty activities (putting excretions in one's mouth, etc.), sometimes even the idea of sexual intercourse with the members of one's family. In other cases, the asocial impulses are cloaked in the form of incomprehensible, pointless symptomatic actions of a compulsive nature (forced touching of objects, or various ceremonials while walking, etc.), and the over-

moral tendencies may appear, not as outspoken symptoms, but in the guise of certain exaggerated traits of character, such as excessive scrupulousness, over-punctuality, etc. The combining possibilities for the distribution of the two types of tendency into compulsive actions, thoughts, and character traits, are so numerous, that an accurate morphology of the various compulsion neuroses would in itself require a monograph.

It is obvious that we are dealing with two great opposing tendencies in the same personality; an outspokenly moral one, and a crudely asocial one. In most cases one cannot speak of a real repression, for the impulses ordinarily repressed in normal persons here come into consciousness as compulsions, often scarcely disguised at all. On the basis of our introductory remarks, we know why this is possible. The connection between the two antagonistically directed tendencies is now intelligible. The oversevere manifestations of the super-ego render possible the appearance in consciousness of the ego-hostile impulses.

We have already formulated the over-morality of the compulsion neurotic as an assurance against his overly strong aggressive impulses. But this description of the connection is not completely exhaustive. The stern conscientiousness and the other over-moral, for the most part ascetic, traits of character in many compulsion neurotics, as well as the obsessive symptoms with an over-moral meaning (those directed against the individual's own self), serve for the relief of his sense of guilt, remove the inhibiting effect of his conscience, and permit the manifestation of the ego-alien impulses.

We must not forget, however, that the manifestations of asocial impulses in the compulsion neurosis are of a most harmless nature. They are gratified either in apparently meaningless actions or in obsessive thoughts which can bring real harm to no one. But the manifestation of morality is of a similar nature. It is a morality of technicalities and concerns itself with trivialities and externals. It might almost be said that the over-morality of the compulsion neurotic was his own private affair, which neither harmed nor benefited anyone. A close investigation of

this point shows, nevertheless, that this statement is not entirely accurate. The compulsion neurotic is over-punctual, over-cleanly, over-systematic, but in vitally important matters he frequently indulges in strikingly asocial conduct. Inhibited compulsion neurotics, who, in trivial and inconsequential matters, show an almost silly over-punctuality and scrupulosity, and almost exaggerated consideration for their fellow men, are willing to be supported by their relatives during the best years of their lives, suffer no pangs of conscience on this score, and often impose shocking hardships upon those about them. This asocial behavior is made possible by their formal "letter-of-the-law" correctness, which serves to conceal from them the real spirit of their doings. They pay by means of form—by strict literal compliance with technicalities.

In the course of psychoanalytic treatment, the bringing out of this hitherto neglected economic relation between the moral punitive tendencies and the "living out" of the repressed ones often has a most powerful effect on the patients, an effect not to be compared with the effect of the analysis of individual symptoms. The whole economic structure of the neurosis is broken up, the possibility of relieving the sense of guilt with a silly caricature of good behavior is removed. The analysis is transformed from inefficacious puzzle solving into a serious affair. A compulsion neurotic has a strong weapon if he is able successfully to turn essential things into trivialities. If the analyst follows him in this, and feels it his duty to apply the analytic art of interpretation with great conscientiousness to all these bagatelles, he incurs the danger of soon becoming quite harmless so far as the patient is concerned. Physician and patient become lost in the interesting and attractive pursuit of symptom analysis. But the secret design of the neurosis, to mask the aggression and all the asocial tendencies by means of the harmless and absurd symptoms and thus divert attention from their more serious even though disguised manifestations, has won out. A careful investigation of the life situation of a compulsion neurotic will always reveal certain real, serious manifestations of aggression, as well as a

clinging to an infantile state of affairs in real life. A silly, insincere morality, absurd manifestations of ego-alien impulses as symptoms, and along with these a real, for the most part, concealed manifestation of the latter in real life; these are the fundamental characteristics of the compulsion neurosis. Nevertheless, we must not forget that in exchange for the real manifestations of his asocial tendencies he must pay dearly with suffering, with real inhibitions on his active functions. So, this neurosis, like any other, means a victory of the infantile asocial part of the psyche and a defeat of the more highly developed part.

After this general economic characterization of the compulsion neurosis, let us attempt to uncover the more intimate parts of its structure. This will be possible only on the basis of clinical cases. During psychoanalytic treatment, we are in a position to acquire a deeper insight into the intrapsychic relations of the personality only after we have succeeded in assuming for our patient the rôle which he has hitherto ascribed to his super-ego. When we succeed in this, there comes to light in the affective relation between patient and physician those relations which have hitherto lain hidden within his personality expressed as intrapsychic relations between the parts of the ego. During this period of the analysis, the compulsion neurotic tries to demonstrate that our behavior, our interpretations, are absurd and trivial, the same method he has hitherto used against the demands of his super-ego. This striving to provoke us into expressions, or even into commands or prohibitions, which he may then subject to doubts, attacks, or criticism, which he can reduce *ad absurdum,* is obviously a repetition of the inner drama, in which the leading parts are always played by an obstinate aggressive child and his over-severe, unjust, unpsychological elders. The devolution of this drama is frequently made difficult and complicated by the fact that the relation between the child and his upbringer, that is between the repressed and the repressing tendencies, often absorbs all the sado-masochistically regressed libido of the patient. In a similar fashion, his relation to the physician in the transference is a purely sado-masochistic one.

I should not like to close this lecture without discussing a clinical case. The choice of a case suitable for presentation is somewhat difficult, for there are so many varieties of compulsion neurosis, so many gradations, that one case will hardly suffice to illustrate the structural relationships. We shall devote another lecture solely to the presentation of clinical observations. To-day we shall discuss one case which will demonstrate to you how the over-severity of the super-ego clears the path for the repressed tendencies.

A middle-aged woman, the mother of three children, suffered from an inability to go out on the street, and from a horrible obsession which destroyed her nightly rest. The content of this obsession was that she might get up during the night and strangle her children in their sleep. Her inability to go out on the street was expressed in her not being able to go out unattended, because of the idea that she might become faint and fall down. However, if she took someone with her, this fear disappeared completely. During her treatment the following important details came to light: Her most intense fear appeared on crowded streets such as the Tauentzienstrasse, Leipzigerstrasse, or Friedrichstrasse. As companions she preferably took along her little daughter or her step-sister. The murder obsession had recently become much more intense since she had decided on accompanying her husband on a journey to which she had been looking forward for some time. Ostensibly she came to the analyst because of this aggravation of her condition. Because of the frequent illness of her children she had been forced to postpone this journey several times.

To explain this case, we must briefly characterize this woman. She was a self-sacrificing mother and dutiful wife, who had devoted herself throughout her married life primarily to the physical care of her children. Her relation to her husband was superficially good, but devoid of content. Social affairs, diversions, travels hardly entered the mind of this well-to-do couple—a perfect example of a banal, middle-class marriage, in which the wife's frigidity in sexual intercourse was almost a simple matter

of respectability. Her life, then, was not in any way superficially remarkable—a puritanic bourgeois existence—and every moralist would have felt that this woman's terrible affliction was a very grave injustice on the part of fate. How had she deserved this fate? How did such horrible murderous ideas enter the mind of this over-moral wife and self-sacrificing mother? The solution of this problem in the light of the economic knowledge outlined above is no longer difficult; especially when we mention an important circumstance in her previous history recounted in her second analytic session, and called to mind through a striking slip of the tongue. In relating her history we must, for many reasons, restrict ourselves to those facts which are of most importance and have the most general bearing.

To my question, whether she had sisters or brothers, she replied in the negative. But the next second, with marked embarrassment and surprise at herself, she corrected her mistake: she had for the moment forgotten that she had two step-sisters and a brother. In fact, she said that one of the step-sisters was living in the same city as herself, and that they saw each other almost every day, for she took this sister along whenever she went out shopping. This forgetting her sister was an unintentional error which is to be regarded as an unconscious confession, in the sense that Reik uses this term, a confession of her repressed wish to do away with the sister. The step-sisters were the offspring of her father's first marriage. Our patient was in the truest sense of the word a "middle child", wedged in between the two older step-sisters and the younger brother. Concerning her not quite clear relationships with her brother and sisters, she had only the feeling that they all barred the way to her beloved father. Besides feelings of jealousy in respect to her younger brother, a strong maternal attitude played a great part.

With this account we have given the factors which are of most importance for the understanding of the neurosis. I shall now attempt to develop for you briefly the insight which I gained into this case. As a child, the patient showed marked death wishes directed against the rivals who were born in the previous mar-

riage, *i.e.*, against her step-sisters. The birth of her little brother embittered her even more, and perhaps he also became the central point of her destructive wishes. To check these murderous tendencies there was developed an over-severe super-ego, which demanded that, to make up for these death wishes, she must adopt an unusually ethical self-sacrificing course in life. The rôle of the self-sacrificing resigned mother began in childhood in relation to her little brother and was continued in her married life in relation to her own children. In her psyche motherhood served to remove her sense of guilt just as in her childhood her maternal attitude towards her little brother was an over-compensation of her jealousy and death-wishes. Thus motherhood for her acquired an ascetic suffering character. Her whole married life became merely the performance of a duty, a sacrifice, from which she was not allowed to obtain happiness or pleasure. But in the depths of her unconscious, there was an entirely different state of affairs. The need for love, mishandled throughout her whole life, at the onset of the climacterium demanded in stormy fashion its last gratification. And just as she had been hampered in childhood by her sisters and brother, so now her children barred the way to her husband. She was only a mother, not a wife, and under pressure of her super-ego, she dared know only the duties of motherhood, not however the joys of a wife. The old murderous wishes she had borne towards her sisters and brother were reactivated in the murderous obsessions directed against her own children, against the children whose need for her care now kept her from the journey she had planned with her husband, in which she would be freed from all domestic and maternal duties. The repressed unconscious murderous wishes freely entered consciousness after she had atoned for the infantile murderous wishes against her sisters and brother with her whole joyless life in response to the ascetic demands of her harsh super-ego. The approaching climacterium encouraged this struggle for liberation. For once she wished not to be a mere mother; she wished to love, to enjoy pleasure free from duties. And out of this rebellious atmosphere of repressed sexuality there arose the street-fear and the murderous impulses.

The fear of going out alone on crowded streets where she might faint and fall was her reaction to her unconscious prostitution phantasies. She, who throughout her life had avoided love, and had known it only in the duty-steeped air of a middle-class marriage, at last desired to enjoy freedom from all moral fetters. On the Tauentzienstrasse, or on the Friedrichstrasse, where free immoral love holds sway, there she wished to " fall ". It is clear, therefore, that the murderous wishes and the prostitution phantasies underlying her street fears signify a breaking through the over-severity of the super-ego, a revolution against its tyrannical domination. Through its harshness it had made absurd the maternal duties and middle-class marriage, and the moral barriers threatened to crumble. However, whereas in her murderous obsessions the repressed tendencies entered consciousness quite freely, her prostitution phantasies remained unconscious, and betrayed their presence only in the reactive street-fear. It is difficult to say why the unconscious death wishes directed against children should have led to obsessions, and the prostitution phantasies to a phobia. Obviously, the super-ego's prohibitory power on this front, in regard to sexual wishes, was still sufficiently strong to keep the prostitution phantasies from becoming conscious.

The street-fear laid a powerful constraint on her freedom of movement. Her daughter and her step-sister, the two causes of her trouble, one in the past, the other in the present, now had to keep her from her last chance of knowing love. When they accompanied her on the street, they protected her from temptation, but at the same time took away her freedom. So, the street-fear, which meant suffering, was still very strongly on the side of the super-ego. Whereas in the case of the murderous impulses, the breaking through of the repressed tendencies was completely successful, the prostitution phantasies, which also rose up in reaction to the severity of the super-ego, were inhibited by a new counter-activity on the part of the super-ego. At this place, the revolution had failed and the counter-revolution was again successful. Perhaps the retreat at this front, the strong instinct tension which resulted from this, opened up the possibility at another point in

the line for the repressed murderous impulses to gain free access to consciousness. I was strongly impressed with the idea that a similar economic connection obtained between the symptom complexes, between the street-fear and the obsessions. At any rate, the mechanism of the phobia calls attention to a certain obscurity in our knowledge at this point. In our case, this much could be stated with assurance: that the street-fear was the ego's fear of its super-ego, which was threatening it with punishment because of the upward-thrusting prostitution phantasies. Under the pressure of this fear of its super-ego, the ego inhibited the prostitution phantasies so that they remained unconscious. It was indeed tragi-comic that the super-ego could be mollified and the fear dispelled only when the patient took precisely those two competitors with her, for whose sake she had suffered all her life. The prostitution phantasy was an act of desperation on the part of her repressed sexuality, and her strong sexual repression was the work of her super-ego, its reply to her infantile sexual wishes. The same super-ego, whose severity had led to the formation of these prostitution phantasy reactions, now threatened to punish her. The super-ego's behavior was very similar to that of a severe justice, which imposes severe penalties for minor infractions, drives the incipient criminal from society, and then, when he is forced into crime, brings him to task for his new deed of desperation. Just as such stern justice breeds criminals and then must proceed against its own products, so we find that the super-ego too must combat the reaction-formations of its own over-severity.

It seems to me characteristic of the phobias that in them the punitive tendencies of the super-ego are not satisfied by means of symptoms punitive in meaning, as in the compulsion neuroses; and that therefore the ungratified punishing tendencies are felt as permanent threats by the ego. In the phobias, the economic problem of every neurosis is solved least happily; namely, the problem of removing the need for punishment which follows a breaking through of the unconscious tendencies, or in other words, reëstablishing the balance between the repressing and the

repressed forces. The ever threatening anxiety in the phobias, which is pure conscience-anxiety, shows that the demands of conscience are unsatisfied. From this fact we may explain the progressive nature of the phobias; they do not represent an equilibrium—an equilibrium such as obtains in a well embedded compulsion neurosis which represents a simultaneous satisfaction of the id tendencies and of the need for punishment and thereby forestalls the development of anxiety. Instead the phobic patient is able to avoid anxiety only by not undertaking the activity which gives the symbolic satisfaction, whereas the compulsion neurotic can carry out this activity, because he does other things at the same time which satisfy his conscience and hence are adapted to relieve him of his anxiety. These anxiety-relieving activities are, so to speak, the prerequisites of his instinct gratifications. From this conception of the phobias, another fact is readily explained; namely, that they appear so frequently as initial symptoms of a neurosis, and in childhood. The development of a phobia would accordingly mean that the ego had not yet succeeded in adapting itself to meet the super-ego's threat of punishment, that it had not yet learned to appease the punishment tendencies by accepting symptomatic suffering, or by using the punishment symptoms to procure passive masochistic pleasure. The ego still attempts to flee from the threats of the super-ego, does not yet have enough confidence in itself to bribe the super-ego with suffering. In our case the obsessional stipulation, that the step-sister or daughter must accompany the patient, was already the first step in the formation of a compulsive symptom. I have already referred to the self-punishing significance of this obsessional stipulation, which restricted the personal freedom of our patient to such a large extent. We can, similarly, conceive of the origin of obsessive ceremonials and of morally colored obsessional symptoms in general as being attempts to overcome phobic anxiety. In this connection, the moral nature of the obsessive ceremonials is particularly noteworthy. These are always, like obsessional character traits, exaggerations of the parents' and teachers' demands for neatness, cleanliness, etc. The painful feeling which accom-

panies their execution also betrays the self-punishing significance of these obsessive ceremonials. Like religious ceremonies, they obviously serve to relieve bad conscience. Their "sacrificial" nature or their painful nature are, consequently, among their most essential features.

The ego's attempt at flight, which is manifested by the extension of the phobias to more and more situations and activities, may be thought of somewhat as follows: The severity of the super-ego, which bars the path to normal instinct gratification, brings about an over-charging of such indifferent functions as walking, riding, writing, etc., with forbidden instinctual cravings; these functions are either erotized, or take on an aggressive meaning. The super-ego understands the secret meaning of this otherwise harmless activity, and threatens the ego when this activity occurs. The ego itself is not aware of this superimposed significance; it merely feels the threats of the super-ego as anxiety, which induces it to leave off its anxiety producing activities. With this, the instinctual tension is raised, as the release of tension through this by-path was not successful, and new activities receive an over-charge—the satisfaction of the instincts is attempted once again. Thus, phobic anxiety spreads more and more; new activities become over-charged and consequently anxiously avoided. The spread of inhibitions may sometimes assume an incredibly grotesque form.

In one case, for example, I was able to observe how the original fear of holding an axe, or later, of going near one, was finally extended to any object which resembled an axe. This went so far that even reading became completely impossible, as the patient had intense fear of seeing a capital "L", a form which reminded him of an axe.

The phobic patient, then, is continuously under the burden of his aroused bad conscience, whose demands he is unable to appease by means of symptoms with punitive significance. This description, however, does not settle the question why it is that in many cases of neurosis formation there is a successful binding of the punitive tendencies of the super-ego by means of symptoms so

that no anxiety is developed (as for example, in the compulsion neuroses), whereas in other cases (the phobias) this is unsuccessful. The point, that the phobia is usually an initial stage, in which the ego has not as yet reached a comfortable compromise with the super-ego, is surely insufficient to clear up this question completely. Of importance is one of Freud's remarks, that the repressed tendencies which we deal with in the phobias are genital in nature, tendencies which did not take part in the compulsion neurotic regression to sadism. He believes that the defense techniques of the compulsion neurosis are not adapted to deal with repressed erotic tendencies. Nevertheless it still remains unexplained why there is not a conversion-hysteric binding of the anxiety, for the genital level is maintained in conversion hysteria, and the conversion symptom is consequently able to bind genital anxiety. Perhaps another circumstance which we have mentioned above may contribute somewhat to the solution of this question. I refer to the economic relation between the two different symptom complexes.

Not only in the case of street-fear, but also in the case of the axe phobia, the phobic manifestations were mixed with obsessions aggressive in content. In the case of the axe phobia I was also strongly under the impression that the obsessive symptoms and the phobic anxiety stood in an economic relation to each other. The breaking through of murderous wishes into consciousness can only be explained by the idea that the demands of conscience, the demands of the super-ego, have been satisfied to excess. The afflicted ego's capacity to withstand the proddings of the id has declined, because the acceptance of punishment has materially loosened its dependence on the super-ego. But it appears that in the psyche the corruptibility of officials still has a certain limit. In our case all the corruptibility of the super-ego was utilized in allowing the murderous thoughts to break through, so that a fresh burdening of the conscience with prostitution phantasies was impossible. The full content of the unconscious idea " I should like to be freed of my children so that I could more easily burst the bonds of my joyless middle-class marriage and give myself

completely over to the pleasures of love", could not, in spite of ever so much suffering and punishment, become completely conscious. After the first part of this forbidden idea ("I should like to be freed of my children") had entered consciousness, the tolerance of her conscience was exhausted; the second part ("I should like to be a prostitute") had to remain unconscious. To what extent one may generalize from an economic relation of this sort between two different symptom complexes, is a question which can only be answered by further empirical investigation. Nevertheless it will always be well to consider not only apparently unrelated symptoms, but also traits of character, and even real living, together from the standpoint of their more general interrelation, and not to expect that the interpretation of one symptom or of one symptom-complex will furnish a complete explanation. Indeed, we have just seen how the neurotic can, for example, often draw upon the suffering and afflictions of the past to justify his present breach through the barriers of repression, and how he attempts to satisfy the need for punishment arising from this breaking through of the repressed material by the development of fresh symptoms and suffering. If we wish to enlarge and supplement the dynamic conception of the neuroses by means of economic quantitative considerations, we are forced to tabulate *all* manifestations of the two great antagonistically directed forces, which originate from the ego (better, super-ego) on the one side, and from the id on the other, and to compare these two rubrics. Through such a quantitative comparison of the two forces we found, for example, the interesting connection mentioned above, namely, that the over-moral traits of character in a compulsion neurotic permit the occurrence of certain aggressively colored symptoms, the moral inhibiting forces being applied and used up elsewhere in the production of over-punctuality or over-scrupulosity. This economic balance of the two fundamental tendencies—of the claims of instinct and of the counter-claims of reality, operating as anxiety and morality—is what I refer to as "the psychoanalysis of the total personality."

You see in the instructive case discussed to-day, that even so

entirely ego-acceptable and elementary a thing as maternal feeling can through an ascetic over-doing be made to serve the purposes of a harsh super-ego, reducing to an absurdity, by means of this distorting influence, the most natural and primary female instinct, and bringing about the victory of primary narcissism. This narcissism sees in the individual's own children a hindrance, which removes the possibility of self-love and prevents the realization of the wish to be the sole recipient of love.

The same mechanism can be found in any case of compulsion neurosis in some form or other. The cruelty and over-severity of the super-ego leads to a reaction against every positive object relationship, and allows only a hostile attitude towards the environment. The patient, tormented by his severe super-ego, is only able to hate.

We should like to emphasize once more that the economic connection just described between the satisfaction of the need for punishment on the one hand and the reappearance of the repressed tendencies in the form of symptoms on the other, is essentially identical with the mechanism discovered by Freud in the manic-depressive neurosis. I trust that I have succeeded in proving that this connection has general validity in every neurosis-formation. We demonstrated by means of a conversion hysteria symptom, blushing, that the atypical innervation which led to blushing was the reactive sequel of excessive sexual repression, an attempt at release through by-paths, and we also demonstrated that even this disguised expression of the repressed instinct was possible only because the symptom also meant suffering for the patient, thus satisfying his need for punishment. The satisfaction of the need for punishment limits the efficacy of the repressing forces. We stated, furthermore, that what happens in the manic-depressive neurosis in separate phases, namely, the manifestations of the repressed tendencies and of the punishment, appear at one and the same time in the compulsion neurosis. Whereas the manic-depressive is completely uninhibited for a time and then in another phase becomes completely inhibited, the compulsion neurotic is at one and the same time sadistic as well as masochistic, satisfies

at one and the same time his repressed tendencies and his need for punishment. Consequently we may assume that instinct defusion is minimal in hysteria, where a single symptom has a double meaning, namely, the satisfaction at one and the same time of the two antagonistically directed forces. Defusion is somewhat greater in the compulsion neurosis, first one and then the other tendency attaining its gratification; it is maximal in the manic-depressive conditions where the equilibrium between the two antagonistically directed forces is completely destroyed. We shall throw more light on this interesting standpoint in our discussion of the instinctual basis of the neuroses.

The number of instances we might offer as evidence of this connection could be multiplied indefinitely, but I should like at this point to call attention to occupational inhibitions, in which this mechanism is always at work.

A patient, who had been incapable of any sort of work for a long while, during his analysis suddenly began to indulge in a curious piece of behavior. The son of a university graduate, and himself studying to pursue a professional calling, he took a job as a manual laborer. This young man, who had hitherto not worked at all, arose every morning at six, worked in an artisan's apron for eight hours, and then, thoroughly fatigued, met his analytic appointment. After this he spent another hour in study with a teacher. He overdid work in an incredible way; instead of real work, it was forced labor. The meaning of this caricature of activity was clear: it was a persiflage of the aim of his analysis, which was identical with the demands of his super-ego; namely, that he give up his idleness. He reduced this demand to an absurdity, so that after this he might, with justification, refuse to engage in any activity.

Another patient with a severe compulsion neurosis stipulated with himself that until he had completed his doctor's thesis, he would permit himself no sexual satisfaction whether through intercourse or masturbation. At first he tried to make his analyst place this prohibition on him, but unsuccessful in this, he placed it on himself. Whenever he failed in his resolution, he would

regard all the work he had done as invalidated, and tear up his documents. Succeeding this, there would ensue a period of excessive masturbation. Naturally he would then have to start on his thesis from the beginning. The meaning of this over-moral stipulation is quite transparent in this case; its purpose was to compromise the super-ego, which was forced to squander its energies as regulator of the instinctual life in preserving these untenable severe measures; and because it was thus compromised the super-ego was compelled to give free rein to the uninhibited impulses of the id, or perhaps better, of primary narcissism.

These examples demonstrate most clearly how completely the super-ego with all its demands remains a foreign body in the psyche of the compulsion neurotic. These demands are not really incorporated into the ego; the super-ego really forms a separate personality alongside the ego. The ego fears its super-ego, but tries to do away with its dependence upon it. It is able to accomplish this by provoking the super-ego into committing an injustice, in order thereby to free itself. By submitting to unmerited punishment the ego becomes completely justified in surrendering to the forbidden tendencies of the id. These politics, however, only go to prove to what extent it feels itself in agreement with the id.

We have emphasized the corruption of the super-ego and its secret pact with the id; we must now charge the ego of the compulsion neurotic with these same practices. The personality as a whole has shifted its balance in the direction of the id tendencies.

LECTURE FOUR

The Meaning of Doubt in the Compulsion Neurosis

In the last lecture we investigated the economic structure of the compulsion neurosis and demonstrated that there was a close relation between the over-moral punishing tendencies and the aggressive ego-alien manifestations of the personality. We went considerably beyond the hitherto customary statement that the over-morality of the compulsion neurotic is a protection against his strong repressed asocial tendencies. We showed that the over-morality of the compulsion neurotic is like those tendencies which the melancholic directs against himself, really in the service of the repressed tendencies; it is a morality of form, often merely a caricature of morality, and assists in ridding the patient of his feelings of guilt by destroying the efficacy of the repressing forces. This disarming of the forces of repression sometimes goes so far that such strongly forbidden tendencies entirely foreign to the ego as, in our case, the wish of a mother to kill her own children, are permitted free access to consciousness.

We can best characterize the psyche of the compulsion neurotic by reference to the psychology of current methods of child-rearing and of the judicial system of our day, both of which are founded on a punitive theory. Punishment is inflicted not to prevent crime but to settle a score. It should therefore not seem strange to us that the compulsion neurosis is so common nowadays when our criminal justice, if not avowedly at least in spirit, is still very much like the primitive *lex talionis*—an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. It is obvious that such a punitive system must tend to foster transgression. An ego reared in this spirit will justly feel that since it has received its punishment from the super-ego, the forbidden tendencies of the id should now have their turn. But we must not forget one point—that in the compulsion neurosis this entire comedy of justice takes place not in a real world but within the self, and just as no real crime is committed,

so the punishment is symbolic. It must, however, be added that the compulsion neurotic, because of the inhibited nature of his life, does suffer real injury; and that, on the other hand, he can frequently live out his hostile tendencies against the environment, even though these may take on a disguised form. So, if we tried to balance the accounts of the instinctual life of the compulsion neurotic, we should find a strikingly accurate system of accounting. The entries on one side of this balance sheet would be the manifestations of the repressed sadistic impulses, the symptomatic no less than the real manifestations; while on the other side we should find the masochistic tendencies which are active in the same personality either in the form of ascetic character traits or as symptoms. The end result is a complete paralysis and neutrality of the patient in respect to the world of reality. Freud's first formulation can be taken literally: external activities are supplanted by internal processes. And most characteristic of this type of phenomenon is its sado-masochistic coloring. It follows that those activities which are supplanted by these internal processes, had they come to expression, would also be sado-masochistic in character. With this we have reached the instinctual basis of the compulsion neurosis. Later we shall attempt to formulate the problem of the neuroses not only from the quantitative and purely dynamic side as we have done so far but also taking into account the quality of the dynamic instinct forces. For the present, although we are making a slight digression in this direction, we shall only go as far as is necessary to elucidate the dynamic mode of approach.

A safe method of procedure for the understanding of a neurotic constellation in the psyche is to search out that situation in the patient's real life which is being reënacted intrapsychically in the neurosis in question. Let us then attempt the reconstruction of this real constellation of the past from the symptomatic picture of the compulsion neurosis. To do so we must call upon our knowledge of instinct development. This attempt at reconstruction necessitates the slight digression previously mentioned, which does not actually fall within the scope of our present topic.

As a matter of fact we are acquainted with a period in the course of instinct development in which the sadistic attitude to the environment predominates. It is a period in which the erotic impulse is still completely utilized in the service of personality formation, its binding energy still completely claimed for the purpose of cementing together the self. During this narcissistic stage, Eros, one of the two fundamental instincts or impulses according to Freud's theory of the instincts, is as yet of no significance as object-libido; it does not yet serve the function of reproduction, nor, in sublimated form, serve to bind individuals into a community. It is, as we have said, chiefly utilized for the formation of one single individual; all of it is needed for the purpose of growth, physical and mental. During this period the basic attitude to the environment is one of hostility, or of fear which checks this hostility. It would of course be an unwarrantable schematization to depict a period of life during which the individual's attitude was purely hostile; but this much is true beyond doubt, that every human being during his infancy passes through a period in which his hostility to the environment overshadows to a disproportionate degree any positive attitude. This period knows as yet no genuine feelings of guilt but only fear, which becomes the foundation for a subsequent conscience functioning independent of external dangers or threats. During this stage, the hostility towards the environment is not as yet checked by some internal faculty but by the counter-hostility of the environment. Every strict disciplinarian upbringing creates a predisposition to a fixation at this narcissistic stage, a stage which should have been traversed and overcome as a result of the many relations with the environment. Every punitive measure which has as its object the overcoming of the narcissism as a matter of fact merely intensifies it. Indeed it is impossible to destroy narcissism; it is only possible to dilute it by including extraneous objects within its sphere. Thus, we proceed from love of self to sexual love, to love for parents, family, class, country, and so on. Various forms of narcissism correspond to these developmental stages: primary narcissism, family pride,

class spirit, and finally nationalism. Present day man has not gone beyond this. The world citizen, one truly such in feeling, is still a figure of the future.

This distribution of narcissism to cover the most varied objects of the environment is a phenomenon which depends upon the flowing out of the libido from the ego into the environment. One of the earliest discoveries in psychoanalysis, the antagonism between ego and sexuality, is only a manifestation of one part of this general process, inasmuch as sexuality itself as well as object love already signifies the passing of the primary narcissism which defends the narrowest bounds of the personality. The overcoming of the developmental stage in which the child narcissistically loves only himself, and has left for the environment only feelings exclusively or predominantly hostile in nature, manifestations of the death-instinct, results from the outward flow of libido. This libido combines with the hostile tendencies and robs them of their destructive character. Aggression becomes ennobled into positively toned activity. Thus, for example, the aggressive quality of the sexual impulse in a sadist is an indication of an insufficiency in the erotic admixture to the primary sadistic aggressive relation to the object, or evidence of a later instinct defusion.

To understand the regression in a compulsion neurosis, we must, however, pursue the fate of the libido development a step further. We shall see that this form of regression represents an attempt to reëstablish the state of narcissism and sadistic object-relations through relinquishing the positive relation to the object. But we shall also see that this regression is by no means completely successful, because the regressively reëstablished state betrays remnants of a higher stage of organization, which the compulsion neurotic had once reached but later abandoned. We shall also be interested in the reason which led to this backward movement in instinct activity.

The first object relation after the relinquishment of primary narcissism is to the mother. The libido quantum necessary for this relation is taken away from narcissism. At this stage, to represent it somewhat schematically, the sadistic attitude still

persists toward the entire environment exclusive of the mother. Very soon the father as the disturber of the object relation to the mother becomes the central focus for this hostility. This is the instinct constellation of the Œdipus complex. To surmount it represents a two-fold problem: (1) the sublimation of the sensual-erotic relation to the mother, and (2) the transference of part of the libido freed as a result of this sublimation onto the father, whereby the former purely hostile attitude towards him acquires an erotic component. This erotic admixture, following an interim of ambivalence, lends the relation to the father a positive coloring. The ambivalence is evidence of the fact that the two antagonistic instinct qualities have not as yet become thoroughly fused, but exist uncombined side by side. That quantity of libido which at first was employed solely in connection with the sensual-erotic desire for the mother is now devoted after sublimation has been effected to the simultaneous but sublimated love for both parents. The transformation of sensual love into tenderness is the first form of sublimation. One might compare this transformation to a process of dilution. With every sublimation the libido relationship loses in *intensity* and gains in *extension* through its distribution over a number of objects. But precisely because of this loss in intensity, it is no longer so well adapted to bind and to neutralize destructive tendencies. During the process of sublimation there is set free some of the " instinct to destroy " which, before the sublimation, was combined with Eros in the sensual craving for the mother. The destructive components of the sexual instinct, thus liberated, again become directed against the father, swell the hostility to him which already exists, and sharpen the ambivalence conflict. In the case of normal development this ambivalence conflict is solved through displacing the hostile tendencies from the father to alien objects, and through sublimating and erotizing the hostility. But the child who is later to fall victim to a compulsion neurosis does not succeed in overcoming the ambivalence. The compulsion neurotic succumbs at this point. He does not succeed in directing his hatred away from his father because he has not given up his attachment to his

mother. Clinging tenaciously to his erotic attachment to his mother, he has not enough libido left over to mitigate or neutralize the hostility toward his father. Due to his strong narcissistic tendency, he is, moreover, prevented from drawing on his self-love for further libido quanta with which to neutralize the outwardly directed aggression. Because he wishes to retain his mother attachment, he must try some solution of the father conflict different from that which takes place in normal development. This solution is an over-development of the inverted Œdipus complex: an excessively strong masochistic attachment to the father, which arises from a deflection of the hostility originally directed against the father to the individual's own person. The psychologic content of this instinct constellation might be crudely expressed in this way: " I am permitted to love mother, provided I am sufficiently punished for it by father "—a point of view familiar to the child since the time of his training in habits of cleanliness. At that time, too, he did not comply with the rules of cleanliness laid down for him with respect to his excretions and, to square the matter, took the automatically resulting punishment into the bargain. This type of solution of his instinct conflict is retained by the compulsion neurotic as a life-long pattern. Punishment rids him on the one hand of his guilt conflict; but on the other hand, it serves him in the satisfaction of his feminine masochistic strivings.

The sharper this sado-masochistic relation to the father becomes, the more libido is in the conflict, and the more empoverished becomes the positive relation to the environment. The aggression originally directed against the father and then turned against the individual's own self, becomes erotized through an identification of the self with the mother. In this way the masochistic attitude toward the father acquires a feminine character. In place of an object relation to the mother, there occurs an identification with her, a re-creation within the self of the object which could not be had in the real world because of the father's veto (castration-fear). Now this previously external conflict continues within the personality, the super-ego assuming the rôle of

the father who is hated and at the same time loved in a feminine masochistic manner. The conflict between ego and super-ego is then a repetition of the struggle between a defiant child and its father and at the same time, to the extent that the ego is identified with the mother, a gratification of the feminine-masochistic wishes with respect to the father. The two groups of symptoms in the compulsion neurosis, which we differentiated in the last lecture, correspond to these two tendencies. The symptoms of an aggressive nature correspond to the hatred of the father (frequently also a sadistically colored erotic relation to the mother), whereas those with self-punishing tendencies and over-morality correspond to the passive feminine strivings. We have already sufficiently discussed how the latter are used at the same time to relieve the sense of guilt, thus permitting the manifestation of aggressive tendencies. If, from the purely dynamic point of view, we have recognized only the inhibition-lifting rôle of the punishment mechanisms, we now also see the rôle they play in connection with the satisfaction of passive strivings. This double benefit from the punishment mechanisms, the removal of inhibiting feelings of guilt, and the simultaneous satisfaction of the passive pleasure strivings, explains their tenacity and their great significance in the development of neuroses.

I have gone ahead with this schematic exposition of the instinctual basis of the compulsion neurosis, an exposition which I have reserved for further discussion later on, and incidentally have assumed a knowledge of the Freudian theory of the instincts on your part. In the course of these lectures I shall attempt to deepen our insight into the rôles of the two classes of instinct in the neuroses, and subject them to a more systematic investigation than this present one. This crudely schematic picture is designed to help us understand the complicated structural relations behind obsessive doubt. The problem which we have set for ourselves to-day is the structural explanation of doubt as manifested in the compulsion neurosis. Doubt is a manifestation of the state of affairs we have just described; namely, that the ego is obliged to serve two masters at the same time, two tendencies which contra-

dict one another: the aggressive and incestuous tendencies of the id on the one hand, and on the other the tendencies of the superego, which takes the place within the personality of the punishing father. That this moral relation with the father becomes erotized in addition, only complicates the picture. Doubt simply serves the purpose of rendering every psychic manifestation susceptible to two interpretations, one acceptable to the id, the other to the superego. The same purpose is served by the preference of such patients for uncertainty and indefiniteness, a point emphasized by Freud. But the best way to demonstrate all this is by means of a few examples. Let us examine, first of all, an obsessive incident produced during an analytic session by a patient suffering from a very severe compulsion neurosis, in whom thought processes had completely replaced activity.

During the analytic hour the patient asks what time it is. I reply that it is half-past nine. After several seconds, he asks the same question, and begs me to repeat my answer. When I then request him to tell me why he has asked the question twice, he explains by telling me of an obsessive doubt: He has suddenly become uncertain whether I did not say that it was half-past ten, and if it actually is half-past ten now, then a whole hour has elapsed without his knowing what he has done during this period of time. He is therefore afraid that perhaps without knowing it he has been to a prostitute and become infected with syphilis. His anxiety is quite sincere; he asks me two or three times whether I really said half-past nine. When I answer " Yes " he asks after several seconds, " Did you say yes or no? "

How is one to understand this remarkable compulsive symptom? The patient doubts what I told him only a few seconds previously. This doubting makes possible for him his curious obsessive thoughts concerning an unconsciously executed sexual act. The doubting and this obsessive idea are closely related. He could have been to a prostitute only if it was half-past ten—he must therefore leave this possibility open through doubt. It is thus evident that in the first place his doubt makes possible the obsessive thought and lends to it a certain real validity. And as

a matter of fact, this obsessive idea is taken so seriously that it is followed by the fear of having been infected. In order to protect him from this anxiety, it becomes necessary for me to assure him that it is half-past nine and not half-past ten. Such reassurances as this he had frequently demanded even in writing. An unconscious wish, which reaches consciousness already disguised in the form of imaginary coitus with a prostitute, is able to influence his perceptions of the real world. Doubt already signifies a falsification of the sense of reality, of his perceptions, albeit not as far-reaching a falsification as, for example, an hallucination. After his coitus phantasy has acquired, on account of his doubt, great illusory "reality", his reaction to it, his fear of having been infected, is quite sincere. He has to pay with his anxiety for his illusion of coitus. But the entire phantasy of the sexual act and of the resulting infection is nothing else than a disguised gratification of the complete Œdipus complex. (Mother = prostitute; infection = simultaneous conception and castration.)

Interesting and very characteristic of this ingenious obsessive mechanism is the method employed to allay the anxiety. The anxiety can be allayed through a simple statement on my part. We shall see, however, that this same statement of mine is used against me, to cast doubt on my interpretation. If we ask the patient how far his doubt really goes, whether he seriously doubted my statement as to the time, he will admit that he knew quite well all along that it was really half-past nine, and that the whole procedure was in fact a sort of playing with ideas. He had only so engineered the matter that this playful bit of thinking became associated with a genuine illusion, linked with real emotions. We are therefore confronted with the curious fact that he maintained two attitudes at the same time: normal conviction, and doubt which made possible his phantastic chain of thought. There could hardly be better proof of the existence within him of two personalities side by side. The subsequent analysis of this obsessive scene reveals to us the relation between the two personalities. It becomes evident from his subsequent associations that the real meaning of the whole performance is a

persiflage of the analysis as well as of his own conscience, which recognized the incest wish behind the coitus phantasy, and therefore threatened him with castration. It means: "I know quite well that it is half-past nine and not half-past ten. The analyst himself assures me of this; it is therefore beyond question. It is consequently totally impossible that during this analytic session (that is, between nine and ten o'clock), I should have been to a prostitute and become infected. To state the matter in general terms: just as unconscious *actions* do not exist, so unconscious *wishes* of which one is not aware are unthinkable. The assertion of the analyst that I have or had unconscious incestuous wishes is complete nonsense. He himself admitted this impossibility by assuring me that it was half-past nine." This entire argument succeeds through a piece of sophistry—through making action synonymous with wishes—by identifying psychic and factual reality. First he attributes real validity to his obsessive stream of thought, and treats thoughts as if they were actually executed deeds—the best proof of this is that he actually developed anxiety. Afterwards, having been relieved of his anxiety through my statement that it is half-past nine, he denies the validity of psychic reality.

An analysis of the structure of this incident is very circumstantial and tedious, but it is worth the effort because it will reveal to us the most intimate structure of the neurosis. Let us attempt to state the rôles played by the various individual psychic components in this obsessive incident. We see that the phantasy of coitus with a prostitute represents in disguised form the incest wish. In order to lend this wish-phantasy any sort of gratification value at all, to make it seem real, the doubt was necessary. This doubt signifies the ego's yielding to the repressed tendencies of the id. The ego gives way before the id by permitting the doubt to arise, by permitting its perceptual faculty to be called into question; that is to say, during the state of doubt it behaves in a way acceptable to the id. But it reacts with anxiety to the breaking through of the repressed id tendencies (the incest wish). No sooner has it developed doubt and given in to the id than it is scared by the enemy thus admitted to consciousness. The fear is

due to the super-ego, which calls him to account for the incest committed in phantasy. The punishment threat of the super-ego is sensed as anxiety and is rationalized as a fear of being infected. Thus the super-ego has taken the entire game seriously, and demands that punishment be inflicted. It is quite right, too, in taking the matter seriously, since it is after all only interested in psychic realities; it is an intra-psychic structure, which rules over wishes and instinctive urges, and its sole task is the adjustment of psychic quantities. Just as the conscious ego controls the motor apparatus, so does the super-ego govern the psychic instinct representatives of the id (the perceptions of instinctive urges). And since the ego has gone so far in yielding to the repressed wishes of the id that in their interest it has doubted its own perceptions (to wit, my answer that it was half-past nine), and has participated so extensively in the phantasy gratifications of the id tendencies, the behavior of the super-ego is quite intelligible. The ego is in doubt, but the super-ego goes even further, treats the obsessive phantasy as if it were real, and threatens to punish for it. The ego does not understand the meaning of the phantasy about the prostitute; but the super-ego understands it thoroughly, and its threat of punishment refers to the hidden meaning, to the incestuous wish. The ego, which can see no harm in the obsessive phantasy, at first reacts only with anxiety to the punishment threat of the super-ego. It is afraid without knowing why and, therefore, rationalizes its fear as a fear of being infected. But in reality it is a question of a fear of castration because of the incest committed in phantasy. The ego endures the fear of infection, is willing to receive the punishment of the super-ego in the form of an imaginary syphilis, but in exchange for this allows itself the gratification of its incest wish in the disguised form of imaginary coitus with a prostitute. Through this very development of anxiety it renders the super-ego innocuous. We have already stated that one part of the ego has no doubt whatsoever, and regards the entire obsessive psychism as nonsense, and we also stated that this non-doubting part by denying the real validity of the obsessive phantasy and of the anxiety puts aside the whole

analytic interpretation, and at the same time reduces the attitude of the super-ego to absurdity. My answer that it was half past nine proves that there is no necessity to fear the super-ego, that its threat of punishment was ridiculous. The super-ego was induced to commit a punitive act, and then this punitive act was repudiated by the analyst himself. But since the super-ego had made the threat only because of the incestuous meaning of the phantasy, the groundlessness of the anxiety, as attested by the analyst, proves for the patient that he harbors no incestuous wish. To summarize the whole state of affairs, we may say that the phantasy of having intercourse with a prostitute is taken too seriously, and at the same time not seriously enough. In one moment it is held that this coitus phantasy is not a phantasy but a reality (hence the development of anxiety), and in the same moment it is also stated that just as this phantasy has no basis in fact, no real meaning, so all incest wishes are unreal, that is to say, are not present.

Thus the super-ego was induced by means of the doubt to perpetrate an unwarranted punitive act, and was shown to be a fool. The super-ego aroused the anxiety because of a bit of nonsense; the patient had been made to fear an infection from a coitus which had never taken place. In this way he reduces his super-ego to absurdity. Through my assurance it was proved that the anxiety was superfluous. The over-vigilant super-ego had immediately perceived something forbidden in this senseless phantasy, and had suspected something incestuous, just as the analyst had. "What nonsense! This phantasy has no incestuous significance, for no phantasy is the equivalent of a real action." In the end, the ego accepts this argument, and the patient explains that such ideas had only come into his mind because the analyst had talked him into all this nonsense about incest. Thus with the one argument he puts me and at the same time his super-ego into an absurd position. We have both believed his phantasy incestuous.

The double rôle of the ego consists in the fact that it serves two masters, the id as well as the super-ego. It serves the id

through doubting; the super-ego through the production of anxiety. By means of the doubt it allowed itself the illusion of gratifying the id tendencies, but it had afterwards to be consistent and take the anxiety in earnest. As to this anxiety, the ego could prove that it had arisen from an obvious encroachment on the part of the super-ego, which had tried to inflict punishment for a deed that had not been performed. Through this encroachment the ego is brought back to its senses, shakes off its lethargy, and declares the anxiety and consequently the phantasy to be nonsense. Meanwhile, however, the id has attained its purpose, and enjoyed the delusional gratification of its tendencies. The ultimate economic meaning of the obsessive incident is this: the gratification of a repressed wish without a sense of guilt; the chief gain, casting doubt on the analytic interpretation, that is to say, the possibility of holding fast to the unconscious tendencies. Even though the ego serves both masters, when all is said and done, it is the id that carries off the victory. The super-ego helped it to do so by means of its over-severity.

An interesting conclusion arises from this statement: the more one tells a compulsion neurotic that his anxiety is senseless, the more does one serve his neurosis. Doing so merely strengthens his contention that his super-ego is in the wrong if it suspects him of harboring incestuous wishes, if it demands punishment and afflicts him with groundless fear. We may formulate this state of affairs in the following terms.

The essence of a compulsion neurosis is contained in a paradoxical thesis. On the one hand it is maintained that wish and deed, psychic and physical reality, are of equal validity; but on the other hand it is asserted at the same time that not only is a wish not a deed, but that it does not exist at all, that there is nothing at all real in the psychic world. We know that the compulsion neurotic erotizes his thought processes and thereby serves the id tendencies, which attain gratification in the thought processes. The first part of this paradoxical thesis, which equates wish and deed, serves the interests of the id. If the compulsion neurotic did not have a moral faculty, a repression agency, the whole problem of instinct mastery would be settled as it is in

the small child, who gratifies his wishes by means of phantasy, hallucinatorily. Doubt permits such an hallucinatory gratification of the repressed tendencies. The other part of the personality, the moral part, represented by the super-ego, prevents this gratification and demands punishment. The need for punishment, then, is gratified in just as hallucinatory a manner as are the repressed tendencies. The unavoidable result is anxiety. To avoid this anxiety is the purpose of the second part of the paradoxical thesis: "a wish is not a deed; it has no meaning". The over-zealous super-ego, which had endowed wishes with the quality of deeds, was shown up as absurd because of this over-stepping of its rights, and rendered harmless. The inevitable reaction of conscience to the hallucinatory wish-gratification was deprived of its meaning. This complicated mechanism is a necessity to the compulsion neurotic, because the repressed wishes as they appear in the obsessive ideas are relatively little disguised. He must therefore be able to cast doubt on the unconscious significance, that is to say, on the meaning of the symptoms, which otherwise would not be able to reach consciousness at all. In the case of a conversion hysteria symptom the meaning is sufficiently disguised, the satisfaction of the wish is removed from the psychic to the physical sphere. Thus the meaning and purpose of the entire obsessive scene was to permit the emergence of an anxiety so groundless and absurd as to make the source of the anxiety, the incestuous significance of the obsessive ideas, seem groundless and meaningless. This is the explanation of the unique provoking absurdity of the obsessive symptoms just discussed. A similarly absurd scene is the following:

The same patient was sent by his mother to buy bread. He handed over the bread, and what was left over of the money, to his mother with the question: "Is everything all right? Is that the right change?" His mother answered "Yes". After several moments he asked his mother whether she had said "yes" or "no". He kept up this questioning, asking the same question repeatedly. During such a scene he would ask for a written statement from his mother. Then he would lose the piece of paper and begin his questioning again—asking his mother whether she

had written "yes" or "no", etc. The anxiety which was the source of this continuous stream of questions arose from the following chain of ideas: If his mother has said "no", meaning that she had not received all the money coming to her, it would be possible that he had given the money to a prostitute, with whom he had had sexual intercourse while he was fetching the bread, without being aware of it. The anxiety was again a fear of having been infected.

This obsessive symptom contains an unusually ingenious mechanism. By having it proved to him that he gave the money not to a prostitute but to his mother, he smuggles an incestuous significance into this harmless action. To give someone money is in this case a substitute for the sexual act; to give his mother money, a substitute for incest. The anxiety is directed against the fictitious action, giving a prostitute money. But the action of giving money to his mother, which guarantees him protection from his anxiety, has an even more complete incestuous significance than the forbidden fictitious action which is invested with the anxiety. The fictitious coitus with a prostitute is that activity, which, because of its incestuous significance, leads to the production of anxiety; but the real action—giving his mother the money—which disproves the execution of the other act, is really symbolic incest. Because of the fact that the anxiety is developed and brought into relation with the fictitious and relatively harmless action; namely, giving money to a prostitute, his attention is diverted from the symbolic incestuous action, giving money to his mother. The contention of the super-ego that the prostitute phantasy has an incestuous significance, is then made to seem ridiculous by the obvious pointlessness of the anxiety after his mother's assurances, and in this way the incestuous wish becomes gratifiable, unhindered, in the symbolic act of handing over the money. I should like to remind you that Freud described this mechanism many years before he understood its structure in his early paper, *Bemerkungen über einen Fall von Zwangsneurose.*[1]

[1] Jahrbuch, 1, 357, 1909. English translation in Collected Papers, Vol. III, 1925.

He formulated this mechanism as follows: that that against which the defensive measures are to be taken, regularly finds its way into that which is to serve as defense. Furthermore, in this same paper, he describes the entire doubt mechanism. The example he gives of " buying a comb " is, in its entire structure and meaning, completely analogous to the case we have just described.

The question might properly be asked, wherein lies the advantage of a structural form of description. Apparently we have made but little progress in the psychological understanding of obsessive doubt since Freud's first formulation. Not even the contention that we can give the individual facts a more general meaning through this description, that we no longer need look upon these remarkable absurd obsessive psychisms as merely clinical curiosities but can read from them that a general principle can be made valid. We saw this general principle in the fact that the act of repression itself serves the purpose of instinctual gratification, or, as we have stated above, that the forces of repression favor the gratification of repressed wishes. But this principle too is already completely included in Freud's formulation. Perhaps the sole progress we have made lies in our being able to state the precise manner in which the act of repression is utilized for the gratification of instinct. The general applicability of the idea of excessive repression (over-severity of the super-ego) and of the punitive system is that additional knowledge concerning the relation between the forces of repression and the repressed tendencies which we owe to our structural conception.

A psychology similar to that behind the obsessive idea just described is also to be found in the very frequent cases of obsessive hypochondriacal preoccupations. The need for punishment and the severity of the super-ego appear in these cases as a compulsive passion to discover in one's self symptoms of disease, and the reaction on the part of the ego to this need for punishment is manifested as fear of these eagerly sought disease symptoms. Fear of disease drives these unfortunates from physician to physician; the latter must frequently confirm their perfect health in a long report drawn up not unlike a legal contract. As

soon as the patients have this assurance, the ungratified need for punishment reasserts itself, for it can be stilled only by a belief in the reality of the disease; the fear of the vengeful super-ego reawakens and to calm this fear the longing for the disease symptom begins anew. Wedged in between these two fears of the cruel super-ego and of disease, these patients try to save themselves first from the one, then from the other. One of my patients carried his physician's written report constantly with him and every now and then became obsessed with a need to reassure himself of the existence of this document. Again at other times he would have the impulse to destroy it. That is to say, he not only had a fear of disease but also a fear of health. As a healthy man he found himself helpless in the grip of his punishment tendencies. The physician who does not understand these tendencies which the neurotic uses against himself will always be helpless in the face of these hypochondriacal fears; he will never understand why people seek, often with remarkable perseverance, to discover nonexistent illnesses in themselves. He will be at a loss to understand why all his efforts to quiet the hypochondriac meet with failure. It likewise avails little for a psychoanalyst to try and persuade such patients of the baselessness of their fear of disease by an appeal to logic. Every reassurance of this sort merely increases the patient's need for punishment and consequently the fear of his super-ego, from which he then tries to free himself through other punitive measures directed against himself. Only the uncovering of those tendencies producing a bad conscience and causing the super-ego to threaten punishment can put an end to this condition. Only when the patient is ready to quit being punished by his super-ego—to renounce the punishment which had permitted him to leave unrecognized his ego-alien tendencies, but which nevertheless also permitted them to be gratified even if only symbolically—only then is the patient cured. As long as he clings to his proscribed tendencies he cannot be relieved from his self-punishment—his hypochondriacal fear of disease—for it is this punishment which permits him to cling to these tendencies.

LECTURE FIVE

Summary

Let us attempt a summary of the views thus far presented concerning the dynamics of neurosis formation. To begin with, we shall consider the purely dynamic relations which obtain between the forces which protect the self from the instincts and the instincts themselves. Then we shall reconstruct the psychological content of this relationship, and finally set forth the origin, or as we might say, the biological and social roots of the neurotic instinct mechanisms. In conclusion, we shall endeavor to apply the insight thus acquired to the solution of one special problem in the theory of the neuroses.

1. *The Dynamic Formula of the Neuroses*

The cases of pathological phobia which we have just discussed illustrate especially clearly to what a large degree conscious anxiety (fear of one's own conscience) has become independent of the objective anxiety from which it originates. The craving to be ill has for its object the appeasal of this conscience anxiety; it means sacrificing one's health to conscience as if conscience were an avenging deity, in order to satisfy the latter's passion to punish. But at the same time there arises a fear of illness. Viewing our results from this perspective, we might say that neurotic illness has two purposes; to wit, the gratification of forbidden tendencies, and at the same time the relief of the conscience anxiety developing as a reaction to this forbidden gratification. We saw that the suffering, which in one form or another, is an indispensable feature in every neurosis, serves the purpose of bringing the situation into accord with the claims of conscience, of avoiding the conscience anxiety which follows the symptomatic gratification of the repressed tendencies, no matter how well this gratification may be disguised. This point of view is applicable to all neuroses without exception. It is only because of the suffering that a

neurosis becomes an illness; without the suffering it would merely constitute a gratification of desire, an unburdening. We saw, however, in addition, that the suffering itself, the conscience reaction, serves as a form of gratification to the ever present passive masochistic pleasure strivings. Recently Freud has called attention to the ego's tendency to let the disease itself become a source of gratification, to adapt itself to the disease. Thus, a chronic ingrown neurosis will often lose more and more of its illness quality, and become in time an important part of the personality, helping to maintain the equilibrium of the psyche. It is thus also that we may understand a fact often observed, the disappearance of an old chronic neurosis when some misfortune occurs in the patient's life. The masochistic gratification furnished by this bad turn of events renders superfluous the self-punishing action of conscience. It is probably the basic principle of the unconscious conscience that no further harm must be done to a sufferer.

The attempt, therefore, to strike a balance between need for punishment and instinct gratification may be regarded as the common dynamic basis which underlies every neurosis. The difference between the various forms of neuroses is due to the difference in the mechanisms by means of which this balance is achieved, or at any rate, attempted. We have seen that there are three main types of this attempt at equilibrium:

(1) The claims of conscience (need for punishment) and those of instinct are gratified at one stroke through the double meaning of the symptom—the mechanism of conversion hysteria.

(2) The claims of conscience and those of instinct, although met at the same time, receive their gratification through different psychic processes—the mechanism of the compulsion neurosis.

(3) The claims of conscience and those of instinct are satisfied at different successive periods—the manic-depressive mechanism.

Besides these there are the neurotic characters in whom the two tendencies are manifested not as symptoms but as characteristics of the individual's way of life. The living out of impulses, and unconsciously intentional self-injuries alternate in this type of personality in the same manner as do the manic and depressive periods in the circular neurosis.

The less a neurosis is accompanied by acute anxiety, the more evidence is there that the economic task of the neurosis, the bringing about of a state of equilibrium, has been accomplished. The appearance of neurotic anxiety indicates that the claims of conscience remain unsatisfied, just as an anxiety dream indicates a failure of the dream work. The neurotic anxiety (bad conscience) leads to renewed instinct restrictions, which in turn provoke the formation of new symptoms. The neurosis then shows a progressive character and does not represent a state of equilibrium. The most classical example of this is to be found in the phobias, where more and more of the patient's activity, becoming over-invested, assumes the significance of unconscious instinct gratification, and on this account must be anxiously avoided. Whether the anxiety itself may be regarded as a gratification of the need for punishment and of the masochistic tendencies, or to what extent this is true, is still an open question. The meaning of anxiety attacks in anxiety hysteria is equally obscure.

Another difference between the various neurotic mechanisms depends upon the degree to which the disease symptoms themselves are utilized for the purpose of instinct discharge. We know that according to Freud the aggression of the super-ego which is directed against the ego can be used not only to satisfy the ego's primary masochism, but also as a means of discharge for the originally outwardly directed sadistic tendencies. At any rate it is certain that the need for punishment itself becomes erotized and put in the service of instinct discharge. It appears to me, however, that the variations in the erotization of the need for punishment have much less to do with determining the form of the neurosis than with its duration. All three of the neuroses mentioned above furnish an opportunity for obtaining masochistic satisfaction from suffering.

2. *The Psychological Content of Neurotic Symptoms*

The meaning of every neurosis consists in an attempt to cling to an instinctual satisfaction which has been condemned by conscience. This attempt, therefore, will be successful only when the

inhibitory influence of conscience is abolished at the same time. This is accomplished through suffering, through the self-punishing quality of the symptoms, or through the formation of ascetic traits of character. In this connection we must not forget that the claims of conscience are merely those claims, those demands of society, which the child has taken onto himself through an identification with its parents, its first guides. The laws of conscience, therefore, originate from without. When it is assumed that these originally environmental codes have by introjection become part of the self it simply means that the child recognizes as its own some of those environmental influences which originally were opposed to its wishes. It submitted to the instinct inhibitory pressure of its environment and now supports this pressure out of its own resources. Thus, even though the content of the rules of conscience is derived from without, the power through which these claims make themselves felt in the psychic apparatus originates from the instinctual reservoir of the psyche, the id. The counter-cathexis (charge—investment) which we experience as conscience-inhibitions therefore arises from the original instinct energies. It behaves like a renegade who turns against his former companions, and is not unlike the police force in a capitalistic state, which is recruited from the protelariat against which its restrictive peace-preserving power is chiefly directed. We may consequently well agree with Radó when he speaks of a "conscience instinct" in view of the origin of the energies of conscience in the instinctual reservoir. We must, however, not forget that it is a secondary instinct derived from the original primordial instincts.

Later on, when we come to examine these conscience energies from the standpoint of their instinctual quality, we shall see that they originate from two sources: first, from originally outwardly directed aggression which, being checked by resistances in the environment, turns upon the self and becomes the sadism of the super-ego; and secondly, from the primary masochism of the ego. It is this second component which converts the neurosis into a form of gratification, whereas the first component is derived

directly from the introjection of an environmental frustration, and then appears as an internal frustration caused by conscience.

The neurosis allows the emergence of the primitive instinctual tendencies up to a certain extent, in spite of the presence of the inhibiting conscience.

Although a genuine gratification of instinct is prevented the symptoms nevertheless furnish a substitutive gratification. We have seen that submitting to suffering constitutes the general mechanism by means of which the claims of conscience are satisfied and its inhibitory influence removed. In accordance with our structural conception of the personality, we are able to use this idea as the basis of a plan of the neurotic mechanism.

In sketching this plan it will be impossible to avoid repeating some of the ideas formulated previously. Objective anxiety, the sole primary form of instinct-inhibiting anxiety, is taken into the personality and there transformed into conscience-anxiety. After this takes place, many outwardly directed instinctive tendencies become inhibited through this newly formed conscience-anxiety. At first this inhibition appears in the form of conscience conflict, whose content consists in a struggle between conscience (anxiety) and temptation. In time those tendencies which lead to a conscience conflict, to conscience-anxiety, become repressed—that is, unconsciously inhibited. Conscience now has acquired an unconscious representative in the super-ego. In a manner similar to conscious conscience, the super-ego in the neurosis then demands that punishment be inflicted if one has yielded to temptation and committed a sin; after which the qualms of conscience, conscience-anxiety, are allayed. The super-ego metes out punishment, inflicts suffering, and as a result of this the sins committed in the form of symptoms are expiated. Thus suffering comes to be a psychic coin by means of which any offense may be expiated. Once this coin has become legal tender within the depths of the personality the reappearance of the repressed in its original form becomes assured. The ego, whose function it is to repress in accordance with the dictates of the super-ego, is now permitted to undergo suffering and thus satisfy the demands of the super-ego; but in

return for this the ego is at the same time privileged to give in to the id without coming into conflict with the super-ego. After suffering the super-ego's punishment, it is secure against conscience-anxiety. The super-ego has accepted the suffering as payment—the bribery has succeeded. As we have already expressed it, the super-ego punishes instead of prohibiting, and the ego suffers instead of renouncing.

The counter-cathexis of the super-ego by means of which it compels the ego to repress, is dissipated in punishment, in the causation of pain. It is certain, however, that both ego and super-ego have in the final analysis given the advantage to the id. The equilibrium of the personality has shifted in the direction of the id, even though the id tendencies are permitted expression only in substitute gratification symptoms, instead of direct gratifications.

3. *The Social and Biological Roots of the Neurotic Punishment Mechanisms*

In the axiom of the neurotic psyche; to wit, that through enduring punishment, through suffering, one achieves not only absolution for sin, but a justification for committing it, we can recognize the foundation of all primitive religious systems in which sacrifice (all sacrifice is associated with renunciation, with suffering) serves to appease an avenging deity. In the psyche conscience-anxiety is allayed through suffering. But even in present-day penal systems retaliation through the infliction of punishment plays a greater rôle than jurists like to admit. That the customary method of child rearing is based upon a system of punishment is self-evident; one need only think of how we drill the infant in habits of cleanliness. We recognize in the internal regime of the neurotic psyche the mirrored image of that spirit which gave rise to the primitive form of societal organization and which is still retained in present-day criminal justice. The same methods by means of which the laws of the land endeavor to prevent the expression of asocial instinctive tendencies are made use of in maintaining the equilibrium of the psyche. The same castration threat by means of which the primal father kept the sons from

committing incest continues to live to-day in the conscience-anxiety of every individual. Freud's thesis, which he has somewhat modified at the present time, that conscience is merely introjected castration fear, is the concentrated expression of the fact that the internal socially aimed regulation of instinct arose through the introjection of the laws of society. To-day this fact is quite self-evident to us, since we have become so familiar from clinical experience with the general method employed by the mind in adapting itself to the environment; namely, identification through introjection.

With the establishment of this identity of spirit underlying child rearing, the laws of society and the internal regime of the psyche, we stand before a phenomenon which led Leibniz, who sensed to an astonishing degree the identity of the laws of nature with those of thought, to the assumption of a divinely pre-established harmony between the internal laws of thinking and the external laws of nature.

Only in this way could the discoverer of the infinitesimal calculus explain how starting from a purely empirical fact one is able to reach entirely new results by way of deduction and the formal laws of logic, results which were then invariably substantiated by experience. Unacquainted with the facts of evolution he could not know that the laws of logic grew out of the process of adaptation to reality, through an introjection of the empirically acquired natural laws, and that, therefore, there was this astounding correspondence between the two.

The same process underlies the psychoanalytic discovery that the relationships obtaining between the various parts of the personality—ego, super-ego, and id—mirror the social relations of mankind. If we were able to say formerly that the neurotic symptom brings to light primitive instincts which are ill adapted to present-day societal forms, we are able to add to this to-day that the spirit of the instinct regulating mechanisms corresponds to the primitive code of justice of primitive society. To put it differently, we might say that at first we recognized in the neurotic symptoms atavistic tendencies, whereas now we have discovered

in the structure of the neurosis the perpetuation of remnants of a primitive level of social organization based upon punishment.

From these remarks it might seem as though we had forgotten completely that society with all its arrangements is entirely the creation of man. Even though we have determined how man had to adjust himself to the society which he created, a society which then pursued its own laws which he in turn incorporated into himself, we must not forget that man created this society in his own image. When we, therefore, rediscovered in the laws of conscience the external laws of society, we were in the position of a man who finds something which he has himself hidden. Social laws originated as projections of internal psychic relationships which then were reëstablished in the psyche by means of a reintrojection, albeit in a modified form.

Let us attempt to apply these views to an understanding of the psychology of the neuroses. If we assume as the basis of the neurosis that punishment does away with prohibitions, a thesis derived through the introjection of the primitive punishment and sacrifice system of primitive society, we now must ask ourselves how this fundamental thesis came to be the basis of the primitive code of justice. What primitive characteristic of the psyche found its projected realization in this punishment system?

I believe it is not difficult to discover those elementary psychological relationships which constituted the basis of the primitive punishment and sacrifice system. The human psyche here made use of experience which it had acquired during its difficult struggle for adaptation to the physical environment. I refer to the painful experience which accompanies the attempt to gratify wishes which are not as yet adapted to reality. These painful impressions conditioned the psychic apparatus to avoid those activities which tended to cause pain in its experimental struggle with the environment, or to modify them till they became adapted to gratify instinctual desires without exciting pain.

One might say in anthropomorphic terms that nature by causing suffering compels humanity to recognize its peculiarities and to adjust itself to them. Man copies inanimate nature in his

system of punishment, which has for its object the subdual and transformation of the primitive instinctive urges. This is most clearly in evidence during the period when the little child is being trained in habits of cleanliness. Every violation of the rules of cleanliness is followed automatically by punishment, until the child becomes impressed with the fact that such behavior is accompanied by pain.

Such an enforced association of punishment and pleasurable instinct gratification can also lead to the paradoxical result that the painful experience does not bring about an avoidance of the forbidden gratification, but instead is simply accepted as a disagreeable but unavoidable accompaniment of instinct gratification which must be borne if one is not to give up all hope of satisfying his instincts.

All functional associations based upon the pattern, "If A happens, B must follow", are subject to being transposed to read, "If B happens, A must happen too". Such an inversion of the formula forms the basis of that psychology which considers pain, or punishment, as a condition of, and at the same time a charter for the gratification of forbidden instinctive activities. That pain and pleasure inevitably succeed each other, an experience deeply engraved on the human mind, is the common basis of all primitive religions as well as of current principles of education, indeed even of our present-day justice. But it also constitutes the basis of neurotic mechanisms. In the case of the latter the source of the pain infliction lies within the sphere of the personality; the pain, which is considered to be inevitable in any event is inflicted upon one's self. One punishes one's self as a substitute for the pain or punishment due from the environment. Passively endured pain is replaced by an active self-infliction, which has the advantage of being milder and arbitrarily apportioned.

The advantage of this internalization of the punishment mechanism is the same as the advantage of being judged by a local court instead of by a foreign one. If the judge himself is part of our own ego we can justifiably hope that the punishment will be a milder one. But we know that the neurotic succeeds even further.

He can impress the self-inflicted punishment into the service of instinct discharge. In the light of this we get a clear picture of the profoundly narcissistic basis of the autonomous penal code of the psyche. Reik justly maintains that the criminal's capacity for satisfying his own need for punishment is his strongest weapon against his judge. Through self-inflicted suffering he rids himself from his compulsion to confess, since he no longer needs the judicial sentence to relieve him of his bad conscience. The type of criminal who, according to Freud, commits his crimes because of a sense of guilt, pursues a similar aim by means of a somewhat different mechanism when he tries to rid himself of his fear of castration by means of minor transgressions with their consequent mild punishments. He too endeavors to substitute a mild punishment for a severe one; he tricks society into punishing him leniently for harboring wishes which his cruel super-ego pursues with the deeply dreaded threat of castration. In such cases the subject's own conscience, which originally developed to protect him from suffering coming from the environment, acquires a degree of cruelty which is feared more than the environmental punishment. The neurotic punishes himself in order to avoid external punishment, and the "criminal because of a sense of guilt" subjects himself to external punishment to avoid the internal punishment from his super-ego.

But it is not only the struggle with reality for the attainment of instinct gratification, not only the spirit underlying modern education and social institutions which forces the psyche to recognize the inevitable succession of pleasure and pain, but also the biological development of his instinctual life.

Several years ago I tried to find the affective basis of the castration anticipation which follows childish masturbation in the affective experiences of the first years of life, the years preceding the genital organization of his instinct life. Following Freud and Jones, who saw in the forced relinquishment of the pleasure-giving faecal mass the anal forerunner of an anticipatory castration, and Stärcke, who thought that weaning contributed perhaps an even earlier painful experience capable of producing an affec-

tive component in preparation of the Oedipus complex, I endeavored to formulate the common affective root of these painful experiences. I sought to discover the affective basis of the anticipation of the loss of the onanistically pleasure-giving penis in the previous loss of a pleasure-giving part of the body and in the principle of the inevitable succession of pleasure and pain. The faecal mass and, as Stärcke justly maintains, the nipple are considered by the child to be parts of his own body. Going still further back, I assumed that the experience of birth is the paradigm for a sense of loss which is repeated later in different forms each time a stage of instinct organization must be abandoned. Thus the experience of birth might be looked upon as the earliest affective root of the castration fear. This theory was in agreement with Freud's assumption that all later feelings of anxiety are in some way related to the experience of birth.

This assumption was fully substantiated by Freud's most recent investigations in which he considered the relation of anxiety to symptom formation. He came to the conclusion that the various painful experiences which we have mentioned, birth, and oral and anal restrictions, are accompanied by a rise in the tension that goes with desire against which the child is at first helpless. The rise in instinct tension makes of instinct a source of danger and gives rise to anxiety in the ego. In my *Metapsychologische Darstellung des Heilungvorganges*[1] I endeavored to define the dynamic effect of the traumatic events incident to instinct development by saying that modes of instinct gratification already acquired have to be constantly replaced in the course of this inevitable development by new gratification mechanisms, indeed by mechanisms which the child has as yet not learned to master.

Thus, from birth on, the infant's need for food and air must be satisfied by suckling and by its own breathing and circulatory systems in place of the intrauterine arrangement. Later, weaning demands a transition to another oral form of nourishment, but one totally different from suckling. As the child learns to walk, its purely passive attitude to locomotion (being carried about)

[1] Zeit. f. PsA., 10, 216, 1924. English translation, Int. Jl. Psa., 6, 13, 1925.

must give place to active getting about. During its training in cleanliness, its hitherto unhampered excremental pleasure suffers a powerful restriction. And no sooner has genital organization been reached than the child's masturbatory indulgence is burdened with the castration threat. The same fate overtakes the child's psychosexual attachment to his mother as a sexual object, which is likewise predestined to disappear. Not even with the sexual reawakening at puberty does the sexual instinct find its ultimate object. Only as an adult is it possible for man to find, in exogamous object choice, a socially tolerated form of sexual gratification. Every stage in the above described evolutionary history of instinct, when it is once attained, may become a fixation point, and every demand for the abandonment of an already achieved stage and its replacement by a new untried stage means pain, which is due to a rise in the instinct tension accompanying every transition to a new level.

The rise in tension is due to the fact that the psychic apparatus has not as yet mastered the required new method of instinct gratification, and consequently is in a state of continuous stimulation during the period of its tentative efforts at instinct release. This helpless state of continuous stimulation Freud calls a traumatic situation. I should like to enlarge upon this observation by adding that the greatest difficulty in overcoming this traumatic state lies in the fact that as a result of the compulsion to repeat, the organism clings to its old methods of instinct gratification and endeavors to continue to apply to these new situations the old no longer adequate techniques of instinct mastery, that it endeavors to solve the problem of ridding itself of the stimulus tension by using the old pattern. However, since these old methods automatically applied are no use in solving the new problems of instinct mastery, there arises a painful state of unresolved instinct tension. Thus we see, for example, in the well known picture of pylorospasm, which might properly be considered a primary neurotic symptom, how some new-born children resist taking nourishment by way of the mouth and digestive tract. Other children after being weaned refuse to take solid food; they thereby

display their fixation on their trusted and tried pleasure-giving sucking activity, which they do not wish to give up in favor of chewing. They would rather go hungry. We require no further examples. The clinging to oral and anal modes of gratification and to infantile love objects is the chief source of the material on which psychoanalytical theory is based.

The renunciation of old instinctual demands which the new situation is not able to gratify is an indispensable condition for overcoming the traumatic state of tension which accompanies the abandonment of a lower stage of organization, since it is precisely the attempt to cling to these demands and the refusal to replace them by new ones which is the cause of the state of tension. It is these instinctual claims no longer capable of being satisfied that constitute the internal danger comparable in its psychological significance to external danger. External danger too can cause a state of stimulus tension when there is a break in the defenses against external stimuli.

The psyche employs various methods of instinct restriction and inhibition to protect itself from the dangerous instinctive urges of a stage of organization already abandoned—urges which interfere with adaptation to the immediate situation. These methods are all intended to aid the adaptation to new internal and external situations. We have seen that in the psychoneuroses of adults, repression is the most important of these defense mechanisms against instinct. Repression serves to prevent those infantile urges which are out of accord with the demands of society and whose realization would be accompanied by pain from gaining access not only to the motor apparatus but also to consciousness. This repression is carried out by the ego at the behest of the super-ego, which upholds the inhibitory demands of society within the psychic apparatus, even in the unconscious. The super-ego employs with reference to the ego the same two methods which teachers, nurses and parents employ when they aim to bring about the restraint of instinctive urges; namely, the infliction of pain (punishment), or the withdrawal of love. According to Freud it is fear of punishment, whose prototype is castration-

expectancy, that furnishes the motive force for repression in the male, while in the female it is the fear of loss of love.

4. *Summary*

By combining Freud's conception of the mechanism underlying the processes protecting the self from the instincts with our principle of the relation between suffering and symptom formation as presented in these lectures, we attain a unitary picture of the nature of neurosis formation. The basic characteristic of the neurotic psyche is that it associates inseparably every gratification of desire with an expectation of pain. This expectation of pain is deeply rooted in the emotional impressions received during the period of instinctual development as well as in the painful experiences associated with one's relation to the environment, and in the experiences of the period of training and education.

The three categories of traumatic situations which are at the base of this expectation of pain are the following: (1) A rise in desire-tension accompanying the enforced abandonment of the several stages of instinct organization during the course of instinct development up to the genital stage (biological traumata). (2) Traumatic states of excitation caused by the new external stimuli which arise in every new environmental situation, and which are as yet not suitable to the psyche and its protective reactions (physical traumata). (3) Educational demands for social behavior (as, for instance, exogamous object-choice), which are opposed to the original instinctual tendencies, and which are enforced by means of punishment, threats of punishment, and withdrawal of love (social traumata).

The first group of traumatic influences is the product of the necessary course of biological development, and includes birth, weaning, learning to walk, etc. The second group has its source in the resistance of inanimate nature to the needs of the individual. (The postponement of satisfaction of needs because of conditions in time and space; stimulation due to changes in the condition of the physical environment.) The third group of painful experiences has its origin in the moral requirements of

society, whose chief aim is the inhibition of certain aggressive and genital tendencies (parricide and incest). This effective inhibitory factor, which arose in primeval human history and still persists in our methods of rearing, consists in the case of the man in castration threats and castration fears, in the woman in the withdrawal of love. This third social form of instinct restriction is the youngest in the evolutionary scale. For this reason it causes present-day man the greatest difficulty. It has not as yet become automatically embodied in the organism as have the other two forms of instinct adaptation. The biological phases of instinctual development take place through specifically determined and hereditarily transmitted automatic transmutations of the total organism. At birth, breathing sets in automatically, the innervation of suckling is of a reflex type, and the development of teeth constitutes a natural transition point to independent nourishment. Walking itself need not depend on training. Even one's attitude towards the environment, the avoidance of typical danger situations takes place largely by means of inherited reflex protective mechanisms.

In contrast to these, the conquest of the Oedipus complex appears to be a phenomenon of adaptation which every individual must accomplish alone and through his own powers, even though its solution by means of repression, as we have already indicated, constitutes a transition to the automatic physical protective process, and has its prototype and preconditions in the primeval history of mankind. It is nevertheless an open and experimentally untested question whether this inherited predisposition would suffice to overcome the incest fixation without any aid from the environment.

The neurotic breaks down when he comes in contact with these socially conditioned instinct restrictions. Fixated in the Oedipus situation, he is unable to carry out in the world of reality either his combative or his erotic tendencies. The frustrations met with in the real world first lead to an introversion of instinct. From this point on a regressive movement in instinct satisfaction sets in, an attempt to return to incestuous genital, or even deeper pre-

genital forms of gratification mechanisms. The disappointment and frustrations of reality increase his fear of reality, which in the case of the man becomes fused with the castration fear originating in the Oedipus complex, and this forces him to a regressive abandonment of genital wishes. But regression itself does not protect him from the castration anxiety which furnished the point of departure for the regressive movement. All previous painful experiences which acted as instinct restrictors during the overcoming of the various pregenital stages become clustered about the castration anxiety; they form an emotional complex of painful impressions which has the effect of castration anxiety. It is only too clear why the regressively rediscovered anal and oral satisfactions are also associated with castration anxiety, although primarily during the original mastery of these tendencies there was as yet no question of castration anxiety. These anal and oral satisfactions simply acquire a genital coloring because they are substitutes for genital incest cravings. In the event of a regressive abandonment of an achieved stage of organization, the stage that is being abandoned leaves its mark on the recaptured earlier instinctive tendency. That is to say, castration anxiety, particularly in its internalized form as fear of the super-ego, forms the barrier which counteracts the tendency to cling to genital incest cravings and their regressive substitutes, the pregenital gratifications. At first glance this formulation seems self-contradictory. For we first said that castration anxiety causes the regressive movement, and now we maintain that the regressively reanimated pregenital satisfaction are likewise associated with castration anxiety. What would be the point of a regression if it contributes nothing towards overcoming the castration anxiety? The factor of *quantity* is the decisive one here. Because "oral castration" and "anal castration" are less feared than the genuine genital variety, we find this regressive return to these levels taking place. But inasmuch as these pregenital gratifications are substitute gratifications for genital wishes previously entertained but now abandoned, they also are burdened with what might be termed a

substitute castration anxiety. This anxiety which develops because of the regression to oral and anal forms of satisfaction has in fact acquired the quality of a castration anxiety, because the pregenital gratifications themselves have acquired a genital character. It is true that regression is a flight from the genital stage with which the severest degree of castration anxiety is associated, but regression alone will not protect the individual from his super-ego. Through regression alone, anxiety cannot be relieved.

The neurotic rids himself of his inhibiting fear of his super-ego through self-inflicted punishments (symbolic castrations). Instead of rejecting certain instinctual urges and thus complying with the demands of its super-ego, the neurotic ego inflicts upon itself the threatened punishments of the super-ego and then having suffered, sees no further reason for denying itself instinct gratification. If denial has for its purpose the elimination of pain, there is no justification for it once the pain has actually been suffered. The instinct-inhibiting fear of the super-ego disappears when the super-ego's punishments are suffered—the instinct-inhibiting fear of pain is removed by the punishment.

We see, therefore, that regression as well as the self-punishment mechanisms serve to relieve the fear of the super-ego. The latter mechanisms are, however, the more general ones, for these mechanisms are also employed in hysteria, a condition in which the genital level is retained. Apart from this, the self-punishment mechanism constitutes a more effective protection against anxiety, for, as we have seen, though regression can mitigate anxiety, it cannot eliminate it completely. Self-punishment alone permits a clinging to the condemned instinct satisfactions. On the other hand, it is only too obvious that just as the super-ego's punishments are not real but substitutive punishments, so the neurotic instinct gratifications are only substitutive gratifications.

The introjection of the painful environmental instinct-inhibitions in the form of an inhibitory super-ego took place in the interest of pain avoidance. But the neurotic psyche introjects the pain as well—the penalty which it voluntarily imposes upon itself,

even though the pain is attenuated; that is to say, symbolic castration in the compulsion neurosis is not equivalent to genuine castration. But by virtue of this pain introjection, it can gratify wishes which run counter to the demands of reality and of the super-ego. The pain-producing symptoms of the neurotic, or in the compulsion neurosis, ascetic traits of character, have therefore fundamentally the same significance, irrespective of whether we deal with a hysteria, a compulsion neurosis, or a manic-depressive disorder; to wit, they take the place of the real penalty of castration or of the withdrawal of the mother's love. Other symptoms, or in the case of hysteria the same symptom, signify, on the other hand, the gratification of the repressed instinctual urges. Thus, in the neurosis, suffering and wish-fulfillment are joined inseparably; the one is the condition for the other. In this union there is expressed the cosmic experience of every living creature, that development means a perpetual struggle with reality and with one's own renegade instinctual urges—a struggle in which pain and pleasure alternate according to definite laws. The neurotic, however, impresses this enforced alternation of pain and pleasure under the sway of his own sovereignty, dodges the painful struggle with reality, and in its stead inflicts on himself his own punishments—but he also turns his back upon real gratifications. To substitute, for pain but also for pleasure, is his guiding principle.

The uncanny apprehension that some sort of vague misfortune is apt to follow particularly after some exceptionally fortunate turn of events or moment of absolute happiness, a feeling experienced by the normal as well as the neurotic, is based upon the deeply rooted infantile experience that pleasure is regularly succeeded by pain, that every successfully attained stage of instinct organization is very soon replaced by a new and at first painful one. In Schiller's poem, Polycrates throws his ring into the sea at the moment in which he feels completely happy in order to fend off by means of this symbolic self-castration the evil-bringing jealousy of the gods. This symbolic action has also a contrary meaning: he throws the ring into the water and thereby represents the wish for the womb.

"Drum willst du dich vor Leid bewahren,
So flehe zu den Unsichtbaren,
Dass sie zum Glück den Schmerz verleihn." [2]

5. *An Application of the Dynamic Formula of the Neuroses*

The utility of a theory or formula is determined solely by its practical applicability to individual facts. The conception that the neuroses are based upon the two tendencies, first, a clinging to infantile mechanisms of attaining instinct gratification, and, second, the elimination of the conscience anxiety to which this gives rise by means of self-inflicted suffering, enables us to offer an answer to the questions recently raised by Freud; namely, wherein lies the essential difference between the phobias and the compulsion neuroses, and how is it that the neurotic anxiety in the latter is almost completely controlled, but in the former not at all? We have already touched upon the answer to this question, but we should now like to take up the subject in more detail even at the expense of some unavoidable repetition. We have already shown that in the phobias, self-punishment, the satisfaction of the super-ego's punishment demands, is absent. The ego attempts a flight from the condemned instinct, or as Freud expresses it, treats it as an external source of irritation. This flight tendency is manifested, first, in the fact that those actions which might serve as means of gratifying the condemned instinct are avoided and replaced by others. These, however, immediately assume an additional meaning similar to the ones avoided. Thus, to give an example cited by Freud, writing acquires a coitus significance, in that a pen signifies a penis, an ink-well a vagina, and ink a soiling fluid. But because of this over-determination this activity too is pursued by castration threats of the super-ego which recognizes its unconscious meaning. To this degree the phobic and compulsion mechanisms pursue a parallel course. In the compulsion neurosis, too, harmless activities acquire a symbolic over-

[2] In the metrical translation of Schiller's poem, these lines are paraphrased and do not express Alexander's point. This by way of apology for the following literal rendering: "Therefore if thou desirest to ward off suffering, pray to the Invisible Powers that they add pain to thy happiness." Trans.

significance. However, whereas the compulsion neurotic appeases his menacing super-ego through carrying on other activities or through assuming over-moral traits of character, adjusted to the punitive wishes of the super-ego, which enable him to carry on the symbolic activity without anxiety, the phobic has not as yet learned this bribery maneuver. He still takes his super-ego too seriously, abandons his activity, and endeavors to find relief from instinct tensions in new symbolic activities. And in this way the endless futile flight continues. In accordance with this, a phobia seems to us an incomplete compulsion neurosis, the first half of a compulsion neurosis. This view is corroborated by the fact that the compulsion neurosis almost always manifests some degree of phobic anxiety, and by the fact that the two clinical conditions so frequently coexist in the same person. This is due to the fact that the neurotic succeeds in overcoming phobic anxiety through compulsion mechanisms only gradually. Probably, in certain cases there is also a conversion hysteria fixation of the phobic anxiety. In the light of these considerations, the phobias appear to us as initial states, and the compulsion neurosis and hysteria as end states. It is the task of empirical research to determine whether or not every compulsion neurosis and every hysteria actually sets in as a phobia, which need not necessarily achieve complete development.

As we have already indicated, the fact that the phobia is the typical neurosis of early childhood is in favor of the correctness of our assumption; or perhaps we could say, and my experience favors the assumption, that the later developing compulsion neurosis is merely a continuation of an early infantile phobia. It readily follows (and clinical experience bears this out to a large extent) that every neurosis begins with phobic anxiety. The various neurotic mechanisms are simply so many attempts to fixate the anxiety and thus remove the inhibitions to gratification. For example, a phobic inhibition becomes a compulsion neurosis when the mastering of the anxiety is made dependent on certain compulsive regulations. In this way compulsive ceremonials develop. Therapeutic experience likewise strengthens this view.

If, in the course of an analysis, one succeeds in doing away with the anxiety-binding self-punishment mechanisms, phobic anxiety again comes to the surface—the same anxiety which the patient had at the beginning of his illness and which he was able to fixate by means of his neurotic pain mechanisms.

We must not conceal the fact that what we have said up to now concerning the phobias applies chiefly to the phobias of adults. The childhood phobias we must investigate as a separate problem. But before doing so, one more remark must be made concerning the compulsion neurosis.

The compulsion neurotic has still another mechanism at his disposal with which to forestall anxiety and defend himself anew against those of his tendencies which, at one time repressed, have broken through the repression barriers and reached consciousness. Freud described this mechanism only recently and designated it as *isolation*. Its purpose is to loosen the contents of consciousness from their connections, separate the individual elements, and thus conceal their meaning. But it seems to me that this isolation mechanism is only an accessory defense mechanism, and is of importance only in the secondary disarmament of those formerly repressed tendencies which have broken through into consciousness. The explanation of the breaking through of the repression barrier seems to me to lie in every case in the general mechanism of the inhibition-removing effect of the self-punishment mechanisms. We see a somewhat different form of attempted flight from the repressed instinctual strivings on the part of the ego in the phobias of children.

In the case of infantile phobias, the ego, as Freud recently so clearly described it, deals with the internal danger as though it were literally an external danger; namely, by means of a projection mechanism. We see from the analysis of little Hans's horse phobia that his own parricidal tendency, the true source of danger, led to his fear of horses, the totemistic representatives of his father. According to Freud, the basis of this fear lay in the child's experience that his hostile activities regularly evoked retaliative measures in those against whom his hostility was

directed. Instead of running away from his own aggressive tendencies, which provoked the peril, the child ran away from the horse, which stood for his hated father. His hate tendency was not given up, but instead, his fear of this tendency was projected outward as a fear of horses. I believe this mechanism resembles more nearly the paranoic mechanism than it does the phobic mechanism in adults. Projection does not seem to play as important a rôle in the typical phobias of adults as it does in childhood phobias.

Thus, in the case of agoraphobia (street-fear) discussed previously, the otherwise harmless activity of walking on the street acquired the over-determined significance of "street-walking" as applied to a prostitute. It is this over-determined significance which leads to a condemnation of the activity and its anxious avoidance. In both the phobias of adults and those of children the flight from a condemned tendency as though it were an external source of irritation offers a contrast to the compulsion and hysterical mechanisms, for in the latter mechanisms the condemned tendency attains gratification through symptoms, while at the same time suffering serves to allay the anxiety.

The difference between the phobias of children and those of adults lies in the fact that the child through projection makes of the internal danger an external one, and then avoids this external source of danger, whereas the adult is no longer able to utilize such a projection mechanism; he flees from the internal source of danger by avoiding those activities which, because of their extra symbolic significance would lead to a gratification of the repressed tendencies. That the symbolic disguise does not protect against the censoring effect of the super-ego is the best proof that the super-ego possesses an internal perceptive function which can not be deceived by the disguise mechanisms known to us. It understands the latent meaning of these activities in spite of the disguise.

This fact, as well as the unconscious need for punishment, forces us to revise our conceptions of symptom-formation. According to this conception, the disguise, symbolic or otherwise,

of the hidden meaning sufficed to explain symptom-formation. But we now see that the disguise of meaning is of value only insofar as consciousness is concerned, and only serves to protect the condemned tendency from being repelled by the conscious ego. The disguise has no significance for the unconscious censor, for the super-ego. The best evidence of this is the fact that anxiety and the sense of guilt develop in spite of the disguise. The super-ego knows the language of the unconscious and does not permit itself to be deceived. It inflicts punishment for wishes which appear in consciousness in a disguised form or which may even not appear in consciousness at all. Without the assumption of a moral faculty which is in direct relation with the unconscious, neither phobic anxiety nor the unconscious sense of guilt are intelligible.

This faculty can not be deceived by any disguise mechanisms; it must have its hush-money in the form of punishment. Since this bribery does not take place in the phobias anxiety develops. We might consider the phobias as unsuccessful or incomplete neuroses which have not as yet succeeded in bringing about a psychic equilibrium, not even a pathological one. That is to say, a phobia does not succeed in satisfying at one and the same time the two sets of tendencies, those that are repressed or condemned, and those moral ones issuing from the super-ego.

However simplified this orientation with respect to the neuroses may become as the result of the dynamic-economic approach, and no matter how easily it may enable us to concentrate our empirical experience into one formula, this mode of approach must still meet our demand that it be in accord with our views concerning the etiology of the neuroses.

LECTURE SIX

Problem of Etiology in the Neuroses: Sublimations

As the result of our investigations up to this point, we are able to give the dynamic formula for a neurosis. This formula in its simplest terms reduces the neurosis to an effort at equilibrium between two groups of forces: (1) protective forces and (2) those instinctual forces against which the organism must protect itself. Without some further amplification, however, this formula is not adapted to give a complete answer to the question of the etiology of the neuroses. That a neurotic symptom is the result of restrictions upon instincts and impulses is an assured fact. Yet all the painful impressions of the developmental years, those which, as can be seen more plainly in the male, merge into the castration fear—partly by preparing the individual for it emotionally, partly by producing it directly—those impressions which taken altogether are to be regarded as the source of the defenses against the instinctive drives, are operative in normal persons no less than in neurotic ones.

The biological restrictions upon the instincts from birth through the period of the training in cleanliness must be borne by every human being. And the same is true for the later social restrictions on the instinctive urges. Indeed it is unquestionably quantitative factors alone which must be held responsible—a fact which Freud recently has again expressly emphasized. It is also quite certain that all the restrictions on the instincts previously alluded to may affect different individuals with different degrees of intensity, and to a certain extent, at different stages in their development. For example, weaning may take place at one time or another, or training in stool habits may take place at an earlier or a later period and with more or less drastic means. Furthermore, the attitude towards infantile masturbation may assume the most varied forms, from completest indulgence to sternest threats of castration. Still more varied—and for the formation

of a neurosis doubtless no less fateful—are the later methods of upbringing. The first trauma of all, that of birth, can, as in the case of a premature or a delayed delivery, interrupt intra-uterine existence at different points of time; furthermore, the birth itself may be more or less difficult—facts in which Rank sees a peculiarly important, indeed, the sole decisive factor. It must therefore be clear that the problem of the etiology of a neurosis is a quantitative problem. We are entitled to expect that the intensity of the various traumatic restrictions of the instinctive urges and the time at which they are applied, in other words, whether they act on an organism with a greater or less degree of resistance capacity, determine the intensity of the instinct-repressions. Now it is precisely this intensity of repression which plays the decisive rôle in the construction of a neurosis; for there is no doubt that in the neurotic a real carrying out of his instinctual urges is markedly restricted through excessive repressions. The instinctual urges attain expression only to a certain extent in such substitute gratifications as may be included in symptoms. This is the fundamental characteristic of the true neurosis. Theoretically, then, we must at first assume that each of the instinct restrictions which may act in a traumatic fashion, through an increase in its intensity, might become the cause of an excessive repression, and in this way the source of symptoms. In addition to this, there are accidental atypical traumatic influences, such as infantile seduction, unusually cruel treatment, and so forth, which Freud, more particularly at the beginning of his career, held responsible for the neurotic configurations. Since that time, our interest has come to be centered more and more on the typical developmental factors, although we do not, because of this, cast doubt upon the fact that pathogenic effects do arise from special accidental traumata. The more our knowledge of the development of instinctive urges grew, the more improbable it became that only one of these typical factors had to bear the sole responsibility for the production of a neurosis. Indeed, the mere fact that the clinical conditions exhibit such great variations speaks strongly against this view. I may, therefore, leave aside the

entirely improbable theory of Rank concerning the effect of the trauma of birth—a theory which has received penetrating but exceedingly indulgent treatment at the hands of Freud. It is easily conceivable—indeed likely—that an atypical shortening or lengthening of the fetal life, and perhaps the severity of the birth also, might cause a neurotic predisposition, that is to say, a greater susceptibility to instinct restrictions and to repression at a later date. But it is quite inconceivable that this should be the *sole general* cause of all later neuroses. Therefore, although Rank, by calling our attention to the trauma of birth, has directed us to a pathogenic factor (as yet unsubstantiated by any empirical data, it is true, but one entirely conceivable and possible; one which could play a part along with others) and by doing so has opened up a new field for empirical investigation, he has, nevertheless, in his emphasis on the exclusive character of this factor, disregarded almost all the well established material won through psychoanalytic experience. The pathogenic effect of later impressions is firmly established, and it can be assumed without danger that a severe traumatic influence during the war, for example, might set up a traumatic neurosis in a person whose birth had been quite normal. Indeed, under a sufficiently strong traumatic influence, the healthiest of individuals can become neurotic.

Our only resource, then, is to return to the field of clinical experience, consider the various known pathogenic factors and confront them with our dynamic neurosis-formula.

Our first and indeed our surest insight into the neurotic symptom was the perception that it is a reaction on the part of the excessively restricted instinctive urges, in other words, an attempt at unburdening. We saw, furthermore, that instinct restrictions result in the first place from the demands of reality; but that in the neuroses these restrictions meet demands which are much more stringent than any that can possibly be imposed by the real situation. The super-ego, which in the psychic structure stands for the restraints imposed by society, demands of the neurotic a greater degree of restriction than does reality. We designated this characteristic of the neurotic as an *over-severity* of the super-

ego. Restrictions on the instinctive urges exist in both normal and neurotic persons; the differences are only quantitative ones. The second important difference between normal and neurotic processes lies in the kind of reaction on the part of the instinctive urges to the restrictions imposed upon them.

We have stated that the normal reaction is *modification* of the impulses not adapted to reality, a modification which we called *sublimation.* A sublimation is characterized by two features. In the first place it represents a legitimate activity directed outward, with an aim lying outside the personality; and in the second place, it has a social quality. In contrast to this, the neurotic supplants the outwardly directed activity either by bodily changes which have a purely subjective significance, or by commonplace activities which do not essentially get beyond the bounds of the personality, or by purely psychological quantities of phantasy activity. The neurotic symptom, in contrast to real activity, is not directed to produce changes in the environment; the changes take place in the individual's own self. The other essential difference between symptom and sublimation lies in the fact that in the case of the symptom the content of the instinctive urge or impulse which is not adapted to reality remains unaltered; the original content merely becomes cloaked in a form unintelligible to consciousness. The essence of these differences between symptom and sublimation may then be expressed as follows: when there is a neurotic restriction on the instinctual urges, the individual dispenses with real fulfillment or gratification of them, and in place of this finds a substitute gratification, the symptom preserving at the same time the original psychological content of the forbidden striving. In place of an alteration in the environment fulfilling the requirement of the instinctive urges, there occurs an alteration in the individual's own self. None the less, the meaning of this alteration is the same as the meaning of that activity which would have been carried out except for the restriction on the instinctual urges. This knowledge is expressed in Freud's formulation that at the bottom of a neurotic symptom are those wishes which in perverse—and we would add, criminal—individuals attain real, or

at least conscious fulfillment. In the case of sublimations, quite a different process takes place: *real fulfillment is not sacrificed,* but the aims or goals of the impulses—*the contents* of the strivings—are most extensively changed, and indeed in such a manner that fulfillment or gratification no longer meets with resistance from the environment. In short: *neurotic* restriction of an instinctive urge inhibits the *activity* of the striving; *normal* restriction changes its *content.* From these considerations it becomes clear that the problem of the etiology of neuroses can not be solved without a comparative study of healthy mental life. Indeed the question that needs an answer is why restrictions on instinctive urges have led to symptoms rather than to sublimations.

The first of the two differences between normal and neurotic instinct release depended on the *extent of the instinct restriction* itself; in the neurotic this restriction is more violent. The second difference lay in the kind of reaction to the restriction: the kind of instinct unburdening. It is, at first glance, easy to think that a causal connection exists between these two factors, indeed that the symptom is the result of an excessive instinct-restriction; the sublimation the result of a normal one. This somewhat rough conception coincides with Freud's earliest idea of the cause of neurotic constructions; namely, that excessive restriction of the sexual life is the most general cause of neuroses. Precisely because among all the instinctive functions sexuality is the one subjected to the greatest restrictions, does it receive its pre-eminent position in the etiology of neuroses. The reproach so frequently leveled against psychoanalysis that it gives sexual motives undue prominence in the explanation of pathological mental conditions, should be leveled by society against its own insincere and over-severe sex morality. The excessive part played by sex in the causation of neurotic illness is merely the result of its excessive repression.

Through another discovery of Freud's this first bit of insight received confirmation and at the same time an expansion. The interruption in the development of the sexual instinct by the

latency period, which separates infantile sexuality from the reawakened sexuality of puberty, represents a phylogenetically conditioned restriction of this instinct more or less independent of upbringing. Because of the insufficiency of the sexual organs, infantile sexuality is foredoomed to disappear. This interruption offers a point of attack for harmful external influences, and particularly for bad upbringing, which at this time may cause an undue intimidation of the sexual strivings. The course of the latency period, the time at which it begins, its duration, and especially its psychological content, vary in accordance with these pathogenic influences. Excessive indulgence of infantile sexuality—the rarely conscious, but for that reason all the more frequent unconscious, seduction on the part of those persons entrusted with the bringing up of the child—as well as its drastic intimidation, for example through threats of castration for infantile masturbation, lead to pathological forms of repression, hinder sublimation, and promote the formation of symptoms. Excessive indulgence makes sublimation superfluous in the first place, and later produces more powerful forms of repression, for, because of the lack of any chance for realization, infantile sexuality must in any case be abandoned. As paradoxical as it may sound on first hearing, spoiling and excessive indulgence, no less than excessive restriction, give rise regularly to powerful methods of repression and promote a pathological over-severity of the superego, even though the resulting neurotic pictures may in the end be quite dissimilar. Drastic intimidation also inhibits the possibility of sublimation. It might be supposed that sexual strivings, restrained through the activity of the persons in charge of the child, would be forced into the substitute paths of sublimation. This is not at all the case. The castration fear—as in the mechanism seen in phobias—seizes upon the derivates of sexuality, upon its sublimated forms, and the only way open for the discharge of the instinctive energy is the construction of a neurotic symptom in which the inhibiting effect of the castration fear is relieved through self-punishing mechanisms—through spontaneously assumed symbolic punishments which serve as substi-

tutes for the dreaded castration—and in this way gratification in symptoms is made possible.

A further discovery of Freud's led to an even deeper understanding. The finding that the Œdipus complex is the nuclear or root complex of all psychoneuroses confirmed and increased the essential correctness of the first impressions. The overcoming of the incest ties and of the father conflict is that developmentally recent demand on the instinctive urges for adaptation on which the future neurotic goes to pieces. The pathological form of their subjugation leads to the clinical phenomenon we described as over-severity of the super-ego. It is, in the first place, to be seen in the undue restraints placed on real gratifications, and in the second place, in the systems of self-punishment extensively described and demonstrated in numerous cases, which permit the maintenance of the Œdipus tendencies—the aggressive as well as the erotic ones—and their substitutive fulfillment in symptoms.

In the light of these explanations, solving the problem of etiology becomes equivalent to an investigation of all the factors which lead to an excessive restriction of the instinctive urges, or in other words, to the formation of an over-severe super-ego. Since we have already discussed all the factors known to us except the constitutional ones, a systematic summary will suffice:

(1) As factors which prepare the way for the construction of a future pathological super-ego, we may designate all those influences which affect the pregenital instinct development in the very earliest years of life, those which Freud in his etiological equation groups together as *dispositional factors.* The best known of these are the biological instinct restrictions concerned with early infantile oral and anal erotism; they may produce more or less traumatic effect according to the support they receive from unpsychological handling of the child. Thus we frequently find the dispositional basis for a future over-severe super-ego in what Ferenczi so aptly terms sphincter morality; that is, in the reactions for regulating the functions of excretion which the child acquires during his training in habits of cleanliness. This sphincter morality of the small child is in fact frequently so similar to the

morality of the super-ego of patients suffering from obsessions that the genetic connection becomes obvious. Often in a child the punishments inflicted do not lead to inhibition, but through a reënforcement of the masochistic components to a transgression of the rules of cleanliness; just so do the later self-punishments serve the compulsion neurotic as a permit for forbidden gratification and at the same time as direct masochistic gratification.

(2) The next group of restrictions on instinctive urges occurs, chronologically speaking, in the latency period. These also have a phylogenetic basis, but the environmental influences introduced during the process of upbringing take on added importance. These restrictions are already operative on such infantile strivings as have reached the *phallic phase*. They determine the course of the latency period. The overcoming of the Œdipus complex through the formation of a super-ego is the result of this stage in development. The two chief types of pathogenic methods of upbringing, over-severity and spoiling, we have just discussed. In Aichhorn's pioneer work, "Verwahrloste Jugend", both of these pathogenic methods of rearing received for the first time a systematic criticism and evaluation.

Having reached this point we should like to bring up for more intensive consideration a fact of great etiological importance; one which we have already mentioned in passing, namely, that both of these contrasting forms of incorrect rearing tend to produce an over-severe super-ego. Not only an unduly strict father, but also an unduly gentle or indulgent one, predisposes an individual to place excessive restrictions on his instinctive urges. If the father is too kind, the hate tendencies arising in the Œdipus complex may occasion an even livelier sense of guilt than if the father's strictness had permitted a rationalization of the hate tendencies, for then they might have seemed justifiable. A strong sense of guilt leads to a strong need for punishment; giving way to and satisfying this need alleviates the bad conscience which arises because of the over-kind father. To still this remorse of conscience the insufficient external severity of the father is replaced by the internal over-severity of the super-ego. A drastic

training in habits of cleanliness, beginning early during the suckling period, followed then by the spoiling of a too gentle father, seems to be exactly what is necessary to give rise to an obsessional neurosis in the male, although other combinations of factors could lead to the same disease picture. The punishments inflicted during the training in habits of cleanliness lead to the appearance of the first sense of guilt. However, a child soon learns, as we have said, to turn the punishment he receives to account in ridding himself of the sense of guilt and in obtaining masochistic pleasure. Thus a child is enabled *for the first time* in his life, by submitting to punishment not only to free himself from his sense of guilt, but in addition to gain pleasure. This form of solution of the guilt-conflict remains then as a model which he may utilize in the solution of the father conflict. But since a kind and gentle father does not satisfy such a need for punishment, the inadequate strictness of the father must be created autoplastically by the construction of an over-severe super-ego. The child's psychic organization, adapted to the strict training such as that which he received in cleanliness, to a strict sphincter morality, stands in perplexity before the kindly attitude of the father when the Œdipus complex comes up for solution. His earliest feelings of guilt were stilled through punishment: he knows only this form of relief. If his environment does not later meet his expectations on this score, he supplies the missing severity by setting up a cruel super-ego. Thus, sphincter morality does in fact become the pattern for all his subsequent moral inhibitions.

Even though at this date any final judgment on the relative effectiveness of the various pathogenic factors is impossible, nevertheless it appears that the influence of upbringing and the accidental impressions received during the latency period play quantitatively the greatest rôle in the causation of the neuroses.

The systematic sketch we have just given of the traumatic restrictions on the instinctive urges requires supplementing in two directions. On the one hand, we should take into consideration the very earliest influences received during fetal life or at birth, and the constitution. In the other direction, a supplementing of

our survey would include the subsequent fate of the individual after the age of puberty. Let us first turn to the latter problem, where we are in possession of more information.

(3) If a relatively great readiness to repress has already been developed in the child through the formation of an over-severe super-ego, his subsequent life will supply him with a fertile soil for the quickening of the conflict between the demands of his instinctive urges and his protective forces. His inferiority in the battle of life, determined in the first place by the restrictions on his instinctive urges, leads to an aggravation of the combative attitude towards his competitors, constantly produces new editions of the father conflict, and thus constantly becomes the source of new needs for punishment. The satisfaction of these latter needs again permits new regressions to the tendencies condemned by the super-ego. Like a decompensated cardiac insufficiency, the neurosis becomes more and more extensive. The frustrations and failures determined inexorably by his restricted activity assist him in depreciating the value of reality, and lead to a regressive reactivation of infantile mechanisms for satisfying the instinctive urges—mechanisms which an adult can put into operation only autoplastically in the form of symptoms.

It is difficult to decide to what extent unusually hard turns of fortune, which bring with them restrictions of normal instinctive urges, may be the source of neurotic disorders even in individuals who were normal up to this point, and to what extent these may lead to the appearance of a neurosis where there was no previous neurotic development. Here as at all points in the question of the etiology of the neuroses one may apply Freud's dictum: that constitution, disposition, and subsequent pathogenic influences form a mutually complementary series: the larger the one factor, the smaller need the others be to set up a neurosis.

(4) Whether or not an abnormality in birth and in fetal development determines a very early predisposition to excessive instinct restrictions remains from the empirical standpoint a completely unsolved problem. The analytic observations of Tausk and Nunberg made on psychotic individuals, and my own analysis

of the artificial schizophrenic states observed in the late stages of Buddhistic self-absorption, seem to indicate that an early resistance on the part of the new-born towards his extra-uterine existence may determine an excessive tendency to regress to the intra-uterine state, which could form the basis of a later psychosis. The complete withdrawal from any relation to objects observed in many psychoses, more especially in the end stages of schizophrenic dementia, does in fact correspond to the state of things found in the earliest developmental phase. The complete shutting off of one's self from the external world, the completely passive behavior of these patients, which goes so far that even the spontaneous taking of food is abandoned, does indeed give the impression that the shut-in passivity of the intra-uterine existence has been reëstablished. What factors are to be held accountable for such an extraordinary opposition to extra-uterine existence (premature birth?—or only constitutional factors?) can not be answered because of the paucity of empirical information. The fact that even when such very early traumatic factors or constitutional factors are present, it is the more or less favorable course of later development which is decisive, follows as a corollary from Freud's etiological equation.

The still completely unknown constitutional factors do not form a part of a psychoanalytic investigation.

An interesting and important extension to the field of etiological investigation is offered by the study of the criminal. It is obvious that in these individuals the restrictions on the impulses are not only weaker than in the neurotic, but even than in normal persons. Naturally there is some inhibition of impulses even in the criminal—the original crime (parricide) is an extremely rare event; most crimes are only substitutes for it. A transition between criminals and neurotics is found in those neurotic criminals in whom a need or craving for punishment goes hand in hand with criminal tendencies. Indeed, in the case of the "criminal through sense of guilt" this craving for punishment forms the motive for the crime. At any rate it still is an almost unsolved problem which constitutional factors and what type of later influ-

ences, especially those concerned with upbringing, determine a criminal rather than a neurotic character development. The first attempt at a solution has come from Aichhorn. But more than a reference to this instructive field would take us beyond the scope of our investigation.

The result of our consideration of etiology may be briefly summarized. All restrictions on the instincts, those biological ones imposed by the necessities of development, as well as the later social ones, may exert a traumatic effect; that is to say, place the mental machine in a position of helplessness towards the demands of its own impulses. The result of such traumatic situations is an increased self-protection against the instincts or impulses, and a regressive search for former mechanisms of mastery over the instincts. The point at which the modern individual most typically breaks down is the relinquishing of the incest attachment. The traumatic effect of this demand on him comes to expression in the over-severity of the super-ego. The previous traumatic experiences encountered during the overcoming of the pregenital strivings have a preparatory function; they provide a tendency to failure in the overcoming of the Œdipus complex. In his latest work, Freud has called attention to two specific circumstances which are typical of the development of human instincts, which furnish, one might say, specific points of attack for traumatic influences, two Achilles' heels of human development. The first of these two points of attack is offered by the "lengthened period of helplessness and dependence of the human child" which comes into the world in a less finished condition than most other animals. His intra-uterine existence is relatively short. Here correct care of the infant should make up for the missing bit of development in the uterus. It appears that the human race performs this task much less completely than does nature. The combating of the dispositional factors is the problem which the infant care of the future must solve. The wisdom of nature can be satisfactorily replaced only through knowledge, accurate knowledge of the laws of instinct development. In this field, too, natural intuition ran ahead of science, and with swad-

dling clothes, and the cradle, which was to imitate the bobbing about in the amniotic fluid, created an artificial substitute for the uterus which had been abandoned too soon. A correctly balanced dosage of indulgence and restraint will be the basic principle of the future scientific care of the infant.

The second point of attack for traumatic influences is offered by the latency period which we have already discussed in detail. This phylogenetically determined period of instinct restrictions brings with it many opportunities for pathological influences to be introduced through the processes of training and education, processes which by rights ought to be helpful and beneficial.

The third factor in the formation of neuroses according to Freud lies in the differentiation of the personality (*seelischer Apparat*) into an *ego* and an *id*. As a result of this differentiation, the ego, adapted to reality, looks upon the unadapted strivings of the id as dangers from within, since their objective satisfaction would lead to pain. Against such dangers from within, the ego defends itself through instinct restrictions, the pathological result of which is the substitute gratification through symptom formation.

It has been the task of this series of lectures to give a dynamic and structural description of those processes which arise through this differentiation within the personality. In so doing, we arrived at the conclusion that the neurotic reaction to the restrictions on the instincts imposed by reality was determined by a quantitative factor—by *excessive* repression. To be sure, we were forced to ignore the constitutional factor because of our lack of knowledge concerning it. It nevertheless goes without saying that the concept of "excessiveness" must be a relative one, and that upon constitutionally enfeebled instincts and impulses, normal demands and normal restrictions may have an excessive, a traumatic effect.

Finally, it has been shown that the neurotic is much more submissive to the resistance which, in the form of demands from the super-ego, reality opposes to the claims of his instincts and impulses; that he gives up the struggle with reality sooner than

does the normal person, whatever may be the cause of this submission—whether it be a congenital weakness in his instinct life, or the result of the traumatic intimidations suffered later on. As a feeble substitute for the real gratifications he has renounced, there remains the neurotic symptom, and it is not surprising if he reconstructs in this imaginary unreal gratification the period of his existence when he felt happiest. The earlier the "refusal to develop further" occurs, the deeper will be this neurotic regression.

We cannot leave the problem of etiology without once again giving some brief consideration to the frequently mentioned subject of sublimation. We said previously that without an understanding of the conditions of the sublimation process, the problem of symptom formation could not be completely intelligible. Both are parallel phenomena—the results of instinct restrictions. It was our task to specify under what conditions the one or the other phenomenon arises. Thus in conclusion there is forced upon us a problem which up to this time has received only step-motherly treatment from psychoanalysis: the problem of health. We know, it is true, that all our activities (even when modified) are fundamentally activities of the id, that our sublimations arise from the Œdipus complex, and that the repressing forces—as we have shown—are not to be deceived on this score. They recognize the best disguised articles of contraband and demand customs duty. How does it happen, then, that the sublimations and the so-called normal activities excite no feelings of guilt and that one need not pay for them with suffering? Or to formulate this question from the standpoint of therapy: What is the nature of this alteration in the instinct or impulse, demanded by us—or more accurately—by the conscience of the patient? How must the instinctive urge be modeled so as not to excite a sense of guilt? It is obvious that this question represents nothing other than the psychology of morals. On this point, Freud has already expressed all that is essential by saying that the content of the neuroses will change with changes in the moral concepts of society. From the standpoint of content, therefore, there is little

to be said. The instinct modification which is acceptable to the ego, so far as its content is concerned, is dependent on the prejudices and convictions of society, or to put it briefly, on the stage of social organization; and as this is not strictly speaking a psychological problem, it does not as such concern the therapist. The question of sublimation nevertheless can not be cleared up without a consideration of this content. I should like to attempt, not indeed to solve this problem, but to throw some light upon it.

For the unsublimated instinct the answer is simple and known to us all. We see again and again that the attainment of the genital level, the positive erotic relation to objects, and especially to exogamic objects, brings with it a liberation from a sense of guilt and the acquiescence of the deepest unconscious strata of the conscience. But the question is not readily answered in the case of social relationships, sublimations. Following a suggestion of Freud, Sachs has attempted by the presentation of certain valuable considerations to solve this problem for the art of letters. According to his view, it is the social factor which differentiates literary art from phantasy, and it is precisely this social factor, namely, communication, going beyond the limits of one's own personality, which relieves the sense of guilt. One is exerting a beneficial influence. I believe that this idea has a much more general application, and that it applies not only to the art of letters, but holds for all cultural attainments, for every sublimation which has a relation to the social group. In this social efficacy I see the derivative of genitality, the erotic factor in Freud's sense, the Eros principle, which binds individuals into larger units, men into society. As Rank speaks of the biological sense of guilt, which stands for the demands of the species, so should I ascribe to social conscience, which is psychologically easier to grasp, the function of watching over social behavior, over the sublimated impulses, approving the erotic relationships and reacting against the destructive ones with a sense of guilt. In the sense in which Abraham speaks of a "genital" character, we may speak of a "genital stage" in social behavior. And we see, as a matter of fact, in the case of artists suffering from inhibition of produc-

tivity, how the interest which should go into their work is replaced by more narcissistically colored incitements such as competitive attitudes, questions of prestige, brooding over technical trivialities, or feelings of inferiority—in other words we see how the genital tone of productivity is darkened by the symptom-complex of the father conflict. Social achievement can allay a sense of guilt; it has the same economic function in the healthy as suffering in the neurotic. But the neurotic pays with a coin of narcissistic value, with suffering, from which he can extract masochistic pleasure, whereas socially directed activity is an active achievement which benefits other persons. Newly created work, no matter in what field, represents new life—the creation of Eros—for which the original sin may be forgiven. I am reminded of the Tannhäuser theme, which in an African story in Frobenius' collection, is to be seen in its original significance. A murderer, who has committed incest, receives a pardon from the judge on condition that the withered branch with which he murdered (a symbol of the destructive impulses entirely stripped of Eros) should produce new shoots. In this judgment is contained the prime law of the human conscience: destroyed life may be expatiated only by new life. And in accordance with this law, the Eros instinct follows the destruction instinct, which according to Freud is its pathfinder, in order to mingle with it and make amends for its ravages.

PART II

THE INSTINCTUAL BASIS OF NEUROSES AND PERVERSIONS

LECTURE SEVEN

Instinct Fusions—A Case of Masochistic Transvestitism

For a preliminary understanding of the structural relations in the neuroses, it was sufficient for us to study the forces emanating from the different parts of the personality in respect to their dynamic effect alone. For the time being we could leave aside a consideration of their quality and origin. We took into consideration the centrifugal discharging tendencies of the instinctive forces, and the centripetal pressure of the repressing forces, or, to use the more general expression which Freud now prefers, the protective forces. We attempted to formulate the relations obtaining between these two antagonistically directed energies. We were guided throughout by Freud's ideas of the structure of the personality (psychic apparatus). Using these ideas we were able to find a general formula for neurotic disorder (and one which at the same time was in harmony with our knowledge), in the relations obtaining between the repressed and the repressing forces. As a starting point we made use of the well established fact that a neurotic symptom is a disguised autoplastic instinct gratification, a recurrence of something that was once repressed; and we inquired how this recurrence had become possible, and why the repression had broken down. The hitherto prevailing answer that through disguising the meaning of the repressed tendency, the censorship is deceived and the instinct thus allowed to go over into activity, is no longer in harmony with our present knowledge. The disguising of the meaning can be regarded only as one of the factors at work in symptom formation. Our discovery of the unconscious need for punishment forces us to assume an agency which censors in accordance with moral con-

sideration, but which itself is unconscious, and which can not be deceived by a disguise of the forbidden tendencies. Indeed it reacts as well to tendencies which are disguised when they become conscious. It is an organ of internal perception and has immediate experience of the instincts. Since this censoring agency condemns even the disguised tendencies, we must seek some condition besides disguise which would make it possible for tendencies with content unacceptable to the ego to go over into symptom formation, into release of instinctive energy. I found this factor to be an economic one, consisting in a weakening of the repressing tendencies and a simultaneous increase of the expulsive tension in the id. You are already aware that the lowered effectiveness of the repressing forces is due to the self-punishment mechanism. The restraining counter-pressure of the super-ego is dispersed in the act of punishing, and after the punishment is suffered the motive of the repression, namely, fear of the super-ego, or conscience-fear, is gone. The increased instinct-tension within the id is the result of the over-moral severity of the super-ego, of its excessive demand for restraint and restriction of the instinctive urges. In brief: the breaking through of the forbidden tendencies in the form of symptoms is the result of the over-severity of the super-ego and of the neurotic punishment code. We have seen that in the case of sublimations in contrast to neurotic instinct-release, the original instinctive urges are led off into social paths and in this way become acceptable to the ego. In normal persons the moral counter-charge of the super-ego is used to bring about a modification of the instinctive urge, its domestication, whereas in the neuroses it is dispersed and used up in punishment. Gratification of the punishment tendencies leads to a weakening of the "moral tension." We must look upon the need for punishment—the moral tendency—as a tension which is just as dynamically effective as are the instinct-tensions, and which is relieved through gratification in just the same way as is an instinct-tension after instinct-gratification.

Since I have illustrated these conditions with examples and by a detailed discussion of the individual neuroses, after this brief

summary of the dynamics of the neuroses, I should like to take up the promised investigation of the instinct qualities which take part in this dynamic equation. Please do not think, however, that with this generalization all the dynamic problems relating to the neuroses have been exhausted. In many respects, the specific circumstances in the individual neuroses withstand explanation. The subject which we are about to investigate; namely, the relation of the instinct theories to the doctrine of structure, is even less explored. It is our task, at this point, to examine the repressing and the repressed forces in respect to their quality.

Let us begin with Freud's finding: that the tendencies of the neurotic super-ego are sadistic. The sadistic tone of morality is particularly obvious in its distorted exaggerated forms, for example, in asceticism. It would therefore be quite simple for us to be led to the assumption that the instinct-inhibiting energy is sadistic. As you know, in his study on *The Economic Problem in Masochism,* Freud does actually show how morality is derived from inhibited aggression against the environment. At any rate in the normal psyche the moral inhibition on instincts shows this sadistic trait to a lesser degree; whereas there are certain cases of moral masochism, in which suicide is not an uncommon outcome, which betray this gruesome feature in quite an extreme fashion. So it seems that cruelty, the sadistic quality in the instinct-inhibiting forces, may form a scale of intensity, from indulgent mildness in normal persons to the grossest self-destructiveness in many moral masochists. A particularly interesting position in this scale is occupied by the perversion of masochism, in which (as we shall see later on as the result of our inquiry) the sadism of the super-ego is bound with a strongly libidinal component and thus rendered harmless. It would be very easy to make an assumption—and the gradation in the severity and cruelty of the super-ego which we have described above makes this assumption extremely probable—that the instinct-inhibiting counter-energy, the repressing force itself is

the result of a combination: a fusion of a pure sadistic and a pure erotic component. This counter-energy, which arises from the super-ego, is then directed by the ego against the impulses and instinctual life. Corresponding to the quantitative value of the erotic component in the counter-energy, we find transitions from the most extreme cases of moral masochism up to normality (which would correspond to a happily balanced fusion), just as there may be different forms of upbringing: a mild one based on love, and a strict one depending on punishment. Our conclusion up to this point would be, according to this, that all the inner forces which inhibit the instincts and impulses, that is to say, the repressing forces, represent the results of combinations or fusions of the two instinct qualities, of the life (Eros) and the death (Thanatos) instincts. A not at all unexpected conclusion, since we have already seen that the impulse-inhibiting effect of conscience is not an external inhibition, but a self-inhibition. It can, therefore, be maintained only by means of the two instinctual forces present in the mental apparatus.

For the investigation of instinct fusions we choose the extreme case of the perversion of masochism, in which the sadism of the super-ego is no longer utilized for its original purpose of inhibiting the activity of an instinct, but, instead, is included in the erotic relations to the object, and lends these object relations their masochistic coloring. Through the admixture of a quantum of the destruction instinct, which arises from conscience, the object relation acquires its masochistic distortion.

I shall now attempt another method of presentation. So far we have tried to give the theoretical ideas first, and then to elucidate them through application to the individual cases. This time I have just barely mentioned the theoretical ideas. I have taken for granted a knowledge of Freud's conception of the two instinct qualities, but without treating them systematically, and I shall begin immediately with a presentation of the individual facts of clinical observation. From these observations we shall progress to the systematic presentation of the theory of the instincts, and then return to our particular problem—the bringing together of

the theory of the instincts and the dynamic structural conception of the ego and the neuroses.

A transvestite of forty finds sexual satisfaction when, masquerading as a servant girl, he is able to serve a severe mistress. But in contrast to the hero of Sacher-Masoch's novel, he does not ask for blows but chiefly for anal-erotic debasement. His mistress first of all must forbid him to wash himself, until his hands become black with grime. The idea of hands black with grime is of itself pleasurable to him and forms the kernel of his masochistic fantasies. A particularly pleasurable effect ensues if his mistress forbids him to use the toilet and commands him to hold back his excrement as long as possible, in order that he may then let it fall anywhere at all when the necessity can no longer be denied.

From very instructive material, memories of youthful experiences, part of which arose during the analysis and part of which he had previously been aware, I should like to present only the most important events which were of decisive significance in the development of the perversion.

One of his earliest recollections is that of being shut up in a fireplace by a very severe governess after some misdeed. In this prison his white suit was dirtied, and in his impotent rage he smeared his hands, his face, and his white suit still more with soot, and on his being freed was found to be in an unbelievably dirty state. Shortly thereafter he began to take a lively interest in chimney-sweepers. Later this interest grew into an unexpressed love for a chimney-sweeper's boy for whose clothes he would frequently ask. Then he would climb into the chimney and come out so dirty that even the chimney-sweeper was moved to say that it was unnecessary to get so black. At seven or eight years of age he frequently smeared himself with feces and while in this state masturbated.

Very interesting is a much later recollection of his first transvestite longings. At this time a trained nurse, whom he and his brothers and sisters respected very much, lived in his parents' house. She wore a nurse's uniform of black. Once he begged

her to be allowed to put on her clothes, and at the idea of this, experienced great sexual excitement. His first transvestition he carried out three years after this, when he put on the clothes of his governess. From dressing up in his mother's clothes he was stopped by a feeling of aversion mixed with longing.

A somewhat later recollection from his first school years is likewise of great importance. In his native village there lived a boy of about his own age, who had strong coprophilic tendencies and took pleasure in playing on the dung heaps. His mother forbade any association with this boy. At school, however, he told his comrades that he had a wicked and severe mother who often for punishment would bury him in the dung heap. This fantastic lie was at the same time one of his masturbation fantasies, perhaps the first one with outspoken masochistic excitement, which began when he heard his governess tell his mother that one had only " to break the backbone of a defiant child once, to make it obedient forever."

The connection between these memories and experiences is in the main readily intelligible, but a reconstruction of the affective relations becomes possible only when I have told the most important happening of his earliest childhood. His father died of an accident when the patient was eight years old. He is still able to remember vividly the conflict with his conscience which the news of this death set up in him. His grief was disturbed by such thoughts as: " It is just as good that he is dead," and other similar ones. Then there came remorse of conscience and outbreaks of despair. After his father's death, the period of grief was followed by a strongly religious, strict, indeed ascetic upbringing, which his mother and governess carried out with great consistency.

The story of this patient's illness and his dream life are the most instructive which I know. They are exceptionally adapted to contribute much that is new and instructive concerning the genesis of masochism. To-day, however, I wish to use them only in relation to the problem which now interests us, namely, the problem of instinct-fusions.

It is not difficult to reconstruct from the data which we have the origin of the first conscious masochistic masturbation fantasy—" his mother punishing him by sticking him in the dung-heap ". The fantasy itself is analytically simple to interpret. It as an intra-uterine fantasy, which nevertheless means incestuous coitus. This coitus fantasy has a clear masochistic coloring (punishment) and at the same time an anal-erotic one (dung heap). But more instructive and more interesting is the history of its origin.

The first real punishment, being shut up in the fireplace by his governess, contains, without any conscious planning on the part of the governess, as its most important characteristic, getting dirty. This getting dirty was here only an accidental by-product of the punishment through imprisonment which had been inflicted on him with a moral intention. It meant, however, the satisfaction of old early infantile forbidden, and then repressed, coprophilic tendencies. Becase of the fact that dirtying at this time was part of the punishment which resulted from the activity of the governess, it became possible for the repressed anal tendencies to break through. The governess through her cruel punishment made absurd any demands for cleanliness. The boy, in his impotent rage, regressed to a stage through which he had already passed, wherein self-smearing was still pleasurable. Nothing stood in the way of this regression any longer, for the dirtying was part of the punishment, and punishment represented the standpoint of morality. We may represent the chain of thought in the unconscious of this boy as follows: " You shut me in a fireplace where I get quite dirty, but on all other occasions you scold me if I dirty myself! What sort of consistency is that? When *I* want to, I may *not* dirty myself, but when it suits *you,* then I *may* get dirty! All right then, see if I care for your preaching to me about being clean: I'll smear myself as much as I please." Thus, because of the over-severity and cruelty of the governess, getting dirty became a punishment, but at the same retained its anal-erotic pleasurable character. And in this way punishment was for the first time erotized.

The paradox arose that a thing became included in punishment which itself had once been prohibited and punishable: self-dirtying. And so, punishment permitted an unrestricted reconquest of the anal-erotic liberties which had been given up during his training in cleanliness. Here we see in its real origin the same mechanism so often observed in neurotics; namely, that precisely the over-severity of the super-ego favors the satisfaction of the forbidden. The secret collusion between super-ego and id always arises on such a basis. In our case, since a forbidden source of pleasure, getting one's self dirty, is presented to the ego as a punishment, the gratification becomes not only thinkable (*i.e.*, capable of entering consciousness) but even attainable.

We see in the later masochistic practices of the patient that the punishment inflicted on him by his stern mistress also represented a gratification of unmixed infantile coprophilic tendencies, such as getting his hands dirty, holding back his feces, letting them fall where he wishes, etc. The justifiable suspicion arises that the whole punishment farce might be merely an insincere mask to permit the gratification of the forbidden coprophilic tendencies. Similarly, the fantasied punishment of being stuck in the dung-heap by his mother, also represents primarily a wish-fulfillment, namely, anal-erotically colored incest.

This erotizing of the claims of conscience, learned in earliest youth, became for this patient a model by which to solve his conflicts of conscience throughout life. Of decisive influence on his whole future development was the death of his father. The strong sense of guilt which arose after this event offered him a splendid opportunity to make use of the infantile mechanism and erotize the claims of conscience. Only from this time on can one really reckon the beginning of his masochism. The conscience conflict after the death of his father was solved according to the same pattern that served him in his early infantile conflict during his training in cleanliness. The need for punishment, which became so powerful because of the realization of his death wishes against his father, through his father's death, found its gratification in the masochistic fantasies. The severity of the mother

simply aided this process. Because he had wished the death of his father, he sought punishment from his mother; nevertheless, at the same time he used this punishment to secure passive anal-erotically colored pleasure. In this way the fantasies of punishment, of being stuck in the dung-heap by his mother, form a new reactivation of the real "fireplace punishment" of his childhood and the basis of his later perversion, in which getting himself dirty plays such a prominent part.

It is clear that in his masochistic relation to his mother are included the passive homosexual wishes for his father, which under pressure of his sense of guilt, grew so powerful after his father's death. A series of dreams showed us with unambiguous clarity that his passive homosexual wishes, which had a strong masochistic coloring, were transferred from man to woman, to his stern mistress—who is nothing more than a man in a disguised form. But the most telling proof for the correctness of our idea is offered by his transvestite tendency. He is not a male slave, but a female slave of the woman. From this it is quite easily seen that the masochistic relation to a woman means at the same time the feminine rôle. His perversion, then, simultaneously signifies in the first place, the gratification of the need for punishment arising from his father conflict—hence the masochistic coloring; in the second place, the gratification of his passive homosexual wishes—hence the transvestitism; and in the third place the gratification of his early infantile anal-erotic tendencies. The genesis of this perversion is roughly as follows: Because of a strong anal-erotic disposition (predominance of passive strivings) the outcome of the Œdipus complex was an exceptionally strong passive homosexual attitude. The death of his father took place precisely at the time of the formation of the inverted Œdipus complex, a time when a strong sense of guilt concerning the father fosters feminine strivings under any circumstances. This sense of guilt was then reënforced by the death of his father, and as a reaction to his guilt, there was a further strengthening of the passive feminine wishes. His stern mother, with her apparently manifest sadistic traits of character, favored the transference of

the passive and masochistic wishes on to her person. The sense of guilt toward his mother, who had become the patient's rival in the feminine striving for the father, also promoted this displacement.

But the complete genesis of the masochism is not the question which occupies our attention for the present. We have in this case a splendid example of instinct-fusion. The original sadistic claims of conscience with their predominantly destructive instinctual basis become erotized, or more accurately, passively sexualized. From a fusion of the sadism of conscience with the passive feminine strivings of the ego, there arises a resultant masochism. The transvestite tendency betrays the passive-feminine erotic component; the punishment ritual, the playing the slave, comes from the sadism of conscience, from the destruction instinct.

The subsequent career of this individual showed me then how important for his very existence was the erotizing of his cruel conscience, whereby at least it was made relatively harmless. In his desperate struggle against his perversion he had, before his analysis, made two extremely significant attempts to establish an instinct-equilibrium without recourse to his perversion. Both attempts endangered his whole existence. The first of them consisted in his entering a religious order and submitting himself to the cruel self-inflicted castigations prescribed in its regulations. In this way he was able to get along for years without masochistic gratifications or fantasies. The claims of his conscience were now satisfied with almost no erotic admixture, starkly sadistic—fasting, prolonged silence, bloody self-castigation, and through spiritual humiliation before his superiors. The only consolation left him was the possibility of satisfying his anal-erotic tendency to get himself dirty, for a restriction on washing and the changing of linen belonged to the rules of the order.

His second attempt took him on a fantastic mission to one of the wildest and most uncivilized regions of the world. There, the perils and the privations of these self-imposed years of exile took the place of his perversion.

It seems quite clear that in the sexual perversion the cruelty of

the tendencies which are set up in opposition to one's own self is much softened by the erotic admixture. If this erotic admixture is lacking in the conscience, then its destroying activity comes forth nakedly and endangers the whole life of the individual. The perversion, therefore, is a natural protection against the cruelty of the super-ego. Through the sexualizing of the conscience-tendencies, their self-destructive effect becomes limited to the field of sensuality, encapsulated in relation to women, but the rest of the personality is saved from destruction. During those periods in which our patient did not give in to his perverse tendencies, a diversion of these self-destructive tendencies into other paths had to take place. In this case, we have an experimental verification of Freud's assumption that masochism in all its forms should be conceived as the erotization of the destruction instinct which, as shown by the cruelty of the super-ego, has turned against the subject's own person. We have here an exceptionally clear example of how the perversion of masochism, through the withdrawal of erotic quantities, can turn into moral masochism and *vice versa.*

In this case, then, we may consider the erotizing of the demands of conscience in the form of masochistic perversion to be an attempt at self-cure, as the reparative effort against a disease which set in at his father's death. The disease consisted in a complete destruction of equilibrium in his instinct life because of a growth in his need for punishment. The roots of the disease, however, go back even further; they are to be found in an excessive defusion of instincts (*Triebentmischung*) during the formation of the super-ego; which in its cruelty was the heir, indeed the pathological heir, of the primary Œdipus complex.

LECTURE EIGHT

INSTINCT-FUSION AND INSTINCT DIRECTION

A General Theory of Disease on the Basis of Freud's Theory of Instinct

It has been our intention to bring the doctrine of the two instinct qualities into harmony with the dynamic formula of the neuroses. We started from the assumption that every mental process is the resultant of the fusion of two original instinct qualities, Eros, or the life instinct, and the destructive, or death instinct. The differences between the several psychic processes would then be deducible from the proportions of the two qualities present in the fusion. In the case we have just described, we saw that in the masochistic perversion the destruction instinct was present much more strongly in proportion to the Eros instinct, than in normal genital sexuality, but that nevertheless the presence of an erotic admixture was unmistakable. Precisely this erotic admixture softens the destructive effect of the death instinct through a sort of *neutralization,* and brings in the factor of pleasure. It is also unquestionable that in the perversion of sadism there is present an erotic component which protects the life of the sexual partner. As borderline phenomena we must consider cases of passional murder, in which the erotic admixture is extremely small. At any rate we have good grounds for the assumption that in the genital impulse the erotic components are represented in a *uniquely high degree* in proportion to the death instinct, in a higher degree than in all pregenital impulse manifestations.

While pursuing the subject of instinct-fusion, we encountered a new complication: namely, that the instincts are variously directed; they are, it appears, directed outwardly or towards the individual himself. Differently expressed, their objects are either to be found in the external world, or the subject is himself the object of the impulse. A systematic instinct theory must there-

fore take into account two separate factors: the quality and the direction of the impulses which determine *four* different impulse manifestations. In this way we may distinguish:

1. *The destruction instinct directed outward,* which we recognize in various instinct fusions. It forms an element of the genital impulse, in which it becomes neutralized by an erotic admixture of equal rank, and is only to be seen after thoroughgoing analysis. When present in a relatively much stronger degree, it helps form the perversion of sadism. In its sublimated form it contributes an important element to every *active* type of behavior (impulse to research, social activities, athletics, etc.).

2. *Sadism directed inward,* which plays so large a part in all instinct-inhibitions, in the categorical imperative of the super-ego—always to be sure, with some erotic admixture. Pathologically we find it in moral masochism as well as in the masochistic perversion.

3. *The Eros instinct directed outward.* Its most important manifestation is the object-libido or the genital impulse. It is always mixed with destructive elements.

4. *The Eros instinct directed inward,* we know best as narcissism. Its principal task is the neutralization of the destruction instinct remaining in the organism. The construction of an integrated system which we call the ego is its achievement.

As reluctant as I am to devote myself to a purely theoretical explanation, I nevertheless believe that we can not make headway in this difficult field without a clear and comprehensive exposition of our assumptions and facts.

You see from this exposition that four combinations may result from the two instinct qualities and the two instinct directions: the two qualities—Eros and the death instinct—may take either one of the two directions. In addition to this they may be combined with each other in different proportions. From this point of view health and disease may be thought of as successful or unsuccessful admixtures, dependent furthermore on the various proportions of inwardly or outwardly directed instincts. Let us first attempt an investigation of disease manifestations from this standpoint.

Every morbid process, first of all, has this characteristic: the death instinct is turned inward to an excessive degree and is then in this introverted form more or less neutralized by Eros. The second important characteristic of a morbid state is a loss of object-libido. The quantum of Eros needed to neutralize the inwardly directed death instinct is taken away from object-relations. In this way, with every disease process there occurs a reduction in the amount of freely available object-libido. Every patient, no matter whether he suffers from an organic or a psychic illness, becomes narcissistic at the expense of his object-relations. Even though we make a distinction between transference neuroses and narcissistic neuroses, we express thereby only a quantitative difference; for, as contrasted with health, every neurosis indicates a narcissistic regression, the utilization of those quanta of libido within the mental machine which are ordinarily fixed on objects.

This turning back of the destruction instinct against the patient's own self, and the retraction of object-libido for the neutralization of the destructive tendencies, are then the two conditions for the formation of a neurosis as well as of organic disease. In the latter instance, however, instead of endogenous self-destroying tendencies, there frequently occurs some disturbance arising in the outer world or called into play by external forces, such as an infection, a wound, etc. This description has the same meaning as our earlier assertion that every neurosis signifies an *autoplastic* instinct-release, the discharge of the two instinct tendencies *within the organism;* that is to say, their discharge by means of processes which cause alterations only in the organism itself and not in the outside world.

Let us once again consider the dynamic neurosis formula, but from this new point of view. The destruction instinct, which has turned inward, is expressed most strikingly as the severity of the super-ego. This phenomenon parallels the manifestations of the death instinct in organic destructive processes. It is a ready assumption, and one constantly strengthened by more and more empirical data, that a conversion of the need for punishment into organic destructive processes forms a very frequent etiological factor in physical disease. It is approximately thus that we must

picture to ourselves the psychogenic origin of organic disease. The already acknowledged erotization in the diseased organ would then be a secondary healing process. Ferenczi has long since pointed out the healing rôle of the inflammatory manifestations in the diseased organ, and recognized their erotic basis through the similarity of inflammation and erection. A similar mechanism is seen in the neuroses. Here, corresponding to the inflammatory process is the neurotic symptom: a reaction to the working of the destruction instinct, neurotic gratification. Indeed in the first part of our study we described the symptom as the reaction to an excessive inhibition of the impulses. In this way we should come to the conclusion that in the neuroses also the clamant process of symptom formation represents a secondary healing process, and that the primary disease process is a turning of the death instinct against one's own self in the form of an over-severity of the super-ego. As you see, this assumption corresponds completely with our conclusions as to etiology. We found the etiological factors of neurosis formation in all those influences which contribute to the development of an excessive inhibition of the instincts.

We arrive then at the fundamental problem, whether we should consider the turning back of the death-instinct as the primary process and the drawing in of object libido as the consequent attempt at a life-preserving neutralization, or whether we should ascribe to both processes—turning back of the death impulse and drawing in of object-libido—a certain mutual independence. The latter assumption would mean approximately that the damming up of the libido, as an independent process without necessarily any preceding turning back of the death impulse—such as in reaction to an object-loss—may lead to the formation of a neurosis. The first formulation does, as a matter of fact, agree better with the results of our dynamic investigations; it differs, however, from the one usually held up to now. The erotic side of the neurosis was known to us at a much earlier date; the invisible working of the death instinct is, in point of time, the latest of Freud's discoveries. The basis of all our psychoanalytic ideas of the neurosis

was expressed in the sentence: the neurotic symptom means the gratification of an instinct. Less appreciated was the fact that the symptom is the reaction to excessive restriction of an instinct. This fact is also not new; only its meaning was less clear to us. We are now prepared to consider the excessive instinct-restriction, seen clinically as an over-severity of the super-ego, as derived from the turning of the death instinct against the subject's own self, thus agreeing with Freud's argument which he has expounded in his article, *The Economic Problem in Masochism.* The general cause of the neuroses, then would be the turning inward of the death instinct. This idea also is in agreement with Freud's assumption that the death instinct is the path-finder for Eros; we must only add: a path-finder not only when the death instinct is directed outwardly but also when turned against the individual's own self. The detaching of libido from objects and its introversion would be the result of the introversion of the death instinct; and this libido which has become narcissistic again would form the dynamic basis of the symptoms. The first half of this sentence; namely, that the genuine disease process is a destructive one, that is to say, a manifestation of the death impulse, is almost self-evident. In addition, as an empirical proof for the correctness of this theory of disease, there may be mentioned the fact that actually in every case the first process in the formation of a neurosis is the turning inward of the destructive impulses. If we examine our experience from this point of view, many weighty facts may be introduced in support of our assumption.

In the first place our fundamental thesis that the Oedipus complex is to be considered the nuclear complex of every neurosis speaks very strongly for the correctness of our theory. We hold that the castration-fear arising out of the father conflict is the obstacle by which the aggression of the child is halted, so that it then turns inward and thus becomes the basis of the instinct inhibiting conscience. This castration-fear, or later conscience-fear, opposes the maintenance of the first genital object-relationship to the mother. The turning back of the death instinct in

the form of conscience inhibition, causes the introversion of the libido. There results a withdrawing of the incest strivings and a replacement of the object love through a narcissistic one, the mother becoming through identification part of the subject's own personality. Yet this process is no other than the erotization of the indrawn death instinct, which, then, in the form of cruelty of conscience, is turned against the subject's own self. Because of the identification with the mother there results from the castration threats of the father and their inner psychic continuation—the self-punishing tendencies—a feminine erotic relation to the super-ego. In short: the formation of the inverted Oedipus complex consists of two phases: (1) Aggression against the father, turning back on the subject's own self, becomes the self-destroying tendency. (2) This self-destroying tendency, because of the identification with the mother—which means the withdrawal of object libido—becomes erotized and thereby weakened in its self-destroying effect. The crude self-destruction tendency develops into a feminine-masochistic striving. The two classes of instincts thus become introverted. The externally directed death instinct develops into the self-destroying tendency; the object-libido becomes narcissistic libido suited for the binding of the self-destroying tendency. As a result of the Oedipus situation this process occurs universally, in the healthy as well as in the neurotic. Illness arises in the first place only through quantitative factors; namely, when the destruction instinct is introverted to an abnormally high degree. In the first part of our study we saw this excessive turning inward of the death impulse in its clinical manifestation, the over-severity of the super-ego, and we were also successful in deducing from it all the forms of the neuroses. I should like to remind you of the fundamental neurotic mechanisms by means of which the sadism of the super-ego is fixed: (1) the hysterical; (2) the obsessional neurotic; and (3) the manic-depressive mechanism. We can now for the first time understand the sense of our assertion that in the conversion-hysteric mechanism the instinct-fusion was most complete, in the obsessional mechanism less so, and least successful of all in the manic-depressive. In the

conversion symptom in hysteria both kinds of tendencies—the punishing tendencies of the super-ego (*i.e.,* the death impulse) and the erotic tendencies—are satisfied in *one action.*

This successful combination is manifest in the double meaning of the symptoms, and corresponds to the *genital* level. In the obsessional neurosis we see both instinct qualities existing side by side; in the manic-depressive psychosis they are separated even in point of time, so that now one, now the other dominates the picture. The danger from the self-destroying tendencies in melancholia is therefore much greater, as the frequency of suicidal cases attests. The neutralization of the death instinct through Eros in this illness is the least successful of all.

If we look upon the neuroses as different types of reaction to the Œdipus complex our assumption concerning the primary rôle of the introversion of the death impulses in the etiology of the neuroses is strengthened. I feel, however, that such evidence is still too general; it must be reënforced by individual facts.

One general and well established finding in the neuroses seems at first sight to contradict our assumption. I refer to the finding that the loss of love objects—whether from internal or external causes—furnishes the most frequent precipitating factor for the outbreak of a neurosis. The replacement of the object through an identification, and along with this the transformation of the libido, which up to this point was object-libido, into narcissistic libido occurs most completely in melancholia, but to a certain degree takes place in every neurosis, even in the transference neuroses. We have already brought out that the term "transference neurosis" gives expression only to the circumstance that in these patients there remains intact a greater or less amount of love capacity. What is "neurotic" in them, however, is always a narcissistic process. At any rate, it seems as if in such cases of object loss, one could deduce the formation of the neurosis simply from the withdrawal of object-libido following the loss of the object, considering the symptoms a substitute for the lost object relation. At first sight, then, it does not seem neces-

sary to discuss the rôle of the death instinct any further in these cases.

The weakness of this objection soon becomes evident if we consider that in most cases the loss of an object has a previous history and is conditioned by subjective factors. In those cases in which the loss of the object is dependent on destiny or external causal factors, the reaction to this loss is nevertheless founded in the previous history of the individual. In both categories of cases, analysis demonstrates a pathological solution of the Œdipus complex, and indeed of the type just described. When the loss of the object is the result of subjective factors, it is always due to the weakness of the object relation that was not able to bear any strain. It is seen that the whole of sexuality is severely burdened by the guilt feelings arising from the father conflict. In other words, the neurotic is always ready, at the slightest external difficulty, to give up his object relation and transform it narcissistically as he had already done with the incest relation. He therefore treats every subsequent love relation as if it were the old incest relation. The external difficulties here have the same effect as the fear of castration by the father had: they induce introversion of libido. The small capacity for resistance in the object relations against outer difficulties is, however, the result of the previously formed strong castration fear. Objective fear is added to the conscience fear which arises from the Œdipus complex, and thus has a stronger effect than in normal persons. For the overcoming of outer difficulties the normal person has at his disposal the outwardly directed destruction instinct, which in the neurotic is directed against his own instinctual urges in the form of conscience-inhibition. The primary rôle of the death instinct is then quite apparent.

An exception seems to occur in melancholia, especially in those cases in which the illness begins as a reaction to the death of a beloved person, as a pathological continuation of grief. Here the augmentation of those destructive tendencies which are directed against the self seems really to be the result, and not the source, of the object loss. The general validity of our theory seems to

be seriously threatened from this side. As a matter of fact, we shall soon see that the mechanism of melancholia makes necessary an extension of our formulation.

The apparent contradiction vanishes immediately if we put our problem somewhat differently. We have just said that an excessive turning inward of the death instinct against one's own self is the prerequisite of every neurosis. Let us go a step further in our etiological curiosity and ask which are the factors that decide whether such a turning back of aggression is to be successful. One factor we have already discussed in detail. This was the childhood fear of the father, and the later corresponding fear of competing, the latter fear, however, already being the consequence of unnecessarily strong infantile feelings of guilt. Melancholia now shows us another factor which may determine the turning back of the aggression. This factor is the *instinct defusion,* which arises at the sudden loss of the object. The first reaction of the psychic apparatus to the sudden, violent loss of a beloved object, is a frantic effort to find some sort of place for the quantum of libido which up to now had been bound to that object. It endeavors to accomplish this by a sudden drawing in of all the libido charge, which then becomes narcissistically bound to the introjected love object. Thus for a short space of time there arises a condition which corresponds to that infantile state in which all libido is narcissistically directed, and only the death instinct is effective against the outer world. The reaction to the object-loss is a sudden excessive introversion and this leads to a complete exhaustion of the object-libido. After the libido introversion, the relation to the outer world is entirely under the sway of the death instinct, which, freed from all erotic admixture, stark and sombre, alone dominates the field. A human being who has become so extremely narcissistic can only hate the world.

As a matter of fact, analytic investigation is able to demonstrate a brief period of bitterness and rebellion at the beginning of every case of grief and melancholia. This narcissistic condition of unlimited self-love and hatred of the world cannot be successfully maintained. During normal development the hate directed

against the environment is neutralized through an erotic admixture and is thereby conquered. During his whole rearing the human being has learned that the standpoint of hate is not sustainable. To such combativeness there ensues the reaction: getting oneself hated. Combativeness leads to being attacked. From hate arises fear. For the purpose of overcoming this hate, and the fear as well, there are only two methods: Either narcissistic love must be sacrificed in order to bind the hate—that is to say, the hate is neutralized and bound by the flowing out of Eros—or the hate must be turned back against one's self and destroy the hater. We see that the melancholia patient is subjected to the latter process. He is unable to love because he has lost his love object, and tries to heal this wound through the narcissistic introversion of his total love capacity. He has divested all love from his total relation to the outer world; he is able only to hate. He has no longer at his disposal any object-libido with which to neutralize this hate, for this would mean a reversal of the whole libido-introversion which he has just accomplished. Of this he is incapable, and so the hate is necessarily turned back against his own self. This condition of unlimited hate leads to the feelings of guilt, to the self-accusations which the melancholia patient mercilessly levels against himself. From this we learn that there is a meaning in his self-accusations. The woman who falls into a depression after the death of her husband, and during her illness accuses herself of having killed her children, speaks the absolute psychological truth. After her husband's death, she had identified herself with him, and now continues to love him in this narcissistic form; she has indeed taken her love away from her children so as to use it for this narcissistic purpose, and now feels only hatred for them. She is right, then, if she charges herself with having murdered her children. To conscience, hate and murder are one and the same thing. Conscience is not disturbed by facts, but only by psychic reality.

The other fundamental feature of the melancholia mechanism, namely, that the patient's accusations leveled against his own self are primarily accusations against the beloved lost object which

has been introjected after the loss, is in harmony with this conception. We assume that with the introjection of the erotic components of the object relation there ensues a defusion of impulses, *i.e.*, a liberation of the destructive components. After the hate components have been introjected in a similar way, there does not result a new combination of the two components; they exist side by side in the form of an ambivalent attachment to the object, which, previously real, is now introjected. In agreement with this stands the clinical fact: that the more ambivalent the object relation was before the illness, the more readily does the instinct defusion in melancholia occur after the object is lost. In other words, persons with markedly ambivalent object relations have a tendency to melancholia.

The real disease process, then, here too consists in a turning of the death impulse against the individual's own self. The cause of this returning is, however, in this case the instinct defusion, the extracting from object relations of their erotic admixture. The best proof that we may speak of illness only after the turning back of the death instinct against the self, is this: that normal grief differs from a true melancholia precisely in respect to this quantitative factor. The same mechanism of introjecting the love object with retraction of object libido, and also the same turning of the aggression against one's self takes place in grief, with the single difference that the latter process is much less intense. The binding of the death instinct through Eros can take place in this case, which is no longer possible in melancholia.

At any rate the melancholia mechanism gives us warning to formulate more carefully our statement concerning the primary rôle of the death instinct in causing disease. That the true disease process consists in the turning of the death instinct against the individual's own self is nowhere clearer than in melancholia. The manic period is an attempt to reëstablish the disturbed instinct equilibrium. It is not a successful one, because the instinct defusion has gone too far. The expansive productions of the manic are predominantly combative in type, although there are frequently very clear uninhibited erotic manifestations. A late extra-

version of both impulses is at any rate the characteristic feature of the manic attack, without there being any concomitant combining of the two impulse qualities in normal proportions. If then the predominant rôle of the death instinct in melancholia is beyond question, we see that the precipitating factor for its turning back against the self is the sudden drawing in of object-libido. The hate liberated in this way cannot assert itself against the outer world; it is stopped by the resistance of reality and of the individual's own guilt feelings, and then becomes introjected.

We must, therefore, widen our idea concerning the origin of the disease process. The turning of the death instinct against the individual's own self may be determined by two factors. The first more simple process is that the aggressive attitude towards the outer world breaks down because of the resistance offered by reality leading to fear or anxiety, so that the combativeness is then turned back against the self. The best known example of this is furnished by the observation of how hostility to the father, because of the castration threat, leads to castration fear, and then to conscience fear; then is turned from the father against the self, and becomes transformed into the sadism of the super-ego. From hatred of the father there arises in this way the self-destructive tendency. The same process (and this is the addition to our previous description) may also take place in such a fashion that the hate which has already been neutralized through Eros, and by this neutralization has been saved from introversion, later—as in the melancholia mechanism—because of the withdrawing of object-libido, becomes *de-erotized,* and its turning inward rendered unavoidable. We must, therefore, grant that in these cases the drawing in of the libido was the immediate cause of the illness. In these cases, the death instinct follows the Eros instinct in its turning back against the individual's own person. We must, however, grant at the same time that the turning back of the death instinct in these cases is a relatively independent process: it could have remained directed against the environment, had the individual's strength been sufficient to defy the whole world. On the other hand, the reaction attending object-loss,

which is typical for melancholia, the sudden drawing in of object-libido, takes place to a pathological degree only when the object-libido was feeble (ambivalent) to begin with. We have already stated that such feeble object relations are the result of excessive instinct restriction (inhibitions by conscience) which arose during the attempted solution of the Œdipus complex, and that the inhibitions of conscience resulted from a turning inward of the destruction instinct. If we consider then not only the acute precipitating factors of melancholia but take into account the total previous existence of the individual, our thesis is seen to be valid: namely, that excessive introversion of the death instinct is the cause, or forerunner of libido introversion; that is to say, is the primary process in the formation of the neurosis.

In the last lecture I was able to present a case in which the mode of development of the perversion masochism confirmed quite well our assumption as to the rôle of the death impulse. We could assert with justice that the conscience reaction setting in after the death of the father flooded the infantile psyche with a large amount of self-destructive tendencies. Only a strong erotic component could have neutralized the destructive effect of the death instinct. This erotic element was found in the erotizing of the need for punishment, which became the basis of the masochistic perversion. An indubitable verification of the correctness of this theory is offered by the interesting fact that as soon as the patient tried to do away with masochistic satisfaction of the self-punishing tendencies, other vicarious self-destructive tendencies appeared, which, however, being poorer in respect to erotic admixture, endangered the entire existence of the patient. At any rate, the neutralization of the self-destroying tendencies took place here in a way different from that occurring in the neurosis. This difference is exceptionally instructive and may serve to give us many indications as to those various conditions which lead on the one hand to a perversion, on the other to a neurosis. Let us attempt to penetrate further into the essential nature of this difference.

The need for punishment was in our case taken up into the

heterosexual relation, and through this inclusion lent the object relation its masochistic coloring. In the strict sense of the word we should not speak here, as I said before, of an *erotizing of morality,* but of a *moralization of sexuality,* the content of which became a moral conception, namely, punishment. Sexual satisfaction consisted in a punishment scene instead of in the sexual act. From a purely phenomenological standpoint, we might, therefore, say that here the need for punishment has become the most important element in the sensual object relation. Perhaps it would not be amiss for us to express the supposition that *a strong durable, object relationship,* an already firm anchoring of the libido in the outer world would enable the death instinct which, in the form of a pathologically elevated need for punishment, was turned back inward to a pathological degree, to be included in this object relation, and indeed to color and modify the latter, and thus bring about a masochistic perversion, but at the same time, through this inclusion in the sensual sexuality, avoid an introversion of the destructive tendencies. The introverted death instinct, therefore, does not in this case lead to an increased sadism in the super-ego, does not make its appearance as a destructive impulse within the personality, but instead influences only the psychological content of the object relationship. The masochist stands in a definite fixed relation to his love object; he loves it feminine-masochistically. The effect of the increase in the need for punishment consists, therefore, exclusively in this: that out of an active male relation to the object there arises a female masochistic one. According to the degree with which the death impulse is present in the object relationship we observe a transition from a somewhat passive and feminine, but to all intents, normal love relation, to the extremest cases of masochism in which punishment and self-abasement dominate the picture.

Such observations bring us close to the supposition that perhaps it is the initial strength of the object relation which determines whether the pathogenic end result of the Œdipus complex will be a perversion or a neurosis. When the relation to objects is sufficiently strong, it may indeed be modified into a perversion

through the backward streaming destruction impulses which have originated in the father conflict; but by this means a still greater degree of introversion of the death instinct is averted. In this way there originates an object relationship in which the two instinct qualities are combined in different proportions than in genital instinct fusions. They have the proportions found in one of the pregenital stages, namely, the sado-masochistic one. Because of its inclusion in the object relationship the death instinct is adequately neutralized, and only the genital character of the object relationship falls victim to this process. On the other hand, should the object relationship not be sufficiently strong to bind the destruction instinct freed to an undue extent by a pathological termination of the Œdipus complex, the destruction instinct becomes introverted. The Eros instinct follows the destruction instinct and becomes introverted at the expense of the object relationship in order to neutralize the introverted destruction instinct. And in this way the object relationship itself—the quantity of Eros contained in it—is sacrificed for the fixation and binding of the destruction instinct. In short: in a perversion the existing object relationship is modified; in the neurosis the object relationship is impoverished in respect to Eros as a result of the introversion of the libido.

A process similar to the one just described may also be at the bottom of the perversion of sadism, in which the circumstances are somewhat simpler. In this case, the aggressive tendencies against the father are taken up into the erotic object relationships even before they turn back against the subject's own person, and through this process the object relationships receive their sadistic coloring. The death instinct remains directed towards the environment but forms a larger element in the relation to objects than it does where there is a normal genital attitude.

How far this genetic conception is applicable to the " non-sado-masochistic " perversions, in fact whether it is applicable at all in these cases, I do not wish to discuss at present. The close kinship of passive homosexuality and masochism suggests the probability that in the former perversion at least, some similar

mechanism could be at work. We saw, indeed, that in the case reported above, the transvestite components in masochism pointed to its intimate connection with passive homosexual strivings. We summarized the meaning of our patient's perverse strivings in the formulation: *he desired to quiet his bad conscience about his father by means of punishment at the hands of his mother.* He preferred to be *punished by his mother because of his sinning against his father.* The reason for this is clear. In this way he rescued his relation to his mother, sacrificing only the genital nature of this relation. If he must be punished, then let it be by his mother. His dreams showed us quite plainly how much he feared paternal punishment, whereas he craved maternal punishment.

One of the interesting dreams which always kept recurring to his memory was one in which his father turned him over to his mother to be punished. This dream shows quite clearly that the need to be punished by the father, bound up with so much fear of castration, was simply displaced onto the mother. In cases where such a displacement does not occur, but where instead the masochistic need to be punished by the father receives a greater erotic admixture and is raised from the sado-masochistic to the feminine genital level, lessening thereby the cruelty in the relationship, there arises passive homosexuality. Should the sense of guilt towards the mother, which arises from a passive feminine relation to the father, become particularly strong so that the mother now becomes a competitor in female strivings, the displacement of the need to be punished from father to mother is encouraged.

It is very interesting that Sacher-Masoch in his novel *Venus in Furs* intuitively seized upon this relation between masochism and homosexuality. The heroine of this novel, whose desire for her "slave" is normally female, tries vainly to heal him at first by making his punishment increasingly cruel. But this is of no avail; the attachment on the part of her slave grows all the stronger. A cure is effected only after she has her lover whip him. This whipping incident restores to health the hero of the

novel. Beneath this fantastic therapy lies the unconscious intuition that the whole purpose of the perversion was to satisfy the need to be punished by the father in a milder form. When the hero for once experiences that which he unconsciously fears yet at the same time desires most profoundly, to be chastised by his rival, his perversion becomes senseless and superfluous for ever more.

Though we cannot take the somewhat naïvely concocted therapeutic fantasy of this author too seriously, it is nevertheless extraordinarily interesting that the climax of the novel should be reached in this beating incident, in which the hero is thrashed not by the woman but by his male rival. To be sure we are not convinced about this cure, but we do recognize behind the *manifest* masochism of the author the *latent* homosexuality in his unconscious, the strongly repressed wish that a rival should chastise him (*i.e.,* have intercourse with him). The displacement of this wish to women as well as the appearance of a masochistic coloring in place of a genital-feminine one is a secondary process. It may be that after the overcoming of the Œdipus complex, the consequence of the conscience conflict—the need to be punished—through being erotized (in other words, through an identification with the mother) leads at first in any case to a passive homosexual wish directed towards the father. This indeed is the basis of the inverted Œdipus complex. Should this female attitude become excessively strong, we have one source of pathological processes. One of the pathological results would be passive homosexuality, if the ego acknowledges its feminine side.

In other cases, the passive homosexuality remains unconscious and the passive strivings are displaced from the father to the mother. The perversion of masochism then would represent a form of solution for the unconscious passive homosexual strivings arising at the breaking up of the Œdipus complex. Why the passive homosexual striving is retained and conscious in some cases and in others is transformed into masochism is a question that cannot at present be satisfactorily answered. I have indicated two factors. The first of these would be excessive fear of the father; the other, the sense of guilt in regard to the mother

arising from the feminine attachment to the father. This sense of guilt leads to the liberation of new destruction tendencies directed against the individual's own self, which are added to the genital-feminine strivings and to the object relationship to produce anew a masochistic coloring. If the introverted death instinct, which arose through the formation of the homosexual attachment to the father, was erotized by means of an identification with the mother, the new increment in destructive tendencies—those arising from the sense of guilt towards the mother—destroys the genital coloring. The need to be punished by the mother is satisfied by the assumption of a masochistic rôle with women. Passive homosexuality satisfies the need to be punished by the father, and its modification, masochism, the need to be punished by *both parents*. In passive homosexuality the death instinct is more completely erotized than in masochism. Indeed the latter arose because new quantities of death instincts were turned against the ego.

In one case of masochism I was able to make numerous observations which speak for the correctness of this construction. The patient's earliest masochistic wishes, the forerunners of those appearing later in his relations with women, were directed in early childhood towards male playmates. His very earliest remembered sexual excitement was however without any distinct masochistic quality. As a five or six year old boy, the patient would lie face downward so that his little friends might lie on his back—an attempted representation of *coitus a tergo*. His pleasure in this procedure arose only from being pressed upon. The whole game had more of a passive homosexual than a masochistic quality. Only later, as his sensual sex strivings were gradually transferred to the other sex, did the masochistic quality make its appearance with increasing distinctness: a clear confirmation that his later masochism arose from his passive homosexual tendencies through a displacement to women and through the addition of more recent destructive components. Passive homosexuality arises according to our conception from an extensive erotization—to a feminine-genital level—of the masochistic attitude towards the father,

and the perversion of masochism from the fact that with an increment of new destructive tendencies passive homosexuality again loses its genital character.

You have seen that the conception of the two classes of instinct qualities has given us a new point of view for the understanding of disease in general and of neuroses and perversions in particular. I am afraid, however, that among the great number of individual facts and individual assumptions brought up during the discussion of the instinct qualities, you may have lost a general view of this difficult and novel field. I should like to make use of the necessity for some sort of summary by giving at the end a concise statement of Freud's idea concerning the part played by the two fundamental instincts in life processes. This task is not light, for Freud, though developing his ideas on this score since the publication of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle,* has expressed them only in scattered articles. From these scattered expressions of Freud I should like to construct a consistent sketch of the relation between the two instinct qualities. I hope with this attempt, even though it must necessarily be incomplete, to render one good service: to promote a comprehension of Freud's extremely concentrated remarks on instinct fusions and instinct defusions. With the assistance of these ideas we shall be able, at any rate, to state approximately the conditions of fusion between the two instincts obtaining in the different forms of neuroses.

When we have perfected our knowledge and concepts concerning instinct fusion, we shall be on the high road to a new branch of psychology which will bear a great resemblance, perhaps not merely a formal one, to physical chemistry. We shall then be able to deduce mental phenomena in all their varied multiplicity from *quantitative* fusion and defusion states of the two fundamental instincts.

LECTURE NINE

The Instinctual Basis of the Neuroses

Freud assumes that the dynamic basis for all life processes is supplied by two elementary instincts: Eros (the life instinct) and the destruction (or death) instinct. These are directed antagonistically: whereas Eros aims to unite biological entities into higher organizations, the death instinct works in the opposite direction—to split up biological entities. One of the most elementary manifestations of both classes of instinct would be the process of metabolism with its simultaneous anabolic and catabolic activities. During growth the anabolic processes are in the ascendancy (*i.e.,* in the first years of life, the effect of Eros is dominant), in middle age the two instincts are in equilibrium, and in old age the death instinct holds sway.

Freud holds the origin of a complicated multicellular organization to be the result of a partially successful outward direction of the death instinct. Through this its destructive effect is deflected from its own proper organization and turned against the environment. Nevertheless, a remnant of this self-destructive energy is left behind in the organism and becomes neutralized by Eros, gradually to come more to the surface in later life.

This erotized remnant of the destruction instinct, which remains behind in the organism, Freud calls *primary masochism.*

The structure of the psychic apparatus—of the personality—is also the joint work of Eros and the death instinct. Here again Eros plays a combinatory rôle and leads to the construction of the ego, of which the earliest nucleus is primary narcissism. The death instinct, as we have already seen, assumes an important part in the process of repression, indeed, generally speaking, in all processes which serve as defenses against instinct. But it must be emphasized that according to Freud's conception the two instinct qualities always occur in a mixed or fused form—even though in varying proportions to each other—and never pure or

unmixed. In the construction of the personality the destruction instinct manifests itself most clearly in the formation of the super-ego. Its effect within the personality is definitely to produce a disintegration. It is precisely through repression that the personality is split into two parts, inasmuch as the destruction instinct turns against the id and treats many tendencies in the latter as if they were external enemies, and excludes some of the id tendencies from the ego. Nevertheless it contributes thereby to the unity of the ego, keeping away from it by this means all alien unacceptable tendencies. In the formation of the personality it is used as soldiers are used against a foe. While a feeling of solidarity binds the citizens of a nation into a integrated whole, the aggression of the inhabitants is used—as army and navy—against foreign foes, and—as police and legislation—against internal rebellious elements, in order to preserve the state.

In a quite similar manner, in each individual a part of the destruction instinct is directed against the environment, while another part, in order to protect the individual from inner tendencies which are hostile to the ego, is turned against the individual's own id. In any instance, its inner utilization destroys the unity of the *personality as a whole,* but protects the unity of the ego. The formation of an integrated ego is thus dependent not only on the combinatory function of Eros, but also on the protective function of the destruction instinct, directed as much against the id as against the outer world. The splitting of the personality due to the operation of the death instinct is found on a pathological scale only in the neuroses. In the neuroses, the sadistic trait in the super-ego gains its clearest expression, even though it be, leaving out of consideration the extreme case of suicide, mitigated by an erotic admixture. In normal individuals we see this internally utilized destruction instinct in an optimum fusion with Eros. The super-ego, because of this erotic charge, becomes included in the unitary ego, and there is no sign of its independent existence, which is so striking in the neuroses.

In the course of individual development, after the psychic organization is saturated with narcissistically utilized Eros, this

latter instinct becomes directed outward and leads to the production of higher entities. In the first place, in the form of genital sexuality, it unites the two sexes in the act of procreation. In its sublimated form Eros leads to the formation of the family, and then to the formation of society.

But even before this, even before Eros is directed outwardly, there takes place an outward flowing of the destruction instinct, by means of which the unifying synthetic task of Eros within the psychic system is made easier: for now that the death instinct is in part deflected to the outer world, Eros has only a diminished quantum of death instinct to combat. In this state, which corresponds to the first period of narcissism, the individual loves, generally speaking, only himself and hates his whole environment. To be sure, this schematic picture is true only as a most crass approximation. Even at a very early date there is a feebly trickling outward flow of Eros and a fusion with the outwardly directed death instinct. Even in the most primitive of the relations to objects, in the oral sadistic relation to the mother, the erotic admixture is already present. From this earliest phase the child continues to develop, through the *first phase* of anal sadism (as described by Abraham) with a gradual increase in erotic admixture to the *second phase* of anal sadism, in which the destructive tendency of the death instinct is already neutralized by the conservational tendency of a large erotic admixture. In the second phase of sadism, the object is no longer destroyed, but only conquered and exploited. Perhaps this phase corresponds to that one in social development where a conquered people is no longer put to death by the conqueror, but merely enslaved or, later, colonized.

It is only in the genital phase and in the service of reproduction that the influence of Eros dominates, although the destruction impulse, especially in active male genitality, takes an important part in the capture and possession of the mate. It appears, indeed, that just as there are two degrees of admixture corresponding to the two periods of the anal sadistic stage, similarly according to the degree of admixture of the two classes of instincts, there are

in the genital stage two periods; the relation between the sexes develops, by means of an ever increasing participation of erotic components, from a *war of the sexes into love.*

The first sublimation of the sexual impulse consists in the splitting off of a tender component from sensual sexuality. This tender component is the basis of the formation of the family, inasmuch as it serves to neutralize the hatred directed to the father. This process means the overcoming of the Œdipus complex and is the first step towards the formation of society. The desexualized love later expands to include not only the father but also the whole community of brothers, and thus leads to the formation of the state. Although in our ignorance of the individual processes of societal formation we do not claim any great significance for our assertion, we might nevertheless say that the overcoming of nationalism, that macroscopic repetition of narcissism, and the building of higher social units in the form of confederations of states is the future task of Eros.

But this description of the development of the instincts is almost too pretty to be true. The hidden rocks which lie in the path of this progressive development are present at each expansion of Eros on to higher units, at each sublimation. The danger takes its origin in the instinct defusion which ensues with every sublimation, and more specifically in the death instinct nascent during the defusion. As a neurosis is the result of an unassimilated instinct defusion, this point deserves more intensive discussion. As we shall see, the apostles of social revolution and of class war may find much that is instructive in these reflections.

The first sublimation is required of the psychic apparatus at the time of the overcoming of the Œdipus situation. Let us investigate the origin of the Œdipus complex in the light of Freud's theory of the two instinct qualities. During the course of these lectures we have often had occasion to consider the Œdipus complex from this point of view, the first occasion being our discussion of the compulsion neurosis. Consequently, a synthetizing exposition should now be sufficient.

The Eros which has been split off from primary narcissism

and turned outward participates to an ever increasing extent in the stages of instinct development just described, the oral sadistic, and the two phases of anal sadism, so that finally in the genital strivings, whose first object is the mother, it reaches its maximal degree of participation. The rest of the environment, that is to say, father, brothers and sisters, are at this time still largely the objects of the originally extraverted destruction instinct. In this period the major part of the Eros which is directed outward is required for the relation to the mother. The father is still hated. The quantities of Eros necessary to neutralize this hatred of the father are extracted from the sensual genital strivings for the mother, and the latter become desexualized or, to put it differently, sublimated into a tender attachment. As we have already stated, sublimation means a diminution in intensity, a dilution of the erotic component, for though the quantity of libido remains the same, there is now not only the mother but father and mother to receive this tenderness and love. With this diminution in intensity, there is necessarily liberated a quantum of the death instinct, which had been neutralized in the sensual genital relation. In the genital sexual striving both of these instinct qualities are present in an especially high concentration, and the withdrawal of Eros from this very explosive mixture leads to a sudden release of raw destruction instinct.

To find a place for this nascent quantum of destruction instinct is the problem, the solution of which is the most difficult task in the life of contemporary civilized human beings. It is only with difficulty that the liberated destruction instinct, unmixed with a new supply of Eros, can remain directed against the outer world. Since it is at first added to the aggression which originally was directed against the environment, and which at this time is largely directed against the father, the hostile negative attitude to the father becomes more acute. The painful experiences rebounding from attempts to satisfy these hate tendencies against the environment, in the form of counter aggression on the part of the persons attacked, lead to fear and in consequence of this to a returning of the destruction instinct against the individual's own self. To

be sure, it is possible for a part of the destruction instinct released at the time of sublimation to remain directed outward and diverted to objects less dangerous than the father, for example to inanimate objects, and then neutralized through a new admixture of sublimated Eros. In this manner arises the sadistically tinged investigating impulse of the child, his combatively colored games, and so forth. But even in normal development a part of the destruction instinct arising from the desexualization of the incestuous strivings is directed in the form of moral inhibitions (super-ego formation) against the living out of the instinctive urges. It appears that the future development of the child is decided to a large extent at this time of super-ego formation. Should the destruction instinct be directed inward to an excessive degree, should a shift in the proportion obtaining between the destructive tendencies that are directed outward, and those directed inward take place, very much to the disadvantage of the former, a neurosis is unavoidable. The consequences of an excessive turning inward we already know in the form of instinct restrictions, the result of which is the neurotic symptom. To be sure, even in normal development there is always a certain amount of returning of the death instinct against the id, which is manifest as the energy expended in repression. The following, however, is obvious: the more the destruction instinct can remain directed outward by means of ennobling through erotic neutralization, the more will the stability of the ego be protected from the backward flooding of destruction instinct, and the less must the erotic tendencies required for neutralization be withdrawn from the environment. The individual becomes less narcissistic and more expansive.

Under any circumstances it seems that whenever there is a system formation, the turning of the death instinct back against the former system, which now is to become part of a higher system, is unavoidable. For example, the development of the id into the ego takes place through the fact that a quantum of death instinct in the form of repression is directed for protective purposes against certain tendencies of the id. In this way there originates a more integrated part of the personality, namely, the

ego, but at the cost of a splitting in another part, the id. And similarly, primary narcissism gives place to secondary narcissism through the critique of the ego-ideal directing itself against the primary narcissistic tendencies and condemning them. And in like fashion, in every instance of a relation to an object, a quantum of death instinct is directed against the ego in the form of restraints and sacrifices which the ego makes for the benefit of the object. The process of state building also demands the surrender of private and family interests for the sake of the general welfare.

All these restraints on the interests of a lower level for the sake of a superior one can only be brought about with the coöperation of the death instinct. Hence there arise conflicts between individual and race, between family and caste, between caste and state. A tendency can apparently be overcome only with the aid of a counter investment, a charging of counter tendencies; for example, coprophilic tendencies are overcome through disgust, hate through pity, exhibitionism through modesty, and narcissism through self-critique. And therefore a system held together by means of Eros, such as narcissism, for example, can be sacrificed for the sake of a higher system only through a turning back of the death instinct. If it is true that every systematization becomes possible only through a deflecting outward of the death instinct, then the overcoming of a system already formed but antiquated can take place only if the process of deflecting the death instinct against the environment is partly reversed, so that it may become directed against the system to be relinquished and in part destroy it. Because of this an irrational something gains entrance into the course of development. If every development were in truth dependent on the destruction of the earlier organizations, we should be able to speak only of a see-sawing and not of progression. It is therefore obvious, and the formation of a neurosis is the best example, that the less the overcoming of a lower level is the result of a turning inward of the death instinct, and the more it is the result of a spontaneous outward streaming of Eros, the more stable will be the founda-

tion of the new organization. Melancholia is the best example for showing us on how volcanic a ground those relations to objects are built, which have been attained through a turning inward of the death instinct against the self—how little stable are those relations to objects founded on a strong sense of guilt. Even slight disturbances in such object relations set up a rapid back-flow of Eros, and the old narcissistic condition is regained. The overcoming of narcissism was not really genuine. It was based on a despotism of the super-ego.

These observations may perhaps serve as an answer to the annunciators of social revolution and class war. The arbitrary overcoming of a primitive condition always contains the danger of a regression to the earlier state. Knowledge of the dynamics of instinct development, and of the principles of psychological and biological system-formation, will become the basis for a future theory of the construction of a social system. These observations already teach us one thing: the less the death instinct is utilized to overcome the present system, the better will be the foundation of the newer, more inclusive system. The overcoming of the class-ruled state in favor of a democratic one should not take place through a turning in of the death instinct against the system which it is designed to overthrow; instead, it should be attained chiefly through an expansion of the unifying tendencies of Eros.

The conclusion from our considerations is that the death instinct itself, through being directed inward against existing organizations, is pressed into the service of development, inasmuch as it assists in overcoming primitive systems for the sake of higher ones. It may have a dangerous effect, for if its inward direction is excessively strong, it can only too easily destroy the system which it should merely overcome. In the process of development, however, the conserving principle is precisely the inclusion of the earlier systems in the newer ones. The more the earlier system can be saved and in a modified form included in the new system, the firmer will be the foundation of the new system. It seems, therefore, that an expansion of erotic attach-

ment to include new objects can be brought about only under the pressure of objective reality, the latter being represented within the system by the introverted death instinct, but that the optimal conditions for development obtain when the participation of the death instinct is kept at a minimum. This may be the case when the inertia of the erotic attachments is not too great, or to put it differently, when the expansive force of the erotic tendencies is high.

You have seen that our study of neurotic illness from this point of view has led us to the same conclusion that we reached from the purely dynamic study; namely, that the instinctual development seen in neurotics depends on undue restraints upon the instinctive urges. This is equivalent to saying that the primitive organizations are not taken over into the higher organizations in such a way that all of their utilizable elements are conserved and that those not utilizable receive an appropriate modification; but instead, the whole primitive organization is repressed *en bloc.* Thus, the earlier stage forever remains a threatening enemy for the higher stage, whose existence is guaranteed only by the sufficiency of the expenditure for repression. The destructive tendencies, which should be directed outward to overcome the resistance of objective reality to the individual's instinctive urges, are employed chiefly against the enemy within. Thus, the neurotic psyche is like a state in which all the armed forces are busied in keeping down an inner revolution, so that the state is incapable of taking any action in international affairs.

Viewed from the standpoint of the theory of instincts, the basis of the development of a neurosis is the excessive application of the *negative principle of development,* namely, the turning inward of the death instinct. The neurosis breaks out at the moment when these excessive restrictions on the instincts lead to the formation of reactions, in which the terroristically supported system is shaken by revolution. This breaking through of the restrained instincts, which we have already studied in detail in the first part of this course, is to be considered an attempt at healing in opposition to the destructive working of the death

instinct, since the latter no longer serves the purposes of development, but instead endangers the existence of the whole system. The different types of neuroses, then, are different types of acts of desperation, attempts to attach or fixate the inwardly directed death instinct. The variety which obtains among the clinical pictures arises in the first place from the quantity of death instinct which must be fixed, and secondly from the various restrained stages of development from which the breaking through of the repressed tendencies occurs. In conversion hysteria a neutralization of the death instinct takes place in a way similar to that found at the genital level. This demonstrates that previous development up to the genital level had taken place in a relatively normal manner, and that only the overcoming of the genitally colored incestuous attachment was effected with an excessive repressing activity. The compulsion neurotic, similarly, did not even succeed in the normal overcoming of the anal-sadistic level; its apparent mastery rested on force alone. If frustrations and disappointments in the environment lead to a new inward direction of death instinct, those products of development which stand on a shaky foundation collapse, and the reactive revolution has the significance of a return to the point at which the pathological development set in. The same is true for the manic-depressive neurosis, except that in this case the fixation or binding of the death instinct is even less successful. The fixation corresponds to that obtaining in the early infantile oral sadistic stage, in which the aggressive tendencies are as yet unfused with any appreciable quantity of Eros. The deeper the neurotic regression, the more starkly does the death instinct come into view. It could hardly be otherwise, since the whole process of instinctual development consists in a gradual and increasing erotization of the death instinct.

The deepest regressions, such as those seen in the late stages of schizophrenia, can as yet not be adequately described in terms of the theory of instincts. It appears that the instinct fusion which occurs in schizophrenic conditions corresponds to one of the prenatal stages of organization of the two instincts with which

we are not as yet familiar. It may be that here we have an extremely interpenetrating and complete fusion of the instincts, in which the two instinct qualities are of equal intensity, somewhat as they occur in the genital fusion. The fundamental difference between this organization of the instincts and all others consists in the fact that in this case both instincts stand in no sort of relation to the outer world. It is easy to assume that after birth a sudden turning of the death instinct against the outer world takes place, through which the Eros instinct, completely undisturbed, may be utilized for inner purposes. The essential meaning of all development from birth on would then be that gradually more and more Eros, originally utilized narcissistically, is drawn upon for the neutralization of the outwardly directed death instinct. In the prenatal state, both instinct qualities seem to be present to a most limited extent; the death instinct seems to be in a state of complete rest. But the upbuilding erotic energies as well are still supplied to a large extent by the maternal organism.

According to this view, in schizophrenic regression the inner utilization of the death instinct would be so complete that all the object libido available would have to be sacrificed for its neutralization, whereas all other neuroses represent an autoplastic, even though frequently quite primitive, relation to objects.

The perspective which Freud's theory of the two basic instincts opens for us allows us a deeper understanding of the process which takes place during a therapeutic psychoanalysis. If the neuroses have arisen from an excessive introversion of the death instinct, then it is this process which treatment must attempt to reverse. A schematic presentation of the analytic process may therefore distinguish between two main phases: the aggression which is turned inward against the self must in the first place be deflected back against the environment, so that then, in the second phase, it may become neutralized by erotic quantities taken from those hitherto used for narcissistic purposes. At the moment when the death instinct again turns against the environment, the Eros quantities hitherto used for narcissistic purposes become

free for the establishment of relations with objects. Their inner utilization becomes superfluous. This whole process takes place in the transference. Every individual psychoanalysis must therefore go through a period of *negative transference*. Usually a long preparatory labor is necessary before this phase is reached. Then only gradually does the negative transference become overlaid or at any rate, neutralized by slowly outward flowing narcissistic libido. This secondary positive transference, which occurs after the negative phase is overcome, must not be confused with that primary positive transference which the patient brings into the analysis, the remnant of his free available capacity for love, which the neurosis has spared.

Two psychological factors play the chief rôle in these processes. Those infantile intimidations, which were the occasion for the excessive turning inward of the death instinct, give place to *trust* in the analyst. The first result of this trust is that neurotic fear diminishes, and the first reward for this trust (at the same time, the first success of the analyst) is that the latter becomes the target for the hatred which now dares to make its appearance. Only at this point does there occur the first *conscious* sense of guilt, since the patient, who has the analyst to thank for the first mitigation in his condition, now dares to hate him. At the same time, there takes place an accumulation of narcissistic libido, which no longer finds endopsychic utilization. Under the pressure of the sense of guilt and of this accumulation of libido, there occurs an outward flowing of Eros and a fixation of the death instinct.

The result of an analysis, therefore, is assured only if we have succeeded in coaxing out the death instinct, and in getting it turned against us. With this the analysis is not yet at an end, even though many analyses break off at this point. If this hatred, which is now directed against the environment, does not become fixed through Eros, then, although an analysis broken off at this point, with the patient harboring negative feelings toward the physician, may produce a transitory improvement, nevertheless it cannot be considered finished. The non-erotized externally

directed aggression can have only one fate—sooner or later it must be turned back against the individual's own self. The human psychic apparatus is not an independent system; it forms part of a higher system, the social group. The person living in a group can not permanently cling to the standpoint of hatred. And you must not think that this turning inward of hatred so that it becomes directed against the individual's own self, the basis of all mental disease, can take place only under the pressure of objective reality; it also takes place without any reprisal on the part of the environment through the burden of a bad conscience. Conscience is that power in the personality which forces a human being beyond his individuality into a higher system, into the social group.

Fear of conscience arose from objective fear, but became independent of it and autonomous. When the captain of a sinking ship first saves the lives of all on board, and himself goes down with the ship, he proves that his conscience is a greater force than his fear of death.

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